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This study seeks to explore the nature of imperial fascism, particularly those 
projects carried out by Italian and French fascists and authoritarians in North Africa from 
1934 to 1943. In the wake of world war and a worldwide depression, these fascists were 
mindful of the limitations of the territorial nation-state, and believed that imperial 
structures would have to be created and maintained in order to protect the sovereignty of 
their nations. A shared set of ideas about the past and future of the Mediterranean provided 
French and Italian rightists an ideological opportunity to cooperate, but geopolitical 
differences and national egoism ensured that each would go their own way. With the failure 
of the so-called “Latin union”, both the French and Italian rightists sought to convince 
North Africans that only the far-right could bring about modernity while protecting Islam 
from secularism and communist atheism. While most North Africans rejected the fascist 
advances, some responded positively for a variety of reasons, though generally in ways 
that failed to correspond to the fascist visions of a new geopolitical order. In a bid to show 
their respect for Islam, fascists also employed several strategies to govern North African 
Muslims; foremost of these were the attempts to integrate the elites into youth 
 vii 
organizations and a greater involvement in supporting Islamic practices in ways that 
depoliticized religion and linked it to the state. The governing techniques, despite 
attenuating some critiques of colonialism, did little to stem the growing desire for 
independence. Furthermore, the fascist rejection of liberal norms and values was 
unacceptable to most North Africans who hoped to either greatly reform colonial structures 
or to gain self-determination. Though French and Italians failed to legitimize their imperial 
projects, studying their attempts highlights the various ways in which fascists adjusted their 
ideas and practices in order to carry out transnational and imperial politics. 
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Note on Transilateration and Translation 
When possible, Arabic names and words have been transliterated using the IJMES system, 
without long vowel indications and diacritical marks. At times, when the Arabic original 
is not available, names are given with the often rough and inconsistent spellings used in 
French and Italian documents. All translations are my own, unless they lead to a reference 
in English. 
 1 
Introduction 
 During the interwar years and into World War II, fascists and authoritarian rightists 
sought to re-establish the basis of flagging imperial structures. Even with the introduction 
of a League of Nations Mandate system which presupposed the eventual independence of 
numerous peoples, and the rapidly expanding momentum of independence movements 
throughout the British and French empires, fascists believed they could salvage the global 
dominance of the West. Fascists believed that retreating into limited, territorial nation-
states would condemn a people to submission to larger geopolitical forces. Only 
incorporating foreign lands and peoples into an imperial nation-state would guarantee 
security, prosperity, and independence. Theirs was a brief and often violent attempt, and 
today appears all the more anachronistic since decolonization rapidly followed in the wake 
of World War II. Yet the study of the fascist imperial project provides important insights 
into fascism as a global force, one that aggressively aimed at imperial maintenance and 
expansion, while also claiming to be a universal alternative to liberalism and communism. 
This study will explore the attempts by Italian and French fascists to theorize and 
construct imperial spaces that would reflect far-rightist values and goals. Given the narrow 
period of time within which this project occurred (roughly 1930-1943), the purpose is not 
to compare two different models, but rather to gain a broader view of what constituted 
fascist imperialism. For the Italian fascists, building a Mediterranean empire was essential 
not only for geopolitical goals, but also to accelerate an anthropological revolution by 
which Italians would become totalitarian citizens. In the case of French rightists, fascist 
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political parties during the Popular Front Period (1936-1938), notably the Parti Populaire 
Français, argued that empire would be the salvation of a supposedly weakened and 
degenerate France. During the Vichy regime, authoritarian conservatives and fascists had 
a brief window (June 1940-November 1942) to implement a series of colonial reforms. 
Together, the French and Italian experiences of far-rightist imperialism reveal some of the 
core components of what can be called a fascist model of imperialism. 
By employing the concept of fascist imperialism, we must identify how such a 
project differed from the liberal version. In no way does this differentiation aim to absolve 
or apologize for liberal imperialism. In fact, certain continuities existed between liberal and 
fascist imperialism in both the French and Italian cases.1 A few examples will suffice: 
Liberal colonial regimes often maintained rigid hierarchies of race that differed little from 
that imposed by Fascist Italy. And while Italy was busy with its brutal suppression of 
Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican resistance in Libya, Republican France was crushing the Rif 
revolt in Morocco, and shelling Damascus during the Druze uprising of 1925-1927.2 
Yet while Republican France and Great Britain fought an interwar rear-guard action 
against anti-colonial movements and demands for independence, Fascist Italy and Vichy 
France aggressively asserted their imperial rights. In the case of Italy, the regime was even 
willing to do so against the opprobrium of much of the world during the invasion of 
                                                 
1 Nicola Labanca demonstrates how liberal Italy’s colonial efforts included their own fair share 
of abuses of power and instances of lawless violence. Labanca, “Italian Colonial Internment”, in 
Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller (eds.), Italian Colonialism (New York, 2008), pp. 27-30. 
2 For French methods of violence in Syria, see Daniel Neep, Occupying Syria under the French 
Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation (New York, 2012). 
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Ethiopia in 1935-1936. Fascists were also willing to celebrate colonial violence as 
regenerative, rather than pushing it under the rug as liberal governments were likely to do. 
However, it would be short-sighted to conclude that fascist imperialism was merely an 
unmasked liberal imperialism, or liberal imperialism without any ethical or humane 
considerations. Fascists were certainly willing to apply merciless tools of violence to 
isolate and destroy internal opposition in the quest for unquestioned sovereignty. But just 
as the classical Marxist interpretation of fascism as a last-ditch defense of capitalism is 
reductive, there is more to the story of fascist imperialism than mere unbridled violence in 
defense of a failed liberal maintenance of colonial power. 
Our knowledge of fascist imperialism is still underdeveloped given the attention 
paid to both fascism and empire. A promising start was made by Hannah Arendt, who 
identified imperialism as a key precursor to twentieth-century totalitarianism. In particular, 
she pointed to the outwardly directed nationalism of the “alliance of mob and capital” and 
the racist nature of an enterprise that undermined the allegedly universal values of Europe. 
With pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism, imperialism was unleashed within Europe itself, 
to the irreparable damage of law.3 Arendt’s linking of nineteenth-century imperialism and 
twentieth-century European violence still inspires detailed studies and theoretical 
considerations,4 yet, unsurprisingly for a theory directed at explaining central and eastern 
                                                 
3 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Orlando, 1994), pp. 123-266. 
4 Enzo Traverso, The Origins of Nazi Violence, trans. Janet Lloyd (New York, 2003), pp. 47-75; 
Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial 
Germany (Ithaca, 2005); Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, Coloniser, Exterminer: sur la guerre et 
l’état colonial (Paris, 2005). 
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European history, has limited application to the French and Italian cases.5 Arendt argues 
that imperialists hoped to expand without extending their nation’s body-politic, or in the 
case of the Nazis, as Enzo Traverso demonstrates, to extend the body-politic through racial 
extermination and resettlement.6 Yet French and Italian fascists sought precisely to 
stabilize imperialism through incorporating colonized peoples into a body-politic defined 
by hierarchy, stability, and European supremacy instead of the liberal values of freedom 
and equality. 
While Arendt and others have brought to light the imperialist influence on fascism, 
less is known about the fascist influence on empire. Surveys by important historians of 
fascism, though often stressing its expansionist tendencies, have little to say about what 
exactly constituted the fascist view of empire, and how imperial subjects would be treated 
by fascist regimes.7 Mark Mazower has examined Nazi history in light of empire,8 and 
Davide Rodogno has done similar work on Italian occupied territories during World War 
II. While critiquing the myth of Italians as “humanitarian” fascists as opposed to the 
ruthless Nazis, Rodogno also recognizes that a gulf separated a Nazi imperialism 
predicated on extermination and slavery, and Italian plans to create satellite states in 
                                                 
5 Arendt also considered fascist Italy to have been a “nontotalitarian dictatorship” like those in 
interwar Hungary, Portugal, and nationalist Spain, partly due to its placement of the state above 
the fascist party movement. Arendt, Origins, pp. 257-259, 308-309. 
6 Arendt, Origins, p. 135; Traverso, Origins, pp. 71-75. 
7 Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York, 2005); Stanley G. Payne, A History of 
Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison, 1995); Roger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a 
Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler (New York, 2007). 
8 Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York, 2008). 
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Europe while placing non-European populations under permanent tutelage.9 French and 
Italian rightists, though sometimes influenced by Nazis, developed their own visions and 
practices for empire. Recent studies on Italian colonialism and French rightists in Algeria 
have begun to paint a more detailed picture, but remain limited in scope. In the case of 
Italian colonialism, many of these studies have focused on culture, from architecture and 
tourism to film.10 This study, while still drawing from these works, shifts the focus back to 
the political. The central question is how French and Italian fascists could first conceive of 
a political space existing in the Mediterranean, and then how other actors could be 
politically integrated into their projets of imperial maintenance and expansion. Studies on 
fascist appeals to Muslims, particularly to rile up hatred and distrust of liberal colonialism, 
view such entreaties as largely instrumental ploys,11 though it is clear that fascists were 
also strongly interested in laying the groundword for a positive relationship between fascist 
imperial governance and Muslim populations.  
A start towards an understanding of a French and Italian fascist imperialism can be 
made through two concepts articulated by the controversial German legal theorist Carl 
Schmitt (1888-1985).  While it may appear strange at first glance to look to a German with 
Nazi--associations for an interpretation of French and Italian imperialism, it is important 
                                                 
9 Davide Rodogno, Il Nuovo Ordine Mediterraneo: Le politiche di occupazione dell’Italia 
fascista in Europa (1940-1943) (Turin, 2003), pp. 91-100, 476-484. 
10 Ruth Ben-Ghiat, Italian Fascism’s Empire Cinema (Bloomington, 2015); Mia Fuller, Moderns 
Abroad: Architecture, cities and Italian imperialism (London, 2010); Brian L. McLaren, 
Architecture and Tourism in Italian Colonial Libya: An Ambivalent Modernism (Seattle, 2006). 
11 Manuela A. Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East, 1935-1940 (New York, 2006); Nir Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 
1933-1940 (New York, 2010). 
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to remember that Schmitt, as a highly respected conservative intellectual and jurist, was 
well-placed to articulate the sometimes-confused and contradictory worldview of the 
European right. The two concepts proposed by Schmitt that are critical for this study are 
the friend/enemy distinction as the core of the sphere of the political, and the great-space 
theory of geopolitics. 
THE FRIEND-ENEMY DISTINCTION 
Famously, in The Concept of the Political (1932), Schmitt argued that the political, 
like religion, economics, or aesthetics, maintains its own autonomous sphere. This sphere 
is determined by the “friend-enemy distinction”; the ability of a decision-maker to identify 
the friends and enemies of the political community. For Schmitt, the political was not a 
space of intellectual debate, or competition between utilitarian or rational systems, but of 
existential struggle that always presupposed the possibility of war and physical violence.12 
The decision to engage in such a struggle could not be made on the basis of atomized 
individualism, but only by a sovereign, an actor existing both within and without the 
political community who would speak in its name. Any members of the political 
community who wished to escape from the ensuing friend-enemy distinction could be 
freely removed.13 
One may wonder what exactly was at the root of the existential nature of the 
political. Why did politics have to be a zero-sum game, instead of an art of compromise, 
                                                 
12 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, 2007), pp. 19-37. 
13 Ibid., pp. 45-52.  
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even if agonistic?14 As a staunch conservative, Schmitt saw the potential necessity of every 
political community to defend its “way of life” and its “form of existence”.15 For example, 
religion is separate from the political sphere, but if a religious way of life is threatened, 
then the possibility of a political grouping based on the defense of that religious way of life 
exists. Such a political grouping can only exist if another grouping constitutes a threat-such 
is the antagonistic essence of the political for Schmitt.16 
The link between the friend-enemy distinction and fascism should be clear. As an 
ideology, fascism thrived off the ever-present possibility of violence that would regenerate 
a political (national) community. To think of the many groups victimized in Nazi 
concentration camps is enough to understand the power of this existential distinction in the 
fascist worldview. Yet the focus of this study will lie less on the “enemy” side of the 
distinction, but rather on the “friend”. Given the aggressive and exclusivist nature of fascist 
movements, on what basis could political friendships be developed? And in particular, how 
could such friendships work outside of the ethnic national political grouping at the core of 
fascist states? In short, how could fascists hope to turn imperial subjects into “friends”? 
Before directly addressing this question, it is helpful to review how the fascists 
hoped to deal with a group that shared some similarities with the colonial subject: the 
proletarian worker. Just as Schmitt’s notion of the political sacrificed domestic politics for 
                                                 
14 Chantal Mouffe argues that an “agonistic” politics is possible within liberalism, a possibility 
that Schmitt does not admit. Mouffe, Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (London, 2013), 
pp. 137-139. 
15 Schmitt, Concept, p. 27. 
16 Ibid., pp. 37-45. 
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international politics by envisaging an authoritarian political community mobilized in 
opposition to foreign enemies, fascist states hoped to depoliticize their political 
communities so as to reduce the possibility of domestic conflicts during wartime.17 For 
some groups, particularly that of Jews, such a desire could lead to ostracization, the 
stripping of legal rights, internment, and even death. But for others, like the worker, 
whether industrial or agricultural, the fascist strategy was absorption into the community. 
On the level of domestic politics, the worker then had to be torn away from the enemy 
groupings of socialism and communism, and turned into fascist friends. 
AMBIGUOUS FRIENDS: FROM THE WORKER TO THE COLONIAL SUBJECT 
The debates on this issue reveal the ambiguity of the category of the worker in 
fascist thought and practice. The crux of the matter was the political potential of the worker. 
Was the worker a possible candidate for a new class of political elites? Or a dangerous 
receptacle of communist or anarchic ideas? Should workers wield domestic political power 
in a corporatist system? Or should they be depoliticized through nationalist state 
institutions? If the friend-enemy distinction was often clear, as it was with Jews and 
communists, then the fascist view of industrial workers was rather ambiguous.  
The closest Italian fascism came to declaring the worker an enemy occurred during 
the squadrista assaults on socialist and communist organizations in response to a wave of 
strikes and leftist demonstrations in 1919-1920. For Schmitt, any political state could, “in 
                                                 
17 Serge Sur, “Ami, ennemi: le politique selon Carl Schmitt”, in Serge Sur (ed.), Carl Schmitt: 
Concepts et usages, (Paris, 2014), pp. 238-239. 
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a critical situation, decide upon a domestic enemy.”18 During the years of squadrismo 
violence, Italian fascists essentially declared leftist organizations to be enemies of the 
Italian nation. They did so in the name of a state allegedly left powerless to make a decision 
by the weaknesses of the liberal regime. Yet, just as quickly as the fascists violently 
suppressed leftist worker associations and unions, they attempted to create their own. 
According to Emilio Gentile, a key proponent of the March on Rome, the former anarcho-
syndicalist Michele Bianchi, understood that the fascists needed to control the state as 
quickly as possible in order to imbue fascist unions with political power before the hesitant 
workers revolted.19 
Once in power, former anarcho-syndicalists like Bianchi aligned more closely with 
the Italian Nationalist Association than with socialists. The syndicalists promoted Italian 
industrial development even at the cost of the well-being of the workers in order to free 
Italy from its subservient role vis-à-vis the “plutocratic” powers of Great Britain and 
France. This was an uneasy alliance. For nationalists, led by Alfredo Rocco, the 
consumption of workers had to be pushed down to facilitate capital accumulation. The role 
of the state was to oversee this limitation of worker consumption while playing a protective 
role against over-zealous employers.20 The syndicalists still hoped that the state itself could 
be constituted by elite syndicalist workers and soldiers, who, with a productivist and 
                                                 
18 Schmitt, Concept, p. 46. 
19 Emilio Gentile, E fu subito regime: Il fascismo e la marcia su Roma (Bari, 2012), pp. 103-104, 
130-135. 
20 A. James Gregor, Mussolini’s Intellectuals: Fascist Social and Political Thought (Princeton, 
2005), pp. 44, 50-51. 
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nationalist ethics, and control over economic decisions, would accomplish the goals of the 
nationalists without the need for coercive measures.21 
The 1927 Charter of Labor settled the debate between syndicalists and nationalists 
by establishing a basic framework that would be expanded upon, but whose principles 
would remain largely untouched. While Italian industrialists hoped to maintain the status-
quo, the syndicalists argued that their fascist unions should co-ordinate national production 
as public institutions with considerable power. In a compromise largely inspired by Rocco, 
Mussolini decided upon employing the fascist state as a means of mediating between 
unions of workers and employers organized in state-run institutions.22 
Henceforth, the fascist regime consistently restricted wages and banned strikes 
while instituting various compensatory social programs. Some of these, like the 
Dopolavoro (Afterwork), an institution designed to organize new forms of leisure for 
workers, had the express intent of reducing the political demands of workers by providing 
forms of depoliticized public life. However, the failure of the syndicalists to achieve a 
prominent position of political power for workers did not end the continued valorization of 
the “producer” as a favored group in an imaginary world of social cohesion. Left-fascists 
continued to experiment with ideas of “productivist values” as a means of aligning fascist 
interests with those of workers.23 Though largely unsuccessful, the Italian fascist attempt 
                                                 
21 Ibid., pp. 72-73, 78-79. 
22 Alessio Gagliardi, Il corporativismo fascista (Bari, 2010), pp. 26-69. 
23 Giuseppe Parlato, La Sinistra Fascista: Storia di un progetto mancato (Bologna, 2000), pp. 
177-225. 
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to neutralize the political opposition of the workers also proposed a positive view of the 
worker as a potential carrier of fascist values. 
From a theoretical perspective, the most fascinating rightist analysis of the role of 
the worker is that of Ernst Jünger (1895-1998), who explored the issue in his 1932 book, 
The Worker (Der Arbeiter). Not only did Jünger’s analysis provide an interesting answer 
to the question of the industrial worker, but also allows us to shift our focus from the worker 
figure to the colonial subject. Along with Carl Schmitt, Jünger was a prominent intellectual 
leader of Germany’s Conservative Revolutionary movement. Rather than defend purely 
reactionary positions, Jünger sought to turn the experiences of total war and mass-
mobilization during the Great War into the founding moment for a new type of man 
opposed to the individualist/mass man of bourgeois society. The new man, called the 
Worker, would reject the liberal heritage of socialism, including a belief in progress and 
class identity, in favor of a desire to radically transform the planet through a profound 
assimilation with technology. The Worker was therefore not a class figure, but a type of 
man who had experience with technology, mobilization, sacrifice, and pain.24 Though 
industrial workers and veterans of the Great War were most likely to have adopted this 
“style of life”, the features of the Worker were quickly appearing in every facet of life. The 
act of reading news-briefings on a bus, of watching a film, of playing a sport; these all 
constituted a world of total work that undermined the bourgeois order and gave way to the 
                                                 
24 The idea that the Worker figure would freely accept pain and sacrifice, stressed by Jünger, was 
also a common theme among Italian fascists, who expected corporatist institutions to habituate 
workers to such hardships in the name of the political goals of the national community. Ernst 
Jünger, L’operaio: dominio e forma, trans. Quirino Principe (Parma, 2010), p. 68. 
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Worker who desired a totalitarian state based on mobilization and grand projects. The 
prophetic vision of the Worker therefore expanded the typical fascist concept of a 
“trenchocracy” of Great War veterans capable of instituting a novel form of politics, to 
wider segments of society. 
Since Jünger’s vision is characteristically vague and mystical at times, it is unclear 
exactly what the new worker state would look like. Even more ambiguous are the 
consequences for the geopolitical order. Jünger argues that the Worker will initiate a 
planetary transformation, and forecasts that as the new form of true Worker socialism 
becomes authoritarian, Worker nationalism will become imperial. As the Worker seeks to 
employ his use of technology in ever greater projects, imperial spaces are incorporated into 
the Worker State. While this stage of the process is clear, the place of non-nationals 
residing in those imperial spaces is not. Are they to be a permanent underclass to the “race” 
of European workers? Will the all-encompassing world of work eventually incorporate 
non-Europeans into the totalitarian state? Jünger, probably unsure himself, provides some 
guesses that forecast the difficulties of fascists in formulating their imperial states. To start 
with, Jünger recognized that the liberal bourgeois order hypocritically justified the 
exploitation of colonial peoples through their claims to universal progress, 
humanitarianism, and civilizing progress. Yet that same discourse undermined the colonial 
order and threatened a sort of global anarchy. Regarding the claims of colonial peoples, 
Jünger was of two minds. Echoing Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, Jünger claimed that 
the conflict between the liberal bourgeois order and that of totalitarian work should draw 
in actors from every corner of the globe, suggesting that “we must recognize our true allies 
 13 
wherever they can be found. They are there where one does not demand conservation, but 
an assault; we are heading for a general situation in which every conflict, wherever in the 
world it breaks out, will strengthen our position.”25 From this perspective, colonial unrest 
promised to help undo the liberal order. 
Yet other considerations put this potential alliance of Workers and the colonized 
into question. Colonial revolt was not based on the Worker figure, but on the same liberal-
democratic principles propounded by the Europeans. Jünger particularly feared that the 
principle of self-determination would lead to a Balkanization of certain areas of the world, 
with “natural”, rather than “historic”, forces coming to the fore with anarchy in tow.26 With 
the re-imposition of new empires based on work, what would happen to the forces of 
decolonization? According to Jünger, the process would lead to a new round of colonial 
wars defined by a dramatic difference in technological means.  
One of the most unpleasant prospects is undoubtedly the possibility that small and 
weak peoples, rooted in their ancient and natural terrain, will undergo violence from 
the second-rate powers that employ superior means without the responsibility that 
their use entails. This gives all the more reason to hope that there will emerge 
powers capable of founding empires whose interiors are guaranteed protection, and 
that one will be able to speak of a world tribunal of which we see a caricature in the 
sad farce of the League of Nations.27 
How exactly the subjects of the new imperial states would shift from aspiring to the liberal-
democratic model to accepting a totalitarian worker state is not described. And here lies 
the aporia in Jünger’s argument: if the colonized would side with the Worker against the 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 147. 
26 Ibid., pp. 224-225. 
27 Ibid., pp. 220-225. 
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bourgeois order so as to attain the unrealized ideals of the liberal order, then what would 
be the basis of further co-operation? Jünger believed that the mobilization of the colonized 
during World War I did not lead to the revelation of the Worker as in Europe, but rather to 
the heightened desire for the rights of the bourgeois individual within a traditional nation-
state. By never describing the mechanism by which the colonized could attain the ranks of 
the Worker, Jünger deprives them of a role after the overthrow of the liberal order. 
Afterwards, they can only submit to the initially raw violence of the Worker states and 
hope for subsequent stability. That Jünger remarks upon the ability of the colonized to 
borrow from liberalism, but does not reflect on their potential to become Workers points 
to a gap in his advocacy for a new imperialism. What if they employed the same tools as 
the European Workers to resist this advance? If the end goal of the Worker state was to re-
introduce order and stability into the world, how could this be guaranteed without an 
articulation of the novel imperial structure? Indeed, as we will see, one of the “second-rate 
powers” that Jünger was probably referring to, Fascist Italy, did brutally put down “small 
and weak peoples”. Yet when it turned to the organization of its new empire, defined in 
contrast to those of the “plutocratic” states, it struggled mightily to legitimize itself. If 
fascism was able to tentatively solve the riddle of the worker in its own eyes, then Jünger’s 
inability to theorize a basis for an imperial order was a harbinger of a more difficult 
conundrum: how to unleash a virulently nationalist movement onto an imperial project.  
THE GREAT-SPACE AS A POLITICAL SOLUTION 
While Jünger could only offer vague and prophetic guesses as to what spatial 
reorganizations would occur under the aegis of the Worker, Carl Schmitt provided a more 
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detailed account of what was likely to occur. Though Schmitt’s earlier writings revolved 
around the nature of politics, sovereignty, and secularism, he later shifted his sights to 
international law. During World War II and the early Cold War, Schmitt argued that the 
universalist values of liberal-democratic powers had undermined state sovereignty while 
intensifying armed conflict. Schmitt believed that only a pluralistic world-order structured 
by regional super-powers could restore order and moderation to international law. 
Though Schmitt’s prognostications have recently raised interest in an increasingly 
plural world in which state sovereignty seems to be under constant attack, the means by 
which regional super-powers can be constituted into coherent political spaces remains 
unclear. Certainly, Schmitt’s own experiences in this regard were disappointing. In his 
1939 lecture/book The Grossraum Principle of International Law, Schmitt argued that 
Germany was particularly well-situated geographically and historically to play the role of 
a non-universalist regional power. As Georges-Henri Soutou has demonstrated, Schmitt’s 
vision of a large German political space was largely at odds with the biological racist plans 
of many Nazi leaders.28 Though the extreme Nazi policies in the East were contrary to 
Schmitt’s ideals, the Italian conceptions of imperial rule corresponded much more closely 
to the future world-order articulated in The Grossraum Principle. While Italians elaborated 
their vision independently of Schmitt, the book was translated into Italian in 1941 and 
influential imperial officials took an interest in it.29 A quick survey of Schmitt’s The 
                                                 
28 Georges-Henri Soutou, “Carl Schmitt et les ‘grands espaces’ dans le context de l’Allemagne 
nationale-socialiste”, in Serge Sur (ed.), Carl Schmitt, pp. 24-31. 
29 ASMAE, Sottosegretario per gli Affari Albanese, B. 213, F. vol. “Il Concetto d’Impero nel 
Diritto Internazionale” di Carl Schmitt, Jacomini to Corrias, 6 February 1942. 
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Grossraum Principle will therefore clarify some of the problems of Italian imperial 
thinking before briefly examining a similar statement by an influential Italian hierarch. 
In The Grossraum Principle, the conception of the political as the friend-enemy 
distinction is fully transplanted onto an international level, a move that Schmitt would 
continue in the post-war years in Nomos of the Earth and Theory of the Partisan. Schmitt 
had built up to these ideas with previous works; in the wake of League of Nations sanctions 
against Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia, he argued that the attempt to build a universal 
liberal-democratic order through the League had weakened sovereign states while 
criminalizing the formerly legal right of such states to declare war. As a result, war was no 
longer a bracketed affair between two legitimate entities, but rather a police action between 
a universal and just power, and a criminal outcast.30 Even in The Concept of the Political, 
Schmitt condemned the false humanitarianism of liberal colonialism since such regimes 
had particular, and not universal goals and interests, yet appropriated the notion of 
humanity to deny rights to their enemies.31 
Despite these criticisms, Schmitt was not advocating a return to the political 
freedom of the nation-state. What he called “economic-industrial organizational 
development” had reached a point where spatially limited national structures would no 
longer be sufficient.32 The only way to compromise between economic globalization and 
                                                 
30 Carl Schmitt, “The Turn to the Discriminating Concept of War”, in Carl Schmitt, Writings on 
War, ed. Timothy Nunan (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 30-33. 
31 Schmitt, Concept, pp. 54-55. 
32 Schmitt, “The Großsraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intevention for Spatially 
Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law (1939-1941)”, in 
Schmitt, Writings on War, pp. 77-79, 111. 
 17 
politics was to establish “great spaces”. The American Monroe Doctrine served as a 
historical model for Schmitt, who saw American control over the Western Hemisphere as 
a more stable and coherent political space than the far-flung and scattered British Empire. 
While the former implicitly recognized spatial forms, the latter opened up British rule to 
claims of dangerous universalism.33 Up to this point, Schmitt’s argument has been clear 
and penetrating. Yet, the content of his spatial forms is murky, and did not become too 
much clearer with later additions to the main text. With the critique of international law 
out of the way, the way forward appears quite problematic. What constitutes his political 
space? How is it organized into a political structure that can replace his ideal Westphalian 
system-era state? 
That particular and not abstract space is intimately related to politics is quite clear 
in Schmitt’s perspective. “For us”, he writes, “there are neither spaceless political ideas 
nor, reciprocally, spaces without ideas or principles of space without ideas. It is an 
important part of a determinable political idea that a certain nation carries it and that it has 
a certain opponent in mind, through which this political idea gains the quality of the 
political”.34 As we see at the end, Schmitt’s definition of the political rears its head in 
geopolitics, as any “great space” must contain ideas and principles in opposition to a 
competitor. Consequently, during World War II, Schmitt asserted that one major role of 
the German Grossraum would be to oppose the assimilationist spaces of the liberal-
democratic West and the revolutionary Bolshevik East. Having identified the political 
                                                 
33 Ibid., pp. 83-95. 
34 Ibid., p. 87. 
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enemies, Schmitt had to find the positive content for the German space. This was to be the 
protection of the nation, understood as a cultural community. In characteristic terms, 
Schmitt described the German Reich as having “the holy honor of defending a non-
universalistic, volkisch order of life with respect for the nation.”35 A Grossraum that 
protected “forms of existence” and “ways of life” would then eliminate the existential 
threat to communities, and thereby eradicate the political within the great-space. Just as the 
worker could be subsumed within a broader political community, so too would smaller 
nations and ethnic groups. Such secondary groups within the Grossraum would be 
protected from the existential threat of competing geopolitical entities; as always with 
Schmitt, the political would be shifted to the borders. 
The problem, never addressed by Schmitt, was the unlikeliness that such a 
Grossraum could eliminate the smaller nations’ desire for sovereignty. During the period 
of decolonization, Schmitt touched on this problem in his analysis of the partisan figure. A 
traditional “telluric” partisan, rooted in the protection of local freedoms and ways of life, 
was acceptable to Schmitt, as such resistance could still fall under legal norms. Yet 
partisans engaged in a struggle defined globally, and influenced by third parties such as the 
Soviet Union, inevitably led to the elimination of bracketed war and the introduction of 
“absolute enmity”.36 As we will see, fascists often saw Arabs and Muslims as servants of 
universal and revolutionary movements such as pan-Islamism and communism. Despite 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p. 102. 
36 Carl Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan: Intermediate Commentary on the Concept of the 
Political, trans. G.L. Ulmen (New York, 2007), pp. 81-95. 
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understanding the possibility that North Africans could then become an “absolute enemy”, 
fascists also hoped that those same North Africans could become a type of partisan engaged 
in a struggle against liberalism and communism. A third alternative-conceding soverign 
status to North African nations-was out of the question. As a result, fascists were forced to 
envision North Africans as “friends” in a regional grouping defined by a global ideological 
struggle. Not all fascists agreed with such a strategy, with some remaining suspicious of 
North African intents. And of course, such a grouping of friends would require the free 
participation of North Africans who often had radically different goals. 
In the desire to downplay Arab nationalism, fascists relied on Orientalists, who 
confirmed theories that the Muslim and Arab worlds were culturally unified. While 
supposedly incapable of forming European-style nations or modern empires, Muslims were 
particularly receptive to global changes since an event in Morocco could elicit strong 
responses in Indonesia, and vice-versa. Such a view of a politically divided, but culturally 
unified Islamic World, proferred by Orientalists and specialists in the Middle East and 
North Africa, bolstered the view that fascist imperialism could be acceptable if it responded 
to cultural fears of liberalism and communism. European ideas of Islam then played a role 
in the belief that Arabs and Muslims would be amenable to something akin to Schmitt’s 
Grossraum- particularly in the case of Italy. 
Shortly after Schmitt began to publish his ideas on the Grossraum, one of the chief 
Italian fascist ideologues and hierarchs, Giuseppe Bottai, offered a brief summary of Italy’s 
vision of the post-war “new order”. Whereas Schmitt was concerned that the liberal and 
Soviet claims to universalism would preclude a stable and multipolar world order, Bottai 
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made the more common argument that Great Britain and France had guaranteed a 
revisionist war through their monopolization of colonial resources.37 Perhaps the bluntness 
of Bottai’s perspective can be attributed to his direct political involvement as a fascist 
hierarch, whereas Schmitt was largely commenting from the sidelines. Yet the two shared 
a suspicion of abstract universalism, and hoped that their countries would articulate novel 
forms of local universalisms to justify the creation of large geopolitical spaces. 
For Bottai, an Italian empire would be centered not on a universalism of values and 
norms, but on a “universal” spirit of justice that history had provided to the Italians. The 
lessons learned from the Roman Empire had allegedly taught Italians how to rule over a 
diverse array of Mediterranean peoples, with their differing languages, religions, and 
customs.38 So long as locals submitted to a universal Italian imperial hierarchy, local 
particularisms would remain intact. Bottai pointed to Italian policy in Libya, Ethiopia, and 
Albania as concrete proof of the Italian approach.39 Unwittingly or not, Bottai had followed 
Schmitt’s recipe for a fascist great-space: the preservation of the existential identity of the 
colonized from other world powers. 
Furthermore, Bottai’s conception of universalism privileged Italians, and was not a 
set of values to be borrowed by others. Indeed, universalism in this guise was synonymous 
with empire as a historically and geographically legitimated right to rule any who might 
fall under Italian sway. In this regard, when Bottai and other fascist ideologues wrote about 
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38 Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
39 Ibid., pp. 15-19. 
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universalism, they were somewhat close to what Schmitt had in mind when he foresaw a 
powerful nation-state acting as the sovereign figure of each Grossraum. Since the 
technological and economic development of each great space would require some 
sovereign animating figure, smaller nations would inevitably be placed under the direct 
control of its regional imperial ruler. For Schmitt, such an arrangement was necessitated 
by questions of international law and stability, as well as the protection of the sphere of 
sovereign politics against global economic forces. However, for a veteran corporatist like 
Bottai, the role of the imperial sovereign in the coming Axis-controlled great-spaces was 
intimately tied to corporatism. Until the excesses of private capitalism were curtailed by 
the state and redirected into equitable development schemes, turmoil would continue both 
in Italy and abroad. Since corporatism had supposedly resolved the domestic tensions 
within Italian capitalism, it was now a matter of extending the same principles to the Italian 
empire. Here the connection between the worker and the colonized subject as domestically 
depoliticized “friends” of the imperial fascist state is apparent. According to Bottai, the 
fascist state would protect imperial subjects just as it had protected the Italian proletariat.40 
Once imperial agricultural, commercial, and industrial interests were directed by the 
universal Italian state, the entire Mediterranean region would enter a new era of peace, 
prosperity, and justice. 
                                                 
40 Ibid., pp. 5-8. 
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CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
It is tempting to read Bottai’s rather hopeful vision as a utopian daydream during a 
flagging war effort, or a desperate bid to provide a rationale for a fascist regime that had 
grown weary and tired. Yet, Bottai did not write his pamphlet on a whim, but rather 
succinctly summarized an Italian imperial vision that had been decades in the making. This 
vision in turn had roots in French thought, and turned into a reinforcing circle by the time 
French fascists began to put forward their own imperial project. The first chapter will 
explore the French and Italian right’s fascination with empire, particularly in its 
Mediterranean possibilities. The intellectual similarities and links between the two 
constituted a shared discourse that was then employed in the interwar years, particularly 
by French settlers in North Africa, to promote a collaborative Franco-Italian (and 
sometimes Hispanic) project of “Latin” imperialism heavily inflected by fascist and 
authoritarian ideas. 
The failure of the “Latin” collaborative approach inspired attempts by both French 
and Italian rightists to engage a Muslim audience. The rest of the study will explore this 
fascist attempt to appeal to Muslims as political “friends”. In doing so, it will distinguish 
between two modes of communicating fascism. The first can be identified as something of 
an insurgent model. In this case, fascists spoke to Muslims as allies in a struggle against 
competing political groups. Since this strategy occurred when and where fascists did not 
exercise direct power, it offered Muslims more freedom to accept, reject, or appropriate 
fascist ideas. The second model was based on governance, and saw the attempt to 
depoliticize Muslims by offering protections for their “modes of existence” and “ways of 
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life”, as well as a certain level of integration into a highly ordered and hierarchical fascist 
colonial state. Any resistance to these programs or to European rule promised to be, and 
sometimes was, ruthlessly suppressed. 
Chapters Two and Three examine the insurgency model. Chapter Two focuses on 
the Italian attempts to spread fascist ideas into Tunisia and Egypt, two Mediterranean states 
whose direct or indirect control by Italy was deemed essential to the establishment of an 
Italian regional space. In both cases, fascist ideas were introduced partly by sizeable Italian 
communities, partly by regime propaganda. Such propaganda often did more to attack 
Great Britain and France than to defend or spread fascist values. More importantly, fascism 
encountered bourgeoning nationalist sentiments among Tunisians and Egyptians. Though 
the nationalist nature of fascism aroused some interest in these circles, the overwhelming 
desire to remain independent from any European power, as predicted by Jünger, did not 
bode well for Italian imperial expansion. 
While Chapter Two explores how Italian fascists tried to disrupt British and French 
colonies, Chapter Three explores how the French Parti Populaire Français’ (PPF) activities 
in Algeria sought to undermine French republican rule during the leftist Popular Front 
period. Concerned that Algerians would be drawn to leftist programs which would 
eventually encourage independence movements, the PPF elaborated a program to draw 
Muslims into their party. By incessantly critiquing the failures of socialists, communists, 
and Jews to a Muslim audience, and offering a program of cultural and economic protection 
that echoed that of fascist Italy, the PPF hoped to save l’Algérie française. While their 
strategy largely failed, several Algerians did play active roles in propagating their vision 
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while still maintaining a level of independence. These Algerians used rightist discourse to 
criticize French rule and promote reform programs that would redress ills while 
maintaining French control over Algeria. 
Chapter Four shifts to fascist governance in Italian Libya. With few resources to 
exploit, the primary purpose of Libya was to serve as a military staging-ground for 
Mediterranean expansion. With that in mind, the so-called “Fourth-Shore” also served as 
an experimental site for demographic settler imperialism and fascist rule over Muslims. 
Administering and controlling Libya’s Muslim population required a multi-faceted 
strategy. For one, the impact of emigrant and exiled Libyans had to be carefully controlled, 
with political enemies closely surveilled, apoliticals encouraged to return, and loyal 
Libyans sent abroad, particularly to Mecca, in order to further the Italian propaganda 
agenda. Secondly, the regime, under the ambitious Governor Italo Balbo, made halting 
steps towards Libyan integration into fascist institutions. The difficulties in implementing 
this program highlights the importance of the late-1930s push for Italian racial prestige. 
Finally, Italy promised to protect and modernize Islam in Libya while firmly detaching it 
from political applications. In practice, Italian efforts to protect the traditional spoke more 
to Italian desires to reify an “authentic” Libya untouched by a corrupting and universal 
modernity. At the same time, the regime’s policy-line that Islam and fascism were natural 
allies sparked a discussion in the fascist press that reflects the difficulties in clearly 
establishing the friend-enemy distinction. 
Chapter Five returns to Algeria, where the Vichy regime, backed by fascist groups 
like the PPF, implemented its own plans for imperial revitalization. Though short-lived and 
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severely hampered by resource scarcities due to the war, the Vichy experience in Algeria 
again reveals the rightist desire to turn Muslims into political friends through the creation 
of state programs and the promise to protect a traditional way of life. Such efforts fell far 
short of their goals amid French settler backlash against the regime’s alleged privileging 
of Algerians and the almost total rejection of illiberal and authoritarian practices on the 
part of Algerian political figures. 
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Chapter One: A Latin Sea? Rightist Mediterraneans in Theory and 
Latin Unity in Practice 
INTRODUCTION 
On 8 February 1937, the budding French Algerian writer Albert Camus gave a 
speech for the inauguration of a Maison de la Culture in Algiers. The purpose of Camus’ 
address was to break the political right’s monopoly on defining the Mediterranean as a 
political and cultural space. Instead of a fascist Mediterranean as conceived by figures like 
the French monarchist Charles Maurras and the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, Camus 
proposed a leftist Mediterranean that would accommodate all the region’s differences, 
bring together East and West, and experiment with new forms of collectivism superior to 
those practiced in Soviet Russia. For Camus, the rightist Mediterranean was “an abstract, 
conventional Mediterranean symbolized by Rome and the Romans, a people of imitators, 
which, though it lacked imagination, nevertheless imagined that its martial genius could 
make up for the artistic genius and zest for life it did not possess.” The leftist 
Mediterranean, in contrast, was “not a classical and orderly place but a diffuse and turbulent 
one, like the Arab quarters of many of its cities or the ports of Genoa and Tunisia. The 
triumphant zest for life, the sense of oppression and boredom, the deserted quarters of 
Spain at noontime, the siesta-that is the true Mediterranean, and it is closer to the East than 
to the Latin West.”41 The heady optimism of the young author soon confronted harsh 
realities, as his political projects failed, Europe fell into war, and French Algeria came 
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under the far-rightist Vichy administration. Five years after his call to allow the 
Mediterranean sun and sea to guide the way to a more humanist society, the protagonist of 
Camus’ famous novel, L’Etranger, Meursault, would murder an Arab while in an 
existential stupor exacerbated by that same sun and sea.42 
Though Camus’ anti-fascist Mediterranean failed to materialize, he did understand 
the threat posed by French and Italian rightists in using the Mediterranean as a category of 
thought to justify the continuation and expansion of violent imperial projects. Indeed, 
French and Italian fascist ideas of imperialism in the 1930s were inseparable from 
contemporary conceptions of the historical, cultural, and social conditions of the 
Mediterranean basin. As a revolt against abstract universalisms, rightist notions of empire 
focused on regional and local traditions and ways of life that would best be protected and 
cultivated by a European power with organic links to the Mediterranean as a whole. As the 
justification for liberal imperialism came under increasing scrutiny in the age of the League 
of Nations, burgeoning nationalist movements, and the Soviet Union, French and Italian 
fascists hoped to articulate a new vision of empire grounded in rightist thought. If such a 
vision would be based on geographic specificity, the Mediterranean served as a perfect 
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conceptual tool: both France and Italy could claim to be responsible for the development 
of a unified Mediterranean space, while also stressing their own status as a “Mediterranean 
people”. Finally, the ultimate goal of a re-invigorated imperialism, Africa, would be 
accessible through a highly developed and unified Mediterranean space. Given the strong 
presence of French and Italians in North Africa, the legacy of Rome in the region, and its 
proximity to Africa, it was a particularly privileged place in the fascist understanding of 
the Mediterranean, and will be the focus of this study. 
The precondition for the flurry of intellectual activity regarding the Mediterranean 
was a particular understanding of the region largely formulated by the French during the 
nineteenth-century. As Hélène Blais and Florence Deprest have demonstrated, the French 
transformed the conception of the Mediterranean from a dividing sea to a unifying one as 
imperialists sought to justify the conquest of Algeria and Saint Simonians dreamed of a 
productive and cosmopolitan Mediterranean led by French technical ingenuity. 
Concomitant with these more explicitly political conceptions came early scientific proof, 
particularly in botany, that Southern Europe and North Africa had much in common. In 
short, the border of Europe had been pushed south to the Sahara, as the flora, fauna, 
geography, and history of North Africa began to be inserted into a Eurocentric vision of 
Mediterranean unity.43 The culmination of these Mediterranean studies came in 1949 with 
the sweeping work of the historian Fernand Braudel, who himself taught in Algeria from 
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1923-1932, where he absorbed many ideas regarding the unity of the Mediterranean.44 In 
his famous study of the sea, which subjected historical events to the structural limitations 
and opportunities of geography, Braudel identified the climate as an example of a unifying 
element in the “living unity of the sea”, where one could everywhere find “the same eternal 
trinity: wheat, olives, and vines, born of the climate and history; in other words an identical 
agricultural civilization, identical ways of dominating the environment.”45 While Braudel 
also split the Mediterranean into many different units,46 the very concept of a 
Mediterranean-based history was the product of a longstanding European desire to define 
the sea in a coherent way. If for Braudel, structural history constituted “a direct existential 
response to the tragic times I was passing through”,47 then a similar structured notion of 
the Mediterranean would help the right pass through its own crises. 
By the turn of the century, the first signs of a literary and artistic recognition of the 
transnational nature of the “Latin” Mediterranean began to pick up steam. At the same 
time, with the establishment of the French protectorate over Morocco in 1912, a consensus 
developed in the French nationalist right to support a colonial project many had previously 
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held in suspicion for drawing strength away from the German border. For the right, the 
colonies would provide a kind of training-ground for the next generation of French youth, 
who would then restore a “true France” at home.48 With rightist support came an injection 
of rightist trends into colonial thought. One such strand of rightist thought that was crucial 
to the genesis of a cultural definition of the Mediterranean originated with the poet Frédéric 
Mistral, who laid the basis for the regionalism that would be later employed by Charles 
Maurras’ Action Française. As the founder and leader of the Félibrige literary organization, 
Mistral worked to valorize and protect the language traditions of his native Provence. His 
was an ominous precedent; the desire to maintain the cultural autonomy of Southern France 
would necessitate its static fixity and ran into the opposition of most of the Provençaux for 
whom he supposedly spoke.49 Despite his own apolitical stance, Mistral hoped Latin 
Europeans would create an “Empire of the Sun”.50 And while the language of regionalism 
could be employed by leftists like Camus, it mostly served as a tool for the right. Indeed, 
the Italian fascist intellectual Alberto Spaini proclaimed that Mistral had made a first step 
towards a Mediterranean consciousness through his visits to Catalan and Naples, and 
understood the need for a Mediterranean empire as few Frenchmen did.51 Paul Valéry, once 
a young admirer of Mistral, would more directly examine the Mediterranean, in which the 
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esteemed poet found a Latin sea that would ideally be cosmopolitan enough to foster peace 
while allowing Europe to learn from the East. At the same time, if the Camus of the 1930s 
celebrated a Greek, “Dionysian” Mediterranean that rejected any inflexible and closed 
system, Valéry promoted an orderly region based on a legalistic, “Apollonian” Latin 
model. To this end, Valéry would sign a manifesto in 1925 in support of the French 
suppression of the Rif uprising in Morocco.52 
Others would make Schmitt proud by seeking new friend-enemy distinctions 
through the notion of a Mediterranean space. The most extravagant case came from the 
adventuring French aristocrat, the Marquis de Morès, who promoted an alliance between 
Latins and Muslims in a global struggle against Jews and Great Britain. After failing to 
create a meat-packing empire in the Dakota Badlands and a railway line in the Gulf of 
Tonkin, the Marquis turned to politics, acting as a political agent for the anti-Semitic 
program of Edouard Drumont. De Morès dove into working-class Parisian culture in the 
hopes of uniting the French proletariat in a patriotic struggle against Jewish finance. 
Despite these efforts, workers generally rejected his Proudhon-inspired advocacy of 
worker-run factories and shops, and Catholic conservatives found his radicalism too much 
to bear. With few political opportunities left, and convinced that British and Jewish 
collusion to destroy France through the restriction of silver had to be counteracted by an 
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expansion of French imperial power, de Morès dreamed of creating a Franco-Islamic 
alliance in the Sahara.53  
Just as he had hoped to draw workers to a patriotic economic nationalism, now the 
ambitious Marquis had his sights set on a grand international alliance that would free 
France and the Mediterranean/Sahara region from the grips of the British and their alleged 
Jewish backers. Before an audience of two thousand who had gathered for a meeting of the 
Society for the Advancement of the Sciences in Tunis, the Marquis provided a kind of 
foreshadowing of the later Italian project, declaring that 
The French, the Muslims, the Mediterranean peoples…acclaim the alliance of the 
French and the Muslims, as well as the union of the peoples living around the 
Mediterranean, to defend the principles of autonomy and alliance, to deliver the 
earth and humanity from the financial yoke which the English today, throughout 
the world, seek to thrust on them. The assembly sends its sympathy and good 
wishes to the Muslims who are fighting them on the banks of the Nile.54 
Unsurprisingly, the French military refused to aid de Morès in his bid to secure Muslim 
allies in southern Algeria and Tunisia, and a Tuareg band killed him and stole the 
considerable amount of money he was carrying.55 The story of the Marquis is a fascinating 
one; his national-socialism, though unsuccessful, in hindsight was an ominous sign.56 His 
desire to create unique friend-enemy distinctions even led him to recklessly risk his life in 
the name of a Franco-Islamic alliance.  
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For all of the Marquis’ efforts, other French rightists had very different views of 
the role of France in the Mediterranean and of its relations with Islam. The novelist Louis 
Bertrand, to whom we will return later, exalted the Latin settler in North Africa for creating 
a new Mediterranean race. According to this view, the harsh geography of the region, 
coupled with its need for economic development, could rescue Europe from its supposed 
crisis of decadence.57 Bertrand had then combined Maurrassian regionalism, a claim to 
Latin superiority, and the rightist rhetoric of regeneration to justify the harshest forms of 
colonial domination. 
As Patricia Lorcin has argued, for hard-liners like Bertrand, the new Latin race 
would exclude Arabs and Berbers, who had allegedly done nothing to build on the legacy 
of Rome. Furthermore, from this perspective, Islam was a backwards force that constituted 
a permanent obstacle to progress. Yet, contact with Algerians could “rebarbarize” 
Europeans by keeping them alert and virile in the presence of the enemies of civilization.58  
A similar view was advocated by the soldier-poet Ernest Psichari, the grand-son of Ernest 
Renan, who hoped that contact with Muslims in French West Africa would revitalize 
French Catholicism and provide a conservative alternative to universalist, secular colonial 
methods.59 Unlike Bertrand, who had contempt for Arabs, Psichari was fascinated by 
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Islam, but believed France had to become more Catholic precisely in order to contain the 
threat it posed. In his view, only by becoming more spiritual than Muslims could France 
maintain its empire in Africa.60 Though Psichari died in World War I, he would not be the 
last proponent of colonialism as a means of restoring religious values in Europe; that the 
Mediterranean was a uniquely privileged place for religious experiences became one of the 
persistent Mediterranean myths. Such experiences could serve as a means to attenuate 
perceived ills such as secularization, commodification, and homogenization. Other 
conservatives were less harsh, and proposed a fruitful exchange between Christianity and 
Islam that would maintain distance and separation while helping Europe recover values 
lost to modernity.  At the least, they could provide a resting-ground for Europeans tired of 
the travails of modernity. As one French journalist wrote about entering the Muslim quarter 
of Constantine, Algeria in 1936: 
Let us march slowly and in silence; as we enter these streets, we also go back in 
time; in changing our environment, we change our era…. For…the beginnings of 
civilization were always of a great slowness, painfully climbing in slow motion the 
ascending slope which leads to its fulfilment. But then, it hurtles down, like a crazed 
body, towards the abyss of decadence. It is very possible we are close to this final 
stage, in which the condensation and industrialization of the world’s telluric forces 
will destroy us in a definitive and catastrophic conflict of motors, shellfire, and 
“automatons”. But it is not the years to come that concern us today, it is the past 
centuries whose relics haunt us in the manner of a dream or wish, forever 
unrealizable or lost.61 
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The myths of North Africa serving as an exceptional extension of Europe became 
standard fare, though open to varying interpretations and ambiguities. In Pierre Drieu La 
Rochelle’s 1939 semi-autobiographical novel Gilles, for instance, the eponymous 
protagonist briefly visits Algeria, where he muses on the need for a new balance of material 
and spiritual values. Echoing Psichari, though with more benevolence, Drieu La Rochelle 
writes how “the Islam around him [Gilles], though damaged by colonization, reminded him 
of the eternal golden rule, to a large extent recently brought back by Maurras”. After 
leaving the countryside, Gilles dismisses a perhaps too-modern Algiers as “like all the other 
cities of the world”; one of emptiness [vide]. Yet it is in Algiers that Gilles ends his spiral 
of self-deprecation and unsatisfying relations with women by finding a simple and 
vivacious wife of partly Spanish origins. Transplanted to Paris, she has to abort their child 
and succumbs to cancer as the right’s Place de la Concorde demonstrations failed.62 Here 
La Rochelle referenced the attempt by French rightist parties to overthrow the Republic, or 
to at least replace the leftist government, on 6 February 1934, which ended in more of a 
whimper than a bang, thanks to the resolve of the police forces, and hesitancy and lack of 
coordination among the rightist groups.63 In Drieu La Rochelle’s pessimistic narrative, the 
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simultaneous failure of a daughter of Algeria and the French far-right to save both Gilles 
and France results in the former’s nihilistic adhesion to fascism.  
This mélange of French Mediterranean conceptions found an increasing resonance 
among Italians in the mid to late-1930s. In the case of the French, rightists were limited by 
the ostensibly universal values of the Republic; though they certainly had occasions to 
enforce their notions of Western order in Morocco and Mandate Syria. But once the fascists 
took power in Rome, the new regime could systematically and unapologetically employ 
the myths related to the Mediterranean. The expansionist aims of Italy were clear from the 
start, though the necessity of consolidating power at home meant that a concerted effort at 
thinking through empire and Italy’s role in the Mediterranean had to wait until the 1930s. 
Once Italy embarked upon expansionism with its invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935, the 
importance of the Mediterranean myth became central to what would become the final 
stage of Italian fascism, marked by imperialism, totalitarian ambitions, and a desire for 
war. In an effort to inculcate a “Mediterranean consciousness” into Italians during this 
period, the regime employed cultural reviews, prestigious academics, films, school 
textbooks, radio broadcasts, and newspaper articles to advance the idea that the 
Mediterranean was a geographically and historically unified space destined to be brought 
to political form by Italy.64 The primary Italian vehicle for developing this imperial 
Mediterranean consciousness was the Centro di Studi Mediterranei, founded by Giuseppe 
Bucciante, a journalist who had been an early fascist, even participating in the March on 
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Rome in October 1922. The Center included many of Italy’s most prominent regime 
hierarchs and cultural figures,65 who often contributed articles to the Center’s glossy 
monthly, Il Mediterraneo. A description of the Center reveals the vision of those who 
ascribed to a Mediterranean-based empire: 
The Center proposes to inculcate in the spirit of Italians the sense of Mediterraneità, 
that is to say, the awareness of a Mediterranean consciousness that fully and 
energetically corresponds to the historical, civil, and political function that Italy is 
called on to carry out in the Mediterranean; to collect in Rome…studies and 
international reports undertaken among the Mediterranean countries in the name of 
that affinity that the French call “le fait méditerranéen” and remains as the basis of 
the spirit, the morals, the thought, the aesthetics, and the customs of the 
Mediterranean peoples, bringing them together and distinguishing them from 
Nordic peoples, Asians, and Anglo-Saxons; to make known the essential Italian 
contribution offered in every century to Mediterranean civilization, tributary of 
Rome and Christianity that has rendered it universal, of the Renaissance and our 
Maritime Republics that gave it light, laws, and power, of Fascist Italy that in the 
Mediterranean is still today, among so much darkness, the lighthouse of the new 
civilization.66 
Though the Italian conception emphasized their nation’s leading role in the region, 
France was recognized as having already begun work on the conceptual unification of the 
Mediterranean. Indeed, the Center for Mediterranean Studies looked approvingly on 
French efforts to think through and define a Mediterranean space. These included the 
Congress on Humanism held in November 1934 by the Académie Méditerranéenne, and 
the Mediterranean University Center established in 1933 in Nice and for which Valéry 
served as the first administrator.67 The French and Italian discourses could be remarkably 
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similar. For instance, the Académie Méditerrannéenne’s congress highlighted the spiritual 
nature of Mediterranean peoples, their tendency to establish strong states that did not limit 
individualism, and their sense of limitation compared to the unbridled materialism of the 
Anglo-Saxons and Americans. Speakers like the writer and socialite Ferdinand Bac 
suggested that while France and Italy were largely responsible for a unified Mediterranean, 
the characteristics of the region had been adopted by others throughout the world, thus 
creating a new form of universalism that could compete with liberalism and communism. 
Contrary to Italian descriptions though, some participants of the Congress hoped to push 
back on a rightist conception that excluded the East and rejected cosmopolitanism in favor 
of Latinity, including the Academy’s secretary François Jean-Desthieux. Even so, most 
speakers broadly fell in line with a view of the Mediterranean that privileged the legacy of 
Greece and Rome over the vaguely defined “East”.68 Valéry too, spoke of the Latin nature 
of the Mediterranean, in need of defense from Nordic Europeans.69  
Yet despite connections to the French, the Italian Mediterranean myth was 
inextricably linked with the late-fascist cult of empire and romanità. As Emilio Gentile has 
argued, Mussolini hoped to re-invigorate a flagging fascist movement by turning the fascist 
party into a totalitarian institution, and by hardening Italians through the crucible of war 
and imperial conquest. The frequent references to the Roman Empire and Mare Nostrum, 
as well as the attempted injection of romanità into italianità that constituted so much of late 
                                                 
68 Foxlee, Albert Camus’s ‘The New Mediterranean Culture’, pp. 102-104. 
69 Il Mediterraneo, “Il Congresso dell’Umanesimo Mediterraneo a Monaco Principato”, 
“L’Università Mediterranea di Nizza ed il suo centro di cultura”, January 1936. 
 39 
1930s fascist rhetoric and discourse did not aim at a reconstruction of the Roman Empire, 
but rather to mobilize Italians in the fascist project of creating “new-men” through 
totalitarian organizations and war.70 The burgeoning interest in the Mediterranean during 
the 1930s speaks to the realization of many Italian administrators, artists, and intellectuals 
that a groundwork had to be quickly laid for the oncoming bid for empire. If, as Sloterdijk 
has pointed out, the Ancient Romans represented the universal struggle to postpone death 
in the Colosseum, Italian fascists understood that the Mediterranean was destined to be the 
site of the success or failure of their voluntarist, existential struggle for empire.71  
To see the Mare Nostrum myth as an empty excuse for expansionism is to miss the 
potential weight it carried. The mythic re-founding of the Roman Empire was not to be a 
return, but a profoundly modern experience intimately tied to the goals of the regime. 
Claudio Fogu’s work on the fascist conceptions of history is instructive here. Fogu argues 
that during the 1920s, Italian fascists created an “historic” as opposed to “historical” 
culture, in which the past served the needs of the present. Yet by the 1930s, Fogu concludes, 
the “fascist mind…finds itself oscillating between present belonging to the past and history 
belonging to the future”.72 This helps explain the apparent confusion between the mania 
over celebrating the history of Ancient Rome and its projection into a future Mediterranean 
empire.  
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Given the compensatory nature of Italian fascist discourse-the obsession over 
redeeming something historically lost, whether it be territory, dignity, or national 
sovereignty- the linking of the Roman past with the imminent attempt to create a 
Mediterranean empire served as a discourse of redemption that exceeded the nation-state. 
Whereas nationalist irredentists focused on conquering lands with sizeable Italian 
populations like the Trento, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia, and Tunisia, historical irredentism 
vastly expanded the scope of Italian ambitions.73 Now any territory linked to the Roman 
past or to the efforts of Italian immigrant communities had to in some sense be attached to 
a new Roman empire if Italy was to honor and rediscover its own past.74 Roger Griffin, 
quoting Walter Benjamin, remarks that “by anchoring a new future in the mythic 
remembrance of things past, Fascists put themselves in the position to ‘blast a specific era 
out of the homogenous course of history’ as much as any Bolshevik revolutionary.”75 Yet, 
if Benjamin hoped for a revolutionary break in time that would redeem the victims of the 
past,76 the fascists would try to redeem the one-time Italian victors of history whose fruits 
had been betrayed by those foreigners that oppressed Italy. The defeat to Ethiopians at 
Adowa in 1896, the mass emigration of southern Italians, the reputation of Italians as 
                                                 
73 Although, even with irredentists, as Annamaria Vinci has shown, the myth of violence along 
the borders of the nation meant that such borders could never be recognized as precise. The 
possibility for conflict and an altered border could not be discarded. Vinci, Sentinelle della 
patria: Il fascismo al confine orientale, 1918-1941 (Bari, 2011), pp. v-vii. 
74 Giovanna Tomasello, L’Africa tra mito e realtà: Storia della letteratura coloniale italiana 
(Palermo, 2004), pp. 76-78. 
75 Griffin, Modernism and Fascism, p. 223. 
76 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, Hannah Arendt (ed.) (New York, 
2007), pp. 253-264. 
 41 
“macaroni-eaters and organ-grinders”77- all these humiliations of the past would be 
remedied by the reconstruction of an empire. 
Thus, a collection of ideas about the Mediterranean had by the 1930s turned into a 
constellation of views and desires that could be arranged and re-arranged by Italian and 
French fascists. These ideas, largely inspired and articulated by intellectuals, ranging from 
authors and poets like Louis Bertrand, F.T. Marinetti, Frédéric Mistral, Valéry, to 
archaeologists, ethnographers, and architects, played into rightist visions for vast spatial 
re-organizations. The rediscovery of a Mediterranean defined by strong religious beliefs 
would prove an antidote to modern secularization and a bulwark against atheistic 
Bolshevism. A Mediterranean defined by the state’s role in organizing society would 
justify the right’s dream of a return to order, hierarchy, and discipline. Finally, the 
identification of authentic Mediterranean songs, architectural styles, clothes, and other 
cultural practices would stem the tide of soulless materialism. Despite the many 
contradictions that inevitably came from such a wide range of perspectives, the nebulous 
constellation constituting the Mediterranean myth provided the rightist political projects of 
the 1930s an ideological space to navigate. 
Of course, these vague calls for a Mediterranean consciousness capable of 
remedying the ills of modernity did not translate easily into politics. For one thing, the idea 
of a unified Mediterranean space did not have to be the unique preserve of the right. Camus 
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was working in a tradition of cosmopolitanism that went back to the theories of Saint-
Simonians a hundred years earlier. And though this cosmopolitanism had always been 
compromised by involvement with the French colonial project, it hesitated in front of the 
rigid civilizational lines presented by the right. Yet in the context of the interwar years, any 
notion of organizing the space of the Mediterranean could only find realistic expression in 
the visions of nationalists arguing for new forms of imperialism, particularly in 1930s Italy. 
How far would nationalist and fascist movements go in adopting these Mediterranean 
concepts to justify the maintenance and expansion of empire? Would the creation of a 
Mediterranean sphere to compete with Northern Europe, America, Russia, and East Asia 
simply place colonized people at the mercy of French and Italian hegemony masquerading 
under a rightist universalism instead of the liberal universalism of the “civilizing mission”? 
Or would the calls to discover longstanding bonds between Mediterranean peoples soften 
the exclusivist priorities of French and Italian rightists? Would the creation of this 
Mediterranean space be a joint French-Italian project, or would they compete for 
leadership? This chapter will provide more context to these questions by examining the 
gestation of rightist intellectual thought related to empire in Italy. A series of influential 
thinkers established interpretive keys that would later be employed by political actors in 
the 1930s. Finally, it will examine the failed attempt by French and Italian rightists to find 
common ground by using the Mediterranean as a unifying device. 
THE MEDITERRANEAN IN ITALIAN RIGHTIST THOUGHT 
After the Italian failure to attain more than the small East African colonies of Eritrea 
and Italian Somalia during the “Scramble for Africa” in the late nineteenth-century, it 
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appeared that Italy would play an insignificant role as a colonial power.78 Yet with the turn 
of the century, a new push for expansionism began, this time inspired less by liberalism, 
and more by organic notions of imperial nationalism.79 The old hopes for expanding in 
Ethiopia and the Ottoman provinces of Tripoli and Cyrenaica were now re-elaborated by a 
new generation of thinkers. 
The first highly developed ideological justification for Italian expansionism came 
from Enrico Corradini (1865-1931), a novelist and journalist who eventually laid the 
intellectual groundwork for the Italian Nationalist movement. Since the Nationalists would 
later form the critical rightist faction of fascism, Corradini’s views proved to be essential 
to the Italian imperial project. A fervent opponent of positivism, liberalism, and socialism, 
Corradini saw expansionism as the key to the elevation of Italy as a great power. From 
1903 to 1906, Corradini’s Florence-based paper, Il Regno espoused an elitist and colonial 
vision of Italy with the help of such influential thinkers as Giovanni Papini, Vilfredo 
Pareto, and Giuseppe Prezzolini.80 
Led by Corradini, the writers for Il Regno elaborated a conception of nations as 
organisms that served as the primary units of action in the world. Elites that incarnated the 
values and aspirations of the nation would channel its forces. The “exuberant” energy of 
Italy was already being exported abroad in various forms: through the spread of the Italian 
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language, art, manufactured products, and workers. Yet such exported energy risked 
benefiting foreign nations. With millions of poor Italians emigrating to the United States 
and the Americas, and substantial communities in Tunisia and Egypt, Corradini pleaded 
for Italian colonies that could absorb excess labor.81 This desire to control the migrant 
problem and prevent Italians abroad from assimilating would later become a key issue for 
the fascists, who would attempt to unify Italian communities abroad and employ them to 
serve state interests while justifying colonial programs in Ethiopia and Libya as a means 
of allowing Italians to emigrate while never truly leaving Italy.82 For all the influence 
exerted by Corradini’s notion of cultural imperialism, his declaration that Italy was a 
proletarian nation struck an even greater chord with many Italians frustrated with the 
domestic politics of liberal Italy as well its apparent inability to exercise its influence 
abroad. 
While justifying Italy’s invasion and occupation of Libya in 1911, Corradini 
described Italy as a proletarian nation. According to this view, Italy was a vibrant nation, 
whose external energies would be exploited by the “plutocratic” colonial powers. Whereas 
Italian labor would provide the blood and sweat in modernizing projects around the world, 
most benefits would go to the decadent suppliers of capital. From this perspective, a 
“young” and “healthy” Italy represented life, while the capitalist powers served the 
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deadening positivist agenda that Corradini so despised. Only by loosening France and 
Great Britain’s control of the world could Italy fulfill its destiny. Following the Versailles 
peace discussions, when irredentist Italians felt cheated by Great Britain and France, these 
views took on even greater significance among nationalists. Furthermore, by transposing 
class struggle onto the national level, Corradini hoped to link his elitist nationalism to 
disaffected socialists. The 1921 split between Socialists and Communists at the Congress 
of Livorno was only the most recent symptom of an Italian left in a constant crisis between 
reformism, party-led “maximalism”, and anarcho-syndicalism.83 The latter, in particular, 
had proven susceptible to conceiving the nation as the most suitable unit of class struggle. 
A trickle of syndicalist intellectuals who supported the invasion of Libya in 1911 turned 
into a strong current of interventionists in 1914-1915. Participation in the Great War would 
supposedly defeat German absolutism, weaken the Italian bourgeoisie, and create a social 
climate favorable to revolution. The theoretical price to pay was to subsume class conflict 
into national competition.84 With the proletarian-nation becoming normalized in Italian 
nationalist circles, the basis of an awkward union of nationalists and syndicalists within the 
fascist movement had been put in place. 
Corradini’s belief in colonial spaces as a repository for Italy’s excess and 
proletarian energies remained a core component of fascist expansionist thought right up to 
the end of the regime. But there were other influential thinkers who sometimes added depth 
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to his views and sometimes challenged his assumptions. While famous literary figures like 
F.T. Marinetti and Gabriele D’Annunzio offered models of the kind of elite, charismatic 
hero sought after by nationalists like Corradini, they also situated these heroes in 
Mediterranean settings that were more than just empty spaces waiting to be brought into 
history by Italians. According to Corradini, the Italians in Libya would replace Arabs and 
Turks that had no historical right to the land through their supposed lack of civilizational 
energy.85 While other Italians were still rabidly Eurocentric, they were not so quick to 
discount the weight of Mediterranean history and traditions, particularly in their potential 
effectiveness as barriers against the perceived ills of modernity. 
It certainly should have been no surprise to many Italians that the decadent poet 
D’Annunzio (1863-1938) provided his own justification for the Italian occupation of Libya 
with his Le Canzone delle gesta d’Oltremare. Like Corradini, D’Annunzio saw no place 
for Libyans in the new Italian colony. Yet whereas Corradini envisioned Libya largely as 
an abstract container for Italian energies, D’Annunzio saw the new colony as one which 
would help reshape the Italian people through its own Latin history. As Giovanna 
Tomasello has argued, D’Annunzio saw Libya “not as something added to an already 
closed ethnic-geographic entity, but rather as a recuperation of something that long ago 
was subtracted from that entity, resulting in a territorial mutilation and the obliteration of 
a unitary race [stirpe] conscience.”86 Expansion into the Mediterranean therefore was an 
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opportunity for Italians to rediscover their historic destiny and hopefully discover their 
heroic nature that would free Italy from international weakness and political malaise. 
D’Annunzio differed in other ways from more close-minded nationalists like 
Corradini. As a dutiful romantic poet, he especially feared the implications of the West’s 
fascination with technocratic rationalism. After taking over the Adriatic city of Fiume 
(Rijeka) in September 1919 with a small band of radical nationalist and anarchist youth, 
D’Annunzio engaged in unique forms of ideological syncretism that projected a kinder 
vision of Islam and Arabs than he had espoused during the Libyan War. From the tenuous 
base of his newfound Carnaro Republic, D’Annunzio hoped to find allies in the 
“oppressed” peoples of the world, particularly the victims of British and French 
colonialism. Islam now appeared as a force that not only countered Italy’s biggest 
European rivals, but also as a deterrent to the spread of Western technocratic imperialism. 
It is possible that D’Annunzio was in contact with an Egyptian nationalist, Dr. ʿAbd al-
Hamid Saʿid, who was in Rome trying to organize a group that would assassinate British 
officials. The British believed D’Annunzio had even convinced Saʿid, a future deputy for 
the nationalist Watani party in Egypt, to buy a submarine.87 While Tomasello argues that 
fascists would write these Fiume-era appeals out of D’Annunzio’s history,88 we will see 
later on how fascists employed similar lines of argument to justify an Islamic alliance to 
Muslims around the Mediterranean and to themselves. The Fiume era also displayed how 
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D’Annunzio’s historical appropriations could highlight the importance of non-Italian 
actors. During Fiume’s piracy campaign against Italian merchant ships, D’Annunzio 
likened his brigands to the Croatian Uskoks who had raided Venetian and Ottoman galleys 
in the 17th century.89 Though such appeals to non-Italian historical legitimacy did little to 
offset the Carnaro Republic’s attempt to marginalize the Croatian minority population 
within the city, its poet-leader proved to be capable of employing surprising sources as a 
basis for his short-lived state. 
Opposed to D’Annunzio’s historical vision of the Mediterranean was another 
influential Italian nationalist writer and intellectual; the futurist leader F.T. Marinetti 
(1876-1944). Born in Alexandria, Egypt, Marinetti continually returned to Africa in his 
writings. In both history and geography, Marinetti tended to flatten Africa into a mystical 
and primitive land in which there were no great differences between Libya, Egypt, and 
Ethiopia. At first, Marinetti deployed a mythical Africa as the site of his debut novel, 
Mafarka the Futurist (1909). The titular protagonist plays the role of a heroic leader who 
transforms a primitive and matriarchal society into one of patriarchy and futurist 
technology through the creation of a mechanical, winged son. The novel’s lesson is clear: 
the primitive nature of Africa was not a limiting factor, but precisely a state far more 
conducive to radical transformation than a humanitarian and egalitarian European 
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civilization. By the late 1930s however, Marinetti had reduced the primitive to the 
backdrop upon which the heroic conquests of a futurist Italy would take place.90  
For modernists like Marinetti, the Mediterranean and its African hinterland 
presented theoretical difficulties. Studies by Mia Fuller and Claudio Fogu have 
demonstrated how some rationalists and futurists sought in the 1930s to attach their 
movements to a conception of mediterraneità in order to assert the independence of Italian 
art and architecture from Northern European trends. Such a move also offered opportunities 
to frame new forms of modernity within the fascist regime’s Mediterranean program. Of 
course, working within the regime meant a definition of mediterraneità that favored Italian 
influences. As such, Fuller has shown how rationalist architects like Carlo Enrico Rava 
believed that the simple, white Libyan houses that served as models for functionalist and 
modern domiciles derived from Roman designs. Whatever was gained in exploring modern 
possibilities in the colonies always had to be recuperated within a controlled discourse of 
Italian or Roman-ness.  Other rationalists rejected historical styles in favor what they 
considered a “timeless” response to the Mediterranean climate. At its most benign, Italian 
modernists like Rava equated the primitive with modern simplicity, or borrowed from local 
styles in an eclectic manner like Italian Libya’s foremost architect, Florestano di Fausto.91 
Indeed, writers praised Governor Balbo’s Tripoli as a modern synthesis of historical 
periods and ethnic traditions. At other times, modernity came without considerations for 
local particularities, as in Asmara, which Curzio Malaparte likened to a modern mid-
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Western American city in an East Africa that supposedly belonged more to the “European 
Mediterranean” than to Africa.92 
Within the futurist movement, Fogu has identified two Mediterraneanist strands: 
one stressing the emporium as a place of exchange and the other stressing the imperium as 
Italy’s claim to rule the region. According to Fogu, Marinetti’s experiences with popular 
culture in Naples opened up novel avenues for futurism. With a newfound appreciation for 
southern Italy, Marinetti and southern Italian futurists hoped to combine experiments in 
modern advertising, local culture, and the state’s economic development of the south and 
colonies into a new field for futurist art. Fogu argues that the futurist architecture and art 
of the Exhibition of African Colonies held in Naples in 1940 exemplified the emporium 
nature of futurism through its rejection of the stern and domineering style of classically-
inspired imperial styles.93 
Yet the futurist advocacy of imperium should not be minimized. Marinetti 
volunteered for both the Libyan and Ethiopian Wars and used both experiences as 
opportunities to extol war as “the sole hygiene of the world”. Whereas in Mafarka the 
Futurist, Marinetti posited the primitive nature of Africa as the condition for futurist 
modernity, in the Ethiopian War, a static and immobile Africa had to be conquered by virile 
and dynamic Italians.94 Indeed, in this climate of imperial expansionism of the late 1930s, 
Marinetti hoped to revitalize his movement through an infusion of African experiences. In 
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a 1937 interview with L’Azione Coloniale, Marinetti explained the purpose of his new 
initiative to send writers to Africa. Italian authors who had become complacent could start 
a new genre of colonial literature which Marinetti hoped would spurn typical colonial 
tropes and bland propaganda in favor of a realistic and imaginative style.95 By 1939, 
Marinetti was prepared to offer some specific advice on how to conceptualize Africa. 
In an article for Africa Italiana, Marinetti bemoaned the fact that European arts in 
Africa had become “monotone”, “nostalgic”, and “static”, while its architecture was a 
“plagiarism” of local styles. In a series of eighteen points, Marinetti proposed potential 
ways to remedy the problem. Beyond using African sights and sounds as new inspirations, 
the connecting thread between the various suggestions was the search for a re-vitalized 
European modernity that would understand itself in relation to a doomed primitive Africa. 
Aerial technology would allow artists to “speedily sum-up zones in flight with aeropoetry 
aeropainting aeromusic that have no European inspirations”. On the ground, one could 
“Discover the unexpected beauties of mechanized Africa and of nascent urbanism 
(examples fluvial navigation irrigation cultivation of cotton revolutionary nationalist 
futurist architectures of the low terraces of Egyptian villages)”. The futurist love of speed 
could now be juxtaposed with immobile Africa by “Giving the sense of desert solitude in 
bitter and persistent conflict with speedy streets (examples highways and paths that cross 
the Sahara and skirt prehistoric villages).” Here the acceleration of historical time could be 
measured against a land without time. As for the Africans themselves, they could be 
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“colonized by art” while Italians would “reveal the new psychic mysteries caused by 
European civilization in the static and traditional souls of the African populations exploring 
and identifying their subconscious anxieties.”96 In the end, Marinetti’s Africa was one of 
unbridled futurist modernity entirely under the control of Italians. It is hard to say how 
many Italians viewed Mediterranean and African expansion in futurist terms, but it 
undoubtedly served the regime’s interests. Its application outside of artistic circles can be 
seen in Etiopia Latina, a monthly illustrated that often employed futurist-inspired fonts and 
page layouts to describe economic and military developments, with some headlines slanted 
and others in a box around the text. Such displays of pure form may seem absurd given the 
scant resources Italy could invest in Africa, but could nonetheless perpetuate the myth that 
Italy had the advantage of a “virile modernity.” 
Marinetti’s view was not limited to artistic circles. Engineers, architects, and 
modern plans displayed a similar enthusiasm for an imperial ultra-modernity. The case of 
the engineer Gaetano Ciocca, who jumped at the chance to volunteer for the Ethiopian 
campaign, is instructive. Ciocca’s biographer argues that the ambitious engineer viewed 
Africa as a “land of opportunity whose essential otherness rendered inapplicable traditional 
European approaches to technics, organization, building, and transportation.” As such, 
Ciocca proposed a “state technics” that, in his own words, would “constitute a laboratory 
for corporativist experiments”.97 For engineers and architects like Ciocca, or Le Corbusier 
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in Algeria, authoritarian colonial governments promised the ability to put Marinetti’s ultra-
modernity into concrete form.98  
A very different conception of the Mediterranean and empire came from the 
esoteric traditionalist Julius Evola (1894-1974). After experimenting with Dadaism, Evola 
began to combine a reactionary reading of Nietzsche with a fascination for ancient cultures 
and myths from around the world. Despite entering the world of esotericism and 
traditionalism, Evola hoped to influence fascism from the outside. From 1926-1927, Evola 
wrote a series of articles for Bottai’s influential journal, Critica Fascista. In 1928, Evola 
expanded on these articles in a book, Imperial Paganism. The purpose of the book was to 
provide a fascist philosophy that would preclude reconciliation with the Catholic Church, 
which, to Evola’s chagrin, would be accomplished shortly after in 1929 with the Lateran 
Accords. As a faithful follower of Nietzsche, Evola felt that Christianity was the ultimate 
poison behind all the forces destroying traditionalism: socialism, humanitarianism, abstract 
science, belief in progress, equality, and democracy. The beginning of the decline was the 
split between sacred and secular power which had corrupted the Roman Empire from 
within. If fascism was to cede the sacred to the Church, its mission would inevitably fail. 
In order to solidify itself against Christianity, fascists had to borrow from the pagan 
Mediterranean tradition. According to Evola, “anti-Christianity is the classical, pagan 
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Mediterranean tradition-our tradition”. Pagan values could therefore be found throughout 
the Mediterranean basin, constituting a “epic and magical tradition of an affirmative, active 
civilization, strong in wisdom [sapienza] and science, one which marked the elites of the 
Egyptian-Chaldean, Paleo-Grecian, and Etruscan civilizations, and of other more 
mysterious ones whose echoes resound in Syria, Mycenae, and in the Balearics.”99 
Fortified by such examples, fascism could supplant Christianity as a spiritual force. But 
the nation-state unit and idea was insufficient for such a task; fascism would have to project 
itself as empire. 
Like Carl Schmitt, Evola was horrified at the prospect of a rationalist economic 
system destroying an existential political field. Evola believed that 
the true cause of the decadence of the political idea in the modern West resides 
precisely in the fact that the spiritual values which once penetrated the social order 
are lessening, without anything to replace them. The problem has lowered itself to 
the level of economic, industrial, military, administrative, or at most, sentimental 
factors, without realizing that all this is only material…just as incapable of 
producing a solid and rational social order resting on itself as the simple encounter 
of mechanical forces is of creating a living being.100  
But whereas Schmitt focused on the legal and political implications of abstract 
universalization, Evola concentrated on protecting the liberty of the individual. As the 
levelling processes of democratic and economic modernity continued, the space for 
individual liberty were reduced further and further. Evola’s solution was a hierarchy in 
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which a select few would maintain unlimited liberty at the expense of the many. The 
political form of this relationship would, unsurprisingly, be that of empire. 
Evola’s empire differed from the conceptions of Corradini, D’Annunzio, and 
Marinetti by rejecting “bombastic nationalism and D’Annunzianism” that would turn 
“warriors” into “soldiers”.101 The basis of the empire would have to be based on spiritual 
values and not on national egoism. Evola claimed that  
It is absolutely an error for the empire to build itself on the basis of economic, 
militaristic, industrial factors and even on ‘ideals’. The imperium, as in the Iranian 
and Roman conception, is something transcendent, and he who realizes it has the 
power to transcend the small lives of small men, with their appetites, their petty 
national prides, with their “values”, “non-values”, and Gods.102  
Fascism ideally would borrow from the “Orient” whenever it found Oriental values to 
enhance its own power, while aspects of the Italian national tradition that restricted that 
power would be discarded.103 But what could bind this fascist imperium together, since 
“the force of arms, economic necessity, material interests, or industrial supremacy” were 
insufficient? The answer was a “higher spiritual and concrete bond”, similar to “mana, that 
today is resuscitated in all the moments of collective enthusiasm, in all the so-called crowd 
states of which the modern sociological schools are revealing the enormous importance for 
the psychology of masses and consequently for various social and historic upheavals.”104 
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Such psychic bonds would be forged by elites using Sorelian myths to inspire action 
without the need for coercive violence. These elites would give sense to notions of nations, 
states, and traditions so long as they were useful for their purposes.105 “Freer and more 
robust than any other”, the elites would lead “a revolt that would “demolish machinery and 
exterior, inorganic, automatic, and violent dependency, break the economic-capitalistic 
yoke, and taunt the duty of work imposed as a universal law and end-in-itself, that would 
in sum, liberate…”106 Ominously, the guiding force behind Evola’s aristocratic elite was a 
notion of race that included biological and spiritual components, and cast the Italians as a 
mixture of Nordic and Mediterranean, paternal and maternal, solar and lunar, influences. 
Though Evola’s ultra-reactionary positions appear to place him at the margins of 
Italian fascism,107 he did exercise a certain influence, with references to his ideas appearing 
in Italian colonial publications. For instance, before becoming an apolitical esoteric, 
Massimo Scaligero approved of Italian racial laws in a series of articles inspired by Evola. 
Such laws, Scaligero believed, would allow for the universal Roman spiritual synthesis of 
North and South to expand its influence into the Mediterranean.108 Others however 
bemoaned the general incomprehension of Evola. Five years after the publication of Pagan 
Imperialism, an anonymous author penned an article lecturing Italians on the true meaning 
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of empire. Complaining that “everyone talks of empire at every step of the way and in 
every occasion”, the author claimed that no one really knew what it meant. Whereas most 
reduced the term to “exclusively economic-territorial-administrative” meanings, Evola had 
shown the deeper truth by revealing that empire was a command of the self. Only after 
acknowledging this metaphysical truth could a real imperial structure follow. To strengthen 
his argument, the author pointed out that even Mussolini had stated that one could speak 
of empire even where no territorial empire existed.109 Though such calls to esoteric 
spirituality had little chance of resounding in Italian society, it was true that Mussolini had 
read Evola, and felt that his notions of a spiritual race-based elite established through an 
imperium could prove useful. Indeed, a diluted form of Evola’s conception of hierarchical 
command insinuated itself into the Italian racial laws of 1938. In colonial circles, the 
maintenance of strict racial segregation was partly justified by a desire for the Italian race 
to elevate itself through its exercising of power. As Ruth Ben-Ghiat has claimed, “Africa 
presented an opportunity for fascists to refashion and modernize Italians in ways that would 
improve their image and prepare them for the demands of total war”.110 Evola’s notion of 
empire, though certainly idiosyncratic, thus contributed to a larger discourse favored by 
the regime that defined empire as not only control over other peoples, but over oneself.111 
Others who were not quite so reactionary and esoteric as Evola shared his belief 
that the Mediterranean was a space uniquely capable of resisting unwanted elements of 
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modernity. For the literature professor Ercole Rivalta, the Mediterranean was the “heart of 
the human race”, and every civilization that aspired to develop without roots in the 
Mediterranean was condemned to wither and die. America’s obsession with the ephemeral 
and Soviet Russia’s “fearful phenomenon of destruction” served as proof of the immortal 
life of the Mediterranean. But unsurprisingly, Rivalta’s Mediterranean was one defined by 
Rome, which had synthesized its own civil and social values with the aesthetic values of 
Greece and religious values of Jerusalem.112 For Ezra Pound, who would later become a 
propagandist for fascist Italy during the war, the Mediterranean’s ancient traditions enabled 
the region to synthesize different values and perspectives, creating an equilibrium and 
sanity lacking elsewhere in the world.113 
Though spiritualist conceptions of the Mediterranean were popular with writers and 
artists, there were differences in their interpretations. For the eclectic journalist and critic 
Eugenio Giovannetti (1883-1951), who had done his own mystical and traditionalist 
studies before publishing The Twilight of Liberalism in 1917, those who privileged the 
patriarchal and hierarchical were advocating the dark forces of the irrational over love. 
Whereas Evola rejected Christianity, Giovannetti held a traditionalist view that saw Christ 
as a healthy maternal figure of love.114 For Giovannetti, the Mediterranean itself served as 
an inspiration for eternal transformation, the balancing of Apollonian and Dionysian forces, 
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and the victory of fantasy and imagination against the static forces of telluric reality.115 
Giovannetti was not alone in hoping to find religious values in the Mediterranean. The 
writer and Senator Alfredo Baccelli, who had begun as a positivist before turning to 
mysticism,116 was profoundly touched by a trip to Egypt. Recounting his experiences 
visiting al-Azhar, Baccelli argued that Islam was worthy of Italian respect, since it led to a 
“zeal for life, a working reality” that scented the air with “the breath of the beyond that 
renders it sacred!”. Those who crossed the Mediterranean, the “mother of civilizations” to 
study there “almost seemed to aim at joining themselves with the mysteries of creation.”117 
Whether out of conviction or of practical concerns, such spiritual and aesthetic 
descriptions of the Mediterranean often served fascist interests. When describing the 
lessons that could be learned about the Mediterranean from Sardinia’s way of life and 
history, Giovannetti highlighted the island’s many jurists. The most notable of these was 
Domenico Azuni, the “proponent of a political-juridical conception of the Mediterranean”, 
that would bring about a “Mediterranean order and secure the harmony of interests and 
rights.” Such an order would not be theoretical or abstract, as in liberal claims to free-trade, 
but as a “concrete conquest of armed right”.118 Such claims to a new Mediterranean 
political-legal-economic order, however, generally pertained to more pragmatic Italians 
who wrote about geopolitics and international economics. 
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As a sign of the importance of geopolitical studies to the regime, Giuseppe Bottai 
sponsored Ernesto Massi’s review Geopolitica, which debuted in January 1939. Massi 
(1909-1997), who had previously hoped to add what he called “dynamic” factors such as 
colonialism, trade-flows, and nationalist movements into the study of geography, was 
inspired by the German geopolitical school then led by Karl Haushofer. With Bottai’s help, 
Massi worked out Italian-centered geopolitical ideas that depicted a world unfairly 
exploited by the “Great Democracies”. Colonial collaboration between poorer countries 
like Italy and wealthier powers like Great Britain and France would then bring about a 
more prosperous and just world.119 As such, Massi and his review hoped to bring the 
science of geography and empirical economic databases together to point the way to a 
technocratic solution to Corradini’s complaint that Italy had been reduced to a proletarian 
nation. 
Even before Massi gained regime patronage, one of the more popular geopolitical 
ideas justifying Italian expansionism was that of Eurafrica. A common subject among 
French and German economists, politicians, and technocrats in the interwar years, the 
potential construction of a Eurafrican system promised to create peaceful European 
collaboration through a shared and equitable development of Africa.120 Such a project 
would prevent inter-European wars while guaranteeing European economic and political 
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sovereignty against the potential geopolitical blocs of the Americas and Asia. Some Italians 
argued that their nation and its fascist principles were particularly well-suited for such an 
endeavor. Attempts at working out Italian involvement in Eurafrica were made in the Volta 
Congresses in Rome in 1932 and 1938, although the latter presaged a more revisionist, 
German-Italian version. 
The foremost Eurafrican advocate in Italy was Paolo d’Agostino Orsini di 
Camerota. Di Camerota hoped to assert the pre-eminent role of Italy in any Eurafrican 
structure. The underlying assumption was similar to that of Corradini: Italy’s energy, as 
manifested in a high birthrate and mass emigration, would provide a labor supply for under-
developed areas.121 By the 1930s, such claims had more to do with fascist aspirations than 
reality,122 but di Camerota was undeterred. So long as Italian colonists could maintain their 
citizenship, they could be effectively put to work in those climates in Africa that allowed 
for Europeans, even if Italy was not in direct control. However, a broad but peaceful 
revision of the political division of Africa would be necessary for an equitable European 
collaboration.123 
Eurafrica therefore had much to offer a fascist vision of the Mediterranean. As di 
Camerota argued, the Mediterranean would “weld Eurafrica together”, since the sea now 
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played a unifying rather than dividing role. Northern Africa had been made the southern 
coast of Europe thanks to a dense system of infrastructure on the Mediterranean with 
shipping lines and above it with new aerial networks. The “single outlet” for Africa’s 
products and resources would be the Mediterranean.124 Thus Italian preponderance in its 
“mare nostrum” would secure the well-being of Europe as a whole. 
Unlike figures like D’Annunzio and Evola who hoped for something of a spiritual 
revival against crass materialism, di Camerota spoke in clear economic terms that would 
appeal more to the nationalist and conservative fascists, as well as to businessmen and 
industrialists. Economic policy would dictate social policy since di Camerota valued 
practicality over idealism- despite the grandiose nature of his project.125 And like Europe’s 
conservatives and liberals who also dreamed of Eurafrica, di Camerota did not allow for 
any African voices to be expressed. The Africans would help the Europeans with their 
labor, “willing or not”.126 The solution to integrating such a labor force peaceably into 
European dominated institutions and structures would be achieved through some expansion 
of the Italian corporatist system to encompass Africans, though the details would have to 
be clarified with time and practice.127 Such corporative organizations, along with a large 
Italian labor pool, would be the primary contribution of fascism to the Eurafrican project. 
By the late 1930s, Eurafrica became an ever more unlikely policy choice for fascist 
Italy as war with Great Britain and France increasingly appeared more likely than 
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collaboration. Yet the schemes of di Camerota are emblematic of a more technical and 
economic, but perhaps no less fascist vision of what Italian expansion into the 
Mediterranean would entail. The focus on emigrant Italian labor, the spread of fascist state 
institutions, the assumptions that a strict European hierarchy would go unchallenged, the 
notion that only expansionism could guarantee Italian national sovereignty: all these 
principles of Italian Eurafrica constituted one possible way of conceiving a fascist 
geopolitical space based on the Mediterranean. And though Eurafrica heavily stressed 
inter-European collaboration, the broad ideas could be easily fit into one of Axis 
collaboration. 
The central articulations of the Mediterranean-as the Italian-site of a new Roman 
Empire, a nodal point for a vast technocratic project, an outlet and incubator for Italian 
spiritual energies, and a refuge from modernity- all shared aspects with French 
conceptions. Yet the Italians became singularly focused on how to turn the Mediterranean 
into a geopolitical space dominated by Italy, not a Franco-Italian condominium. As the 
primacy of Italy became clearer to French rightists who sympathized with or even 
supported Fascist Italy, co-operation became difficult. Yet the efforts made in the 1930s 
by French rightists to see the good in Italy nevertheless highlights how the shared discourse 
of Latinity and the Mediterranean as a unified space opened up a space in which French 
nationalists could propose a kind of joint-imperial project to salvage a colonialism under 
siege from Wilsonian principles, colonial independence movements, and Bolshevism. 
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THE FAILURE OF FRANCO-ITALIAN RIGHTIST COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
Though engaged in a geopolitical contest in the Mediterranean, Italian and French 
officials still had occasions to congratulate each other on their colonial achievements and 
the construction of a “Latin” North Africa. A potential conflict was possible, but so was 
increased co-operation. As such, the discourse of Latinity served as a useful tool, as did the 
respect officials sometimes reciprocated to each other in public. Even during the Popular 
Front period when relations between the two countries had deteriorated, the French still 
thought it necessary to build a pavilion for the March 1937 Tripoli fair, since the presence 
of Mussolini would lend special attention to the event. The event symbolized the attempts 
by officials from both countries to find common ground even during a period of diplomatic 
tensions. Following Italian suggestions, the French pavilion focused on the infrastructural 
development of colonies, in what was likely an attempt to shift the justification of 
imperialism to an area in which the Italians invested heavily. Several important Italian 
figures visited the pavilion, including the Minister of Communications and former 
president of the General Confederation of Italian Industry, Antonio Stefano Benni, the 
founder of Fiat, Giovanni Agnelli, the prominent regime figure and Minister of Education 
Giuseppe Bottai, Marshal Badoglio, all accompanied by the Governor-General Balbo. 
While the Italians demonstrated a mixture of respect towards French colonialism, and 
defensiveness in regard to their own accomplishments, Badoglio found a common ground 
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by invoking Hubert Lyautey and Joseph Gallieni when visiting the stands for Morocco and 
Madagascar.128 
Badoglio was wise to do so, as Lyautey served as a unifying figure for French-
Italian co-operation. The devout Catholic Lyautey served as the pre-eminent French model 
for a conservative, yet modern colonial hand. As the Resident-General of Morocco from 
1912-1916, Lyautey favored a hybrid approach to colonial governance that sought to 
support local Moroccan hierarchies and social structures on one hand while facilitating the 
construction of ultra-modern European urban centers on the other.129 In short, Lyautey 
hoped to soften the blow of French-imposed modernity. Like Psichari, Lyautey desired the 
restoration of traditional, and even mystical values, in French society through the army’s 
engagement with rural North Africans, while simultaneously acting as a Cartesian planner 
who, as Timothy Mitchell has argued, created the category of a “traditional Orient” in order 
to better define “French modernity.”130 
For Italians who wanted to turn Libya into a “fourth-shore” of Italian modernity 
while also maintaining an “authentic” Libya of spiritual values and tourist destinations, the 
famous career of Lyautey served as a clear model. And indeed, the Governor-General of 
Libya, Italo Balbo, mimicked the French aristocrat in several prominent ways, asserting 
that “no one admires him more than I”.131 Like his model in Fez, Balbo ruled in Tripoli as 
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something of a Renaissance prince transplanted to North Africa, always careful to cultivate 
the appearance of a modern, yet Oriental court dispensing patronage and arbitrating local 
issues between banquets and military ceremonies with native soldiers. Balbo also presented 
himself as an urban modernizer who would provide the finest facilities for Italians while 
protecting the traditional spaces of Libyans. While the urban programs were not necessarily 
unique to Balbo, his charismatic personality and skill in propaganda attached his name to 
such projects. While Balbo’s biographer is right to argue that Balbo “found his own way” 
of governing, it is clear that the career of Lyautey served as a critical inspiration. 
As a result, it should be no surprise that when seventy French veterans and reserve 
officers visited Tripoli under the guidance of the French general Ursman Somon, they 
provided Balbo with a medal decorated with an effigy of Lyautey to commemorate Latin 
colonization in African lands.132 At times, the Italians would praise Lyautey: the main story 
of the December 1935 issue of Il Mediterraneo heaped fulsome praise on the recently 
deceased general, noting his respect for Islam, his patriotism, and his search for a 
metaphysical unity that would bring humanity together.133 
Though Balbo and Lyautey never met, the former did host a lesser known, but still 
emblematic French colonial figure in 1935-Captain Gabriel Carbillet. Carbillet, unlike 
Lyautey, did not favor the promotion of native elites, preferring instead the introduction of 
modernity into colonies through shock methods. The outcome of Carbillet’s approach in 
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the Syrian Jabal Druze, which Daniel Neep has called Mandate Syria’s “most extreme 
example of Republican Utopianism”, was a major factor in the Syrian Revolt of 1925-
1927.134 The controversial officer then moved to southern Algeria along the Libyan border, 
where he continued to experiment in colonial modernity, particularly in the sphere of 
urban-planning. Since Carbillet was responsible for maintaining good relations with Italian 
border units, he was in correspondence with Balbo; a relationship that culminated in 
Carbillet’s tour of Libya. 
As the visit coincided with the signing of the Laval-Mussolini Accords of 1935, 
Carbillet had cause to look upon Italy with sympathetic eyes in his lengthy report on what 
he saw. His impressions reveal a sincere admiration for the fascist colonial project, despite 
his leftist inclinations. Time and time again, the French officer remarked upon the 
modernity of the architecture and urban-planning of Tripoli and Benghazi. The recently 
built settler villages in Cyrenaica particularly impressed Carbillet, since they all followed 
the same plan, but with houses and churches built in different and “very elegant” 
architectural styles. Furthermore, he believed that the town square buildings represented a 
“great moral force” that inculcated fascist and national values. In conclusion, Carbillet 
thought that Italy was rapidly transforming Libya, and in doing so, had proven that they 
would be a worthy ally of France.135 Following this tour, Carbillet invited an Italian 
counter-part, Colonel Moccia, to visit the oasis of Ouargla, the pride and joy of Carbillet’s 
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local modernization efforts. Such an occasion would allow the French and Italian officers 
a “closer collaboration in the struggle for civilization”.136 However, Carbillet’s contacts 
did cause some concerns: General Noguès recommended to the Governor-General of 
Algeria that the correspondence between Balbo and Carbillet constituted a security risk, 
while his desire to frequently meet with Italians would allegedly lower the prestige of 
France in the eyes of Algerians.137 Such reprimands and strained tensions did not greatly 
change Carbillet’s attitude. When Mussolini visited Libya in March 1937, Carbillet sent a 
telegram to Balbo apologizing that bad weather had kept him from coming, and assuring 
him of his desire to continue their “fruitful Latin collaboration.”138 
Carbillet was not the only representative of the French colonial establishment who 
admired fascist Italy. The Resident-General of Tunisia from 1933-1936, Marcel Peyrouton, 
went so far as to allow his sympathies for Italy influence his political decisions. Before 
taking up his new post, Peyrouton interviewed the Italian consul in Algiers, who came 
away impressed by the “prototype of a new French functionary…deeply Latin in education, 
spirit, and substance.” During the interview, Peyrouton remarked upon his admiration for 
“youthful Italy” and his support for Italy’s demographic colonization plans in the 
Mediterranean.139 Two years later, after the first Italian military victories against the 
Ethiopians, Peyrouton congratulated the Italian consul in Tunis, Enrico Bombieri, telling 
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him in private that the only French opposed to Italy’s war were part of “international Jewry 
or anti-fascists.”140 Both Italian consuls believed that Peyrouton’s attitude towards Italy 
was sincere. Their faith was rewarded by Peyrouton’s actions as Resident-General. 
In response to growing threats from unions and Tunisian nationalist movements, 
Peyrouton employed a series of repressive measures aimed at restoring the administration’s 
control over Tunisian politics. As part of this authoritarian turn, Peyrouton moved against 
Italian communists and anti-fascists, to the satisfaction of the Italian consulate. 
Furthermore, he gave the consulate a largely free hand in policing their own affairs- a tacit 
permission for the consulate to crack down on Italian leftists. As Juliette Bessis has 
remarked, “any debates on the Italian question in Tunisia and on fascism were stifled.” 141 
Though Peyrouton took the geopolitical threat of Italy seriously by bolstering the French 
military presence in Tunisia, he clearly saw allies in the Italian fascists in tamping down 
any forms of colonial resistance. Sidelined by the Popular Front in 1936, Peyrouton would 
later become the first Minister of the Interior under the Vichy government and help pass 
laws persecuting Jews and free-masons. Named as Governor-General of Algeria after the 
American occupation, he would try to delay the repeal of those laws before resigning in 
May 1943.142 
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Peyrouton’s acquiescence to Italian authorities was particularly striking given the 
long-standing tensions between Italy and France in the Tunisian Protectorate. The presence 
of an Italian settler population larger than that of France made the French conquest of 
Tunisia in 1881 difficult to swallow for Italians. The Italians finally recognized the 
protectorate in an 1896 Convention that protected Italian fishing rights, schools, legal 
professions, and most critically, nationality. Thus, the Italians had salvaged something of 
a “state within a state”.143 Even in 1938, according to Bessis, the Italians significantly 
outnumbered the French, with a population perhaps one and a half times greater.144 During 
the 1920s and 1930s, the fascists exerted great efforts to bring these Italians into the life of 
the regime through control over schools, cultural and work associations, and the main 
Italian newspaper, L’Unione, while also working to prevent naturalizations.145 Even 
accounting for a noticeable group of anti-fascists among Tunisia’s Italians,146 fascist 
activities heightened tensions between the two communities. 
Despite the uneasy relations between French and Italians authorities and settlers, 
there were moments when the discourse of Latin unity brought the communities together. 
Perhaps nothing lent itself more to such displays of friendship as the events 
commemorating World War I. The experience saw the two nations in an alliance that 
provided a shared traumatic memory with a binding power for the participants. Though the 
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Italian interventionists, including Mussolini, had made much of the need to defend a 
republican and revolutionary France against the stultifying autocratic Germans,147 the turn 
to fascist authoritarianism meant that the shared discourse would now focus entirely on the 
less explicitly political concept of Latinity. 
In 1932, on the anniversary of the Italian entry into the war, the Italian colony 
invited French veterans to join them for the ceremonies. At the main reception, four of the 
French representatives gave speeches expressing their friendship with Italy, and the 
required visit to the Monument to the Fallen included both the Italian and French sites in 
order to emphasize Latin solidarity.148 Another plea for unity came in early 1933, when the 
French Radical-Socialist deputy Louis Proust gave a speech at a banquet chaired by the 
Resident-General and attended by important leaders from both communities. Proust argued 
that the French and Italians would work towards Latin unity by sharing the project of 
civilizing North Africa, a theme later emphasized by the Eurafricanists. The basis for the 
project was to be found less in the Roman past so commonly talked about, but in the 
experience of the Great War. Discarding the rhetoric employed during the war, Proust 
remembered the conflict in a fascist sense, describing how Latin fraternity was “formed on 
the battlefield, where the enthusiasm for struggle and for the community of danger made 
the war bearable”. Despite the daily divisions that pulled the two communities apart, Proust 
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believed that the patriotic ceremonies recalling the glory of The Great War would serve as 
the guarantee of their continued unity.149 The myth of communal blood-shedding as a basis 
for a sacred national bond then popular in fascist Italy could then be transferred to the Latin 
identity by the French.150 
Yet at times, Franco-Italian demonstrations were not much appreciated by the 
Italian consul. When the Committee of the Franco-Italian League met in April 1933, under 
the guidance of its president, the naturalized-French Edmond Boccara, and his long-time 
friend, the French deputy Valensi, Bombieri dismissed their event as largely a means of 
protecting the interests of Jews.151 Italian authorities looked suspiciously on those Italians 
who were either Jewish or had taken on French citizenship. Collaboration would then only 
be encouraged if the divisions between the two communities were clearly delineated. 
The period of 1935-1936 proved to be the turning point in Franco-Italian relations 
in Tunisia. On 7 January 1935, Mussolini and the French Prime Minister Pierre Laval 
finalized the Rome Accords, largely signed out of a French desire to find allies against 
Nazi Germany. Italy benefited most from the accords, with the French making small 
colonial concessions and essentially giving Italy a free-hand in Ethiopia in exchange for 
Italian concessions in Tunisia. The Italian community in Tunisia, protected from French 
naturalization laws by the Convention of 1896, would enjoy such benefits for another ten 
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years. But after 1965, third-generation Italian settlers would have to take French 
citizenship. Though the Laval-Mussolini Accords favored Italy, French officials in Tunisia 
hoped to use the agreement as a basis for defusing tensions. As a result, many French 
officials and newspapers, like the pro-administrative Dépêche Tunisienne spent much of 
the year praising the Italian authorities in Tunisia as well as the fascist regime and its 
actions. As Bessis has pointed out, the ensuing months saw a mixture of Italian and French 
officials at every public event and ceremony, thus legitimating the very Italian institutions 
designed to strengthen Italian claims to sovereignty over Tunisia.152 
During these collaborative events, the rhetoric tended to normalize and apologize 
for fascist Italy. About two months after the Accords, the Dante Alighieri Society of Bizerte 
could claim a newfound interest among the French, with one hundred mostly French 
“Friends of Dante” joining the eight hundred Italian members.153 In the meantime, the 
French journalist Pierre Grivel had given a conference on Stendhal and Italy for the 
Society. The consul in Bizerte was pleased with the event; not only did Grivel praise the 
Italian regime, but the “political and diplomatic aspects outweighed the literary aspects”, 
and showed that such conferences were a useful tool in keeping a pulse on French feelings 
towards Italy.154 
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Yet the sudden outpouring of French goodwill towards the Italians, encouraged by 
the policies of Peyrouton, began to deteriorate with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 
October 1935. With a weak set of sanctions imposed on Italy by the League of Nations, 
and reluctantly followed by Laval, fervent Italian fascists began to hurl invectives at the 
French on the streets and in newspapers. Those Tunisians, French, and Italians who had 
long opposed fascism found a new reason to criticize the Italian regime. Yet those French 
who still hoped to maintain good relations, whether for diplomatic reasons or a genuine 
sympathy for Italy or fascism, continued to promote a Latin union. Local fascist institutions 
like the Dante Society continued to serve this function; the President of the Society 
organized a series of conferences in Tunisia to justify the Italian invasion, which led to 
such large audiences that organizers used loudspeakers for those who could not fit in the 
rooms. Among those in attendance were numerous French settlers, who allegedly came to 
show their sympathy for Italy and its government.155  
For French rightist settlers, the situation called for more than just passive sympathy 
for Italy. Public demonstrations of unity were required to maintain the Latin union. While 
French rightist papers defended the alleged civilizing mission of Italy, others showed their 
support in Italian political demonstrations. On one occasion, French veterans attended a 
ceremony celebrating the anniversary of the March on Rome, which included speeches 
attacking Great Britain and a rendition of the Marseillaise.156 In another, during a 
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conference held by the Dante Alighieri Society on Ethiopia, and attended by 450, an Italian 
professor urged the French to ally with Italy against Great Britain, citing the latter’s burning 
of Joan of Arc and exiling of Napoleon. As the audience began to leave, a French colonel 
stood up and gave a short speech claiming that Italy was fully within its rights to bring 
Latin civilization to a “barbarous” people.157 
Finally, in December 1935, rightist French settlers organized a conference on the 
Ethiopian issue, with three hundred attending, including many Italians. The main speaker, 
a certain M. de Lorrières, attacked the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden as another 
member of an international Masonic plot opposed to fascism. Furthermore, he praised 
Mussolini as a “modern Caesar”, predicting that the French would look to the light of Rome 
to create their own national idea and calling for French and Italians to pursue the Latin 
ideal together.158 Yet similar calls for unity by Italians could be rather duplicitous, as a 
French agent reported that the fascist deputy Bartolo Gianturco gave a speech conciliatory 
to France before attacking the country in front of an Italian audience on the same day.159 
Similarly, a speaking tour of Tunisia by Marinetti in 1936 further demonstrated the 
growing gaps in the Latin identity and the ways in which Italian speakers could address 
different audiences. In his Italian speeches, Marinetti talked about his recent experiences 
as a volunteer “poet-soldier” in Ethiopia. But when speaking in French, his talks on “The 
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Mediterranean and its Dynamism” were framed in a more universal language. But 
Marinetti still provided hints that his futurist conception of the Mediterranean was tied to 
fascist expansionism, citing the need to unify the many Mediterraneans, while claiming 
that the particular brilliance of Italy was its dual interest in art and war that constituted a 
form of “armed-poetry”. As Tunis-Soir remarked, Marinetti’s desire to see the multiplicity 
of the Mediterranean united into a single space not so subtly implied that Italy would assert 
control over its competitors. While Marinetti’s celebrity may have caused a stir with French 
spectators, his longstanding admiration for war and ties to fascism was a cause for concern 
for those listening closely.160 
French rightists continued to push for collaboration into 1937 in several meetings 
of the fascist Parti Populaire Français. In front of 270 French and 30 Italian spectators, 
Lorrières continued his early campaign, now calling Mussolini an ally in a fight against 
“the Asiatic and communist threat”,161 while another meeting of 300 featured several 
speakers who spoke highly of the youth culture of Italy and the need for a rapprochement 
between the Latin countries.162 Yet as Italian foreign policy fell increasingly in line with 
German interests, the hopes of Franco-Italian collaboration in Tunisia and elsewhere 
became untenable. Finally, on 30 November 1938, inspired by the Munich concessions, 
the Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano delivered a speech in front of the Chamber of 
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Deputies in which he called for the satisfaction of the “natural aspirations” of the Italian 
people. Those in the audience, and the Italian press at large in the following days, insisted 
that Italy lay claim to Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Tunisia.163 At this point, the long-
envisioned possibility of an Italian annexation of Tunisia became a critical component of 
Italian foreign policy. The French settlers in Tunisia responded with anger to the 
increasingly public Italian threats, and any possibility of a union between rightist 
nationalists had been scuttled.164 Some still tried to keep the union alive by appealing to 
the old rhetoric: the President of the Association of Colons in Massicault, Jean Rodrigues, 
gathered one hundred Italian farmers to plead for their loyalty, pointing out that the rupture 
had only occurred because of the Popular Front, but that the French would only respect 
fascism if it restored Italy’s place in the world through peaceful measures. Finally, 
Rodrigues implored his audience to speak to the Italian consulate, and tell them that “Latin 
fraternity is not a slogan devoid of meaning.” Despite such local efforts, the fascist 
commitment to Mediterranean expansionism at the cost of France had ended any plausible 
opportunities for international rightist colonial collaboration.  
While irreconcilable geopolitical differences were clear enough, even the forms of 
shared discourse began to transform into purely nationalist ideas. Starting in the mid-1930s, 
the Italians began to subsume some of the common themes of Latinity into the myth of 
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Romanitas. Since Romanitas was intensely bound up with fascist goals and Italian 
nationalism, it decisively excluded French participation. And once Romanitas had 
overtaken Latinity among Italians, the French who had clung to Latinity were left out in 
the cold. No longer concerned with garnering the support of French rightists, Italy would 
instead increasingly appeal to Tunisians in order to undermine French rule, an attempt that 
will be explored in Chapter Two. 
While Italian ambitions ended the influence of Latinity in Tunisia, French 
nationalists curbed similar desires for unity in Algeria. French Algeria was more fertile 
ground for the success of Latinity. Just as Tunisia had a large Italian settler population, 
Algeria saw large currents of seasonal, and some permanent immigration from Italy, Spain, 
and Malta. For these poor southern Europeans, Algeria was a cheap and close destination, 
and they tended to gather in coastal cities as small artisans and workers, with Italians 
choosing Constantine, Bône (Annaba) and Algiers, and the Spanish flocking to Oran.165 
Government efforts to settle the countryside with French citizens struggled and no efforts 
were made to limit non-French immigration, creating a heterogenous European 
population.166 However, there were significant differences between Algeria and Tunisia. 
While Italy had always asserted its rights in Tunisia, it did not contest French legitimacy 
in Algeria, despite the presence of a sizeable Italian community largely based in the eastern 
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department of Constantine. In Tunisia, the Italians successfully negotiated the 1896 
Convention with France that allowed Italians in Tunisia to maintain their nationality, thus 
placing Italians under a type of dual-sovereignty. In Algeria, the Naturalization Law of 
1889 turned any non-French European born in Algeria into a French citizen so long as they 
did not object. Though the naturalization law prevented the kind of interference practiced 
by Italy in Tunisia, it came with its own challenges for French settlers. For some French-
Algerians, the recently naturalized French were “néo-Français” who had maintained too 
much of their original identities and cultures to ever become truly French. And their 
numbers were significant: in 1891, there were 152,000 Spanish nationals to 268,000 
French. 167 As many chose to accept French citizenship, the number of foreign nationals 
fell, but even in 1936 there were still 21,000 Italians and 92,000 Spanish nationals out of a 
European population of 815,000.168 The identity of French-Algerians would therefore 
emerge from the steady intermingling of these different European populations.  
At the turn of the century then, the European settler community in Algeria was a 
hybrid one, in which different communities had their own patois, and where the pre-
dominance of lower-class and recently naturalized Italians and Spaniards created a kind of 
rough-and-tumble culture characterized by an emphasis on masculinity and frequent 
tensions with Muslims and Jews. Politically, the French-Algerian identity tended to 
encourage distrust of the metropole. For the French settlers, the French government 
                                                 
167 Anne Dulphy, L’Algérie des Pieds-Noirs entre l’Espagne et la France (Paris, 2014), p. 10. 
168 Jonathan K. Gosnell, The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria: 1930-1954 (Rochester, 
2002), p. 160. 
 80 
constrained their rightful expropriation and use of Algerian land and labor, while many 
recently naturalized immigrants preferred to see their French-Algerian identity as distinct 
from a purely French one.169 As a result, the French-Algerian population in the late-19th 
and early-20th centuries sought a unique geographical identity that could accommodate a 
variety of national pasts. Latinity therefore served as a powerful discursive tool for French-
Algerian settlers to understand themselves and to unify the European population against 
the supposed threats from the French administration, Muslims, and Jews. 
The early political manifestations of French-Algerian Latinity took a decidedly 
local flavor. In the midst of the Dreyfus Affair, a French-Algerian wave of anti-Semitism 
briefly united the diverse European populations behind Max Régis, a settler of Italian origin 
and the leader of the Algiers Anti-Semitic League. The targets of settler anger were the 
naturalized French Jewish community and a French administration that allegedly sought to 
curb settler ambitions in order to protect Algerians. For the Italians and Spanish, anti-
Semitism served to highlight their own Catholic identity while lashing out against their 
lower social status vis-à-vis the French.170 Furthermore, some leftists and socialists were 
drawn to anti-Semitism as a form of anti-capitalism; a visiting Jean Jaurès had to firmly 
condemn their stance.171 Along with acts of violence against French Algerian Jews, French 
settlers elected Régis as mayor of Algiers along with several anti-Semitic deputies, 
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including the noted journalist Edouard Drumont.172 The French concession of budgetary 
powers to French-Algerians defused the crisis, but the events revealed the unsettling 
manner in which a uniquely French-Algerian identity could bring together diverse 
European groups at the expense of the Jewish community.173 
The 1920s saw a recrudescence of French-Algerian anti-Semitism with the local 
success of the Unions Latines (UL) in the department of Oran. According to Samuel 
Kalman, the rise of this group marked the open embrace of far-rightist ideas in Algeria. 
Under the leadership of Dr. Jules Molle, and with incendiary newspapers like Le Petit 
Oranais, the UL railed against the alleged global Jewish involvement in monopoly 
capitalism and Bolshevik plots as well as local Jewish political efforts to block settler 
power by voting in bloc for the left. Though Molle and his followers attempted to maintain 
ties with more moderate republican conservatives, their dalliances with authoritarian far-
rightist groups like the Action Française and the Jeunesses Patriotes were more natural fits 
for their radical stances. Despite frequent references to global affairs and conspiracies, 
local political practices still did much to shape the UL’s views. In Algeria, where French 
male citizens enjoyed universal suffrage, and Algerian property-owners and civil servants 
could only vote for municipal elections, political parties relied on extensive patronage 
systems to garner votes rather than ideological platforms. Local leaders of districts would 
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put great pressure on their population to vote for the candidates with whom they had good 
relations. Parties would often hold large events or give away food and wine to buy votes.174 
Since the tightly knit Jewish communities generally followed their religious leaders and 
wealthiest figures, political parties had to court these elites in order to gain the support of 
the majority of the Jewish population.175 A backlash against the Jewish bloc finally broke 
out in Oran, whose Jewish population was proportionally larger than in any other Algerian 
city.176 In 1924, Molle, then mayor of Oran, lost an election in which the Jewish bloc voted 
for his competitor. Molle believed the Jewish population took advantage of the split 
European community to play arbiter and thereby wield a disproportionate amount of 
power.177 As a result, he viciously attacked the Jews on a number of levels. According to 
Molle, the Jews were naturally intolerant, opposed to any form of assimilation, and 
dedicated to using democracy and communism as a means to lessen the power of other 
elites so as to consolidate their own power.178 In order to defeat the Jewish bloc, Molle 
hoped that a Latinist ideology that preached the union of the Spanish, Italian and French 
races could create a bloc capable of the same electoral discipline as the Jewish community. 
And while the unrest of the late 1890s did not make use of a discourse defining the basis 
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for European settler unity, the UL had cultural resources to draw from to justify the political 
union of “Latins” against “Jews”, and “Bolsheviks”. 
At the same time that Régis briefly upset Algerian politics, a novelist from Lorraine 
smitten by the Roman past of North Africa and the possibilities of a new Latin Algerian 
race published his first novel, Le Sang des races. Louis Bertrand, eventually elected to the 
Académie Française in 1925 on the strength of his Algerian novels and popularization of 
Latinity, depicted Spanish and Italian migrants as virile and adventurous figures who 
battled the climate, the obstructions of the French bureaucracy, and the decadence of 
Islamic culture to build a prosperous and civilized Algeria from the sweat of their brows. 
While Patricia Lorcin has argued that Bertrand’s most notable contribution was to 
strengthen the racial barrier between Europeans and Arabs,179 it should also be noted that 
he provided a particularly rightist interpretive lens for the new “Algerianist” French-
Algerian identity. Whereas Maurice Barrès deplored the supposed decadence and 
degeneration of a French society increasingly uprooted from its soil and history, Bertrand 
saw in the Latin re-colonization of Algeria an opportunity for regeneration. At times, this 
even took the form of condemning the French in Algeria as weak and effeminate compared 
to their Spanish and Italian neighbors.180 Bertrand and those novelists who built upon the 
Algerianist tradition thus created a common set of discursive themes that rightist settlers 
would increasingly draw upon in the 1930s. 
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While the death of Dr. Molle in 1931 marked a brief decline in the rightist political 
discourse of Latinity, the ever-expanding international crisis of the 1930s eventually 
brought the idea back into the mainstream of Algerian political culture, especially in its 
stronghold of Oran. Whereas the Unions Latines in the 1920s had added international 
conspiracy theories to local politics, the 1930s manifestation was strongly shaped by the 
sense of a global struggle between the Latin forces of Fascist Italy and Nationalist Spain 
against Communists, Jews, and Freemasons. Kalman’s in-depth study of the French-
Algerian right mentions the international influences of the 1930s, but the intensity of this 
connection should be elaborated on to fully understand the worldview of those mobilizing 
against the Popular Front and a variety of threats to the colonial order. For rightist settlers, 
the repercussions of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the Spanish Civil War had 
heightened the stakes of local politics. Furthermore, in rightist eyes, the Popular Front 
threatened to give France over to the communists and Algeria over to Muslims. 
Consequently, politics in the mid to late-1930s was an existential affair for the Algerian 
right. Starting in 1935, rightist French-Algerians responded by employing the discourse of 
Latinity as a weapon to unite French-Algerians in the defense of the colonial status-quo, 
attack the French Popular Front, and associate themselves with the rightist regimes of Spain 
and France. 
The revitalization of the politics of Latinity revolved largely around the efforts of 
Gabriel Lambert, the mayor of Oran, and Lucien and Paul Bellat, a father-son team that 
controlled local politics in Sidi-Bel-Abbès. These figures represented the local rightist 
leadership in the department of Oran during the Popular Front period. For many French-
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Algerians, the events surrounding the Popular Front’s May 1936 electoral victory were 
worrisome: the ranks of the Socialist and Communist parties grew, strikes broke out, and 
perhaps most ominously, Algerians increasingly participated in leftist demonstrations 
while asserting their own claims through the Muslim Congress. The Algerian nationalist 
leader, Messali Hadj even made a spectacular call for independence at a meeting of the 
Muslim Congress. Many worried French Algerians felt like their world was collapsing. 
The first step to protecting the colonial order was to organize anti-leftist groups under a 
common movement. Thanks to leftist enthusiasm and divided rightist electoral lists, four 
Popular Front candidates out of ten managed to win parliamentary seats in an electorate 
that skewed heavily to the right. In Oran, rightists and conservatives split between Lambert 
and the Croix de Feu candidate, Marcel Gatuing. Blaming his loss on the department’s 
Jews, Lambert quickly made amends with his former competitors and embraced a radical 
rightist vision for Algeria. Since Lambert remained the mayor of Oran, he still wielded 
considerable power, and quickly moved to unite the disparate Algerian rightist groups 
under his umbrella organization, the Rassemblement National pour l’Action Sociale 
(RNAS). Founded weeks after the 1936 election, the RNAS grouped together local parties 
like Lambert’s Amitiés Lambert and the Unions Latines with national parties like the Croix 
de Feu and the Parti Populaire Français. Backed by substantial support from the local 
French press, local politicians, and from French-Algerian voters, the RNAS organized 
rallies, ensured opposition to Popular Front reforms, and encouraged violent reactions 
against Popular Front demonstrations in Algeria. 
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The new generation of leaders distinguished themselves from early Algerian 
advocates of a Latin identity by framing their Latin project in global terms. Speaking during 
a banquet held for Latin-American journalists, Lucien Bellat explained how “common 
origins, race, and thoughts should tie together the Spanish, true French, and Italians; in 
short all the peoples born from Rome. That would be, if you pardon the expression, a 
limited ‘international’ to which we would be able to devote our bodies and souls for the 
greatest benefit of our common interests.” As an example of how a Latin power had been 
mistreated by the global order, Bellat cited the economic sanctions against Italy for its 
aggression in Ethiopia.181 These were not just words intended for foreign consumption, but 
central to the Algerian Latinists analysis of their role in Mediterranean geopolitics. In an 
internal report on the status of the UL before the critical 1936 elections, the author feared 
that the combined forces of Jews, Soviets, and Freemasons would force France into a 
conflict with Italy. Such an outcome would be a disaster for the French Empire, since Italy 
would be a particularly valuable colonial ally, given that its application of fascist principles 
to Ethiopia would open up a “new colonial era”.182 At the same time, Paul Bellat wrote to 
a Latinist and UL candidate for deputy that everything possible had to be done to spread 
Latin ideals. To this end, he had sent an open letter attacking sanctions against Italy to 
Prime Minister Pierre Laval in the name of UL members, as well as ensuring that more 
articles based on Latinity would be published in newspapers and reviews with which he 
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was in contact. Towards the end of the letter, Bellat declared that “we will not let Mussolini 
be defeated; he whose name makes the rabble tremble and is synonymous with order and 
social progress.”183 
Bellat went even further with his admiration for Italy. In a conference for the 
Rassemblement National, the young deputy asserted that the Italian word Risorgimento 
should be borrowed by the French for their own purposes. Yet he was not referring to the 
nineteenth-century Risorgimento of Garibaldi and Cavour, so much as the belief that 
fascism was the final and greatest stage of a continuing Italian Risorgimento. In this 
interpretive key, Bellat hoped that a similar effort would revitalize a France weakened by 
communism and self-doubt.184 
One of the foremost proponents of Latinity, Raoul Follereau (1903-1977), 
frequently spoke highly of Fascist Italy in conferences in Algeria. A graduate of the 
Sorbonne in law and philosophy, the future global champion of the struggle against leprosy 
had several ties to the far-right, even in his poetic attempts, which led him to meet with 
D’Annunzio during his honeymoon.185 As president of the Paris-based Ligue d’Union 
Latine, Follereau advocated for a type of Latin international that would contest 
Bolshevism. In his 1936 book, La Trahison de l’Intelligence, Follereau catalogued the 
failures of German and Anglo-American philosophies, and suggested that they not only 
helped create Bolshevism, but also deprived mankind the tools necessary to combat it. Only 
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a Latin worldview, based on order, hierarchy, and a balance between individual rights and 
social duties could save the world from the post-war political and economic crisis. This 
would be accomplished through the application of universal Latin principles in a patriotic 
International that would contest the Bolsheviks. As Follereau put it, “faced with an 
international crime, we must repress it with international means.”186 
Though Follereau did not mention Italy explicitly in his book, his Algerian 
conferences reveal the importance he placed on Fascist Italy in propagating universal 
Latinity and in opposing Bolshevism internationally. In speeches given in the department 
of Oran in late 1936, he explained the various stages of Bolshevik expansionism. At first, 
they had targeted Italy, where “they believed themselves victorious” until the rise of 
Mussolini. Next was Spain, which had reacted with similar vigor. Now was the turn of 
France, threatened by the Popular Front. Italy had thus served as the first example of how 
to fight back, and was thus an inspiration for other Latin nations. A reporter for Oran’s 
most fervently Latinist paper, Le Petit Oranais, enthusiastically supported Follereau’s 
interpretation of the global situation, asking “Who better than the [French] Algerians to 
respond to the needs of this triple alliance [among Spain, Italy, and France]?”187 In another 
trip to Algeria in 1938, Follereau railed against the world’s Jews, declared that “France for 
the French” included Spanish Algerians, and ended his speeches by asserting the 
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importance of France in establishing a universal Latin ideal: “Without France, the world 
would be alone.”188 
Faced with a challenge to the Algerian status-quo, rightist settlers looked to Italy as 
a model of hierarchical social order. As seen with Tunisian veterans, some argued that 
France owed Mussolini’s Italy a debt for his pro-French interventionist stance in 1914-
1915.189 Furthermore, criticism of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia appeared to implicitly 
challenge the justification for French colonialism, as articles pleaded for Italy’s right as a 
civilized nation to colonize a “savage” and “uncultivated” land.190 Even Italian domestic 
affairs served as inspiration for French-Algerian rightists. Lambert, who visited Italy in 
1936, believed the regime had changed the character of Italians for the better and had 
delivered an effective and comprehensive social welfare system.191 Journalists who visited 
Italy, like the future adviser to Salazar in Portugal, Jacques Ploncard d’Assac, praised the 
modernity of the regime’s urban planning and social institutions.192 Newspaper articles 
consistently made reference to Italian fascist concepts as ideals to pursue. Le Petit Oranais 
re-printed segments of a work advocating a Latin Front, which suggested that if modern 
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achievements of construction, flying and exploration were to rest on the moral authority of 
Virgil, Cervantes, and Pascal, “man will dominate machines, without either destroying or 
worshipping them”.193 Eugène Rethault, an Algerian schoolteacher who became a 
prominent local political figure, echoed several fascist beliefs in his short book A la Dérive. 
French salvation, Rethault argued, would come through an idealistic and practical youth 
whose inspiration would be the past and future, and whose incentive would be spiritual 
rather than profit-based.194 
While Italy served as an ideological model, the much larger Spanish population in 
Algeria elevated Nationalist Spain into an equally valued example. Since the final outlines 
of the new regime had not yet been established, the praise of the nationalists was often 
vague and mostly orientated towards the defence of civilization. The French Algerian right 
commonly placed the rebellion in a broader narrative of the resurrection of the Latin model 
on the international stage. After Mussolini had brought Italy back from the edge of disaster, 
Franco had begun to rescue Spain at the last moment, while the French Algerians had 
finally unified in a rejection of the Popular Front.  In terms of ideology, the French Algerian 
rightists assumed that the nationalist movement was a Spanish equivalent of Italian 
fascism. This view of Spain managed to conflate the different Italian and Spanish 
nationalist movements into one Latin-based phenomenon that aligned with the views and 
needs of French Algerian colonists. 
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Avec l’abbé Lambert à travers l’Espagne Nationaliste, a book by Lambert’s 
secretary Francois Rioland, exemplified the French Algerian right’s propagandistic image 
of Spain. Wherever the nationalists took control, order and prosperity reigned. Rioland 
extolled public housing for workers, a stabilized cost of living and social programs funded 
by the wealthy.195 The ultimate praise of the regime’s work was summed up in the 
declaration that “one must note a general tendency to imitate Italy. What Italy is today, 
Spain will be tomorrow. Who could complain about that? Not the Spanish people.”196 Not 
only did Rioland praise the harmonious society established by Franco, but he also warned 
any Popular Front supporters or sympathizers of the violence they could expect in the 
future. After showing photos of the naked, tortured and mutilated bodies of Nationalist 
soldiers and sympathizers, Rioland declared that “The same fate is reserved for us if we 
cannot unite…”197 After meeting Franco and speaking of Latin civilization on Queipo de 
Llano’s Radio Sevilla, Lambert returned to Algeria where he recounted his experiences at 
a large conference. Lambert praised Spain’s decision to embrace Italian corporatism, and 
suggested France must do the same. 
Yet for all these efforts, the topic of Latinity increasingly became a point of 
contention among the coalition of French-Algerian rightists. By 1938, Lambert’s 
dependence on the Parti Populaire Français (PPF), led by the fascist Jacques Doriot, led 
him to resurrect the Amitiés Latines to maintain a personal following. Though Lambert 
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continued to boast of his contacts with nationalist Spanish leaders, the distinguishing 
feature of the organization was a radical anti-Semitic stance.198 The PPF General Delegate 
to Algeria, Victor Arrighi, embittered by Doriot’s decision to back Lambert as a candidate 
for deputy for the 1940 elections instead of himself, hoped to outmanoeuvre his supposed 
ally. Since anti-Semitism was too strongly embedded in Oran to risk criticizing, Arrighi 
chose to criticize the concept of Latinity. Both Arrighi and the Oran PPF Secretary Gaston 
Vidal began to do so after another rightist electoral failure in Oran in 1937. Arrighi 
contemptuously spoke of Lambert’s Latin organizations as nothing but artistic groups 
where “beautiful women and paintings are shown off”, and to which he would never 
belong, since he considered himself French and not Latin.199 In a November 1937 meeting 
in Relizane, Vidal spoke about how his party now opposed the Amitiés Latines on account 
of its foreign policy.200 Later, in Mostaganem, Vidal expanded on this criticism, claiming 
that the theory of Latinity would lead to the French Empire being split up while isolating 
France from Anglo-Saxon countries.201 With the continued bickering of rightist parties, the 
PPF hoped to use such arguments as a tool to bring doctrinal unity. At one point, Victor 
Arrighi even reprimanded Paul Bellat, urging the supporter of Latinity to call himself 
French instead of Latin, and to cry “Vive la France” instead of “Vive Franco”. The PPF 
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also at this time required its members to pick just one party, with some success, as their 
first day of new recruitments around Sidi-bel-Abbès drew fifty former Unions Latines and 
Parti Social Français members. 202 By late 1938, Lambert’s political fate was largely in the 
hands of the PPF, as the metropolitan parties had squeezed out the Amitiés Latines.203  
That is not to say that the PPF rejection of Latinity was wholesale. The basis of the 
French Algerian settler myth- the creation of a new European race out of Mediterranean 
migration and the ardors of North African colonization remained. Indeed, in the November 
1938 PPF North African Congress held in Algiers, Arrighi continued this discourse in his 
speech, calling the “Algerian race” an “admirable mixture”. In Doriot’s speech, the PPF 
leader proclaimed that the French Algerians were “descendants of a race of pioneers and 
conquerors” working a land that required strong men and women with a natural inclination 
to join a “hardy and virile” party like the PPF.204 By echoing the themes made so common 
by cultural figures like Bertrand, the PPF could continue to appeal to a regional identity 
uniquely susceptible to rightist politics. Yet by not mentioning the words Latin or Latinity 
throughout the Congress, the PPF implicitly rejected the international focus of many of 
their Oran supporters, even though that department constituted much of their strength in 
Algeria. By 1938, the needs of organizing an exclusively French-nationalist response to 
the late 1930s domestic and international political crises had outweighed the vague desire 
for Latin co-operation. Though Kalman is right to suggest that the PPF had caved in to 
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French-Algerian anti-Semitism,205 their rejection of a nascent movement for rightist 
international co-operation in the Mediterranean shows that metropolitan interests were not 
entirely sacrificed in right-wing French-Algerian politics. 
In the end, Spanish and Italian ambitions during World War II thwarted genuine 
attempts at “Latin” imperial co-operation in North Africa. After the French defeat, the 
Germans ended up protecting French Tunisia from Italian rapacity, since Hitler understood 
the danger of weakening the Vichy regime too greatly. Similarly, Hitler rejected Franco’s 
demands for a Spanish entry into the war since they included the possession of French 
Morocco and the department of Oran in Algeria.206 Strict nationalism had then trumped 
efforts by French settlers and idealistic right-wing thinkers to create a Latin union in the 
Mediterranean. 
Conclusion 
When dealing with French colonies, the Italian regime had two options. One was 
to work with the French, and hope to draw out concessions as part of a broader revision of 
the Mediterranean colonial order.207 To this end, the rhetoric of Latinity and Eurocentric 
conceptions of the Mediterranean served as a useful tool to promote cooperation. Even 
French settlers, wary of pan-Islam, Arab nationalism, Bolshevism, and Parisian meddling 
in colonial affairs, could be drawn to the possibilities of a Latin alliance based on an 
authoritarian reassertion of European order and stability. The other option was to fan the 
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flames of Arab discontent in order to weaken the French and pry open the door for Italy to 
make good on its own claims. This was a dangerous strategy, since Italy had its own Arab 
and Muslim subjects in Libya and East Africa. Furthermore, as we have seen, insofar as 
rightist conceptions of the Mediterranean transcended nationalism, they did so by creating 
a kind of super “Latin” nationalism that would theoretically resolve some of the problems 
raised by the apparent limitations to the nation-state. If it was hard enough to build 
consensus for a Latin project, how could rightists realistically appeal to Arabs and 
Muslims? Even some of those given such a task, like the Italian agitator Daniele Occhipinti, 
working in Tunisia, saw the Arabs as inferior and advocated the creation of a Latin 
Empire.208 Yet, as Italian and French interests increasingly diverged in the late 1930s, it 
became clear to both French and Italian rightists that their imperial dreams rested upon 
finding a place for Arabs and Muslims. The following chapters will explore how this path, 
ideologically and practically more difficult, was taken up by the French and Italians, and 
how Arabs and Muslims responded. 
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Chapter Two: Transmitting Italian Fascism in the Mediterranean: 
Egypt and Tunisia 
INTRODUCTION 
With the failure of Latin collaboration in the Mediterranean appearing every more 
probable, Italians began to appeal to Arabs both in North Africa and the Levant. If Italy 
was to build a Mediterranean empire, it would have to weaken the power of France and 
Great Britain. The new friend-enemy grouping, which became increasingly clear as Europe 
hurtled toward war, convinced Italians of the necessity of acquiring Arab allies. On one 
hand, Arab unrest in places like Palestine could delegitimize British and French rule. On 
the other, future Italian expansionism would likely entail Italian control over Arab 
populations, and preliminary steps had to be taken to paint Italy in a positive light. Though 
Arabs were victims of fascist aggression and threats while simultaneously being subjected 
to fascist propaganda during this period, they were not passive. This chapter will explore 
Arab relations to fascism in Egypt and Tunisia, focusing on individual cases of Arabs 
intrigued by or sympathetic to fascist ideas, institutions, and movements, as well as how 
Italian communities served as a tool of fascist propaganda. 
The field of Arab-fascist relations is a hotly contested one. In a recent collection on 
the subject, Israel Gershoni has summarized the terms of the debate by outlining a long-
standing narrative of sympathy and support for fascism in the Middle East that was unable 
to fully come to fruition during World War II thanks to Allied military success, but which 
had extremely troublesome consequences for the post-war Arab world. Recently, thanks to 
scholars like Gershoni, this narrative has been revised by a series of studies that have 
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demonstrated the rather limited nature of Arab support for fascism. In the realm of public 
opinion, anti-fascist voices were more common than those advocating fascist ideas, and 
those who did flirt with fascism often did so for specific reasons that did not constitute a 
full acceptance of Nazi or Italian Fascist views.209 
This chapter, while fully recognizing the limited nature of Arab support for fascism, 
which is abundantly confirmed, for example, in the Italian Fascists’ own interpretations, 
seeks to further develop the study of those who did take an interest in fascism. This chapter 
also does not treat those Arabs who found something to admire in, or borrow from fascism 
as necessarily authoritarian or xenophobic. As will be seen, individuals across the political 
spectrum had a variety of reasons to examine fascist ideas and practices. And even those 
who seemed to fully embrace co-operation with fascists still maintained their own specific 
visions that sometimes clashed with those of their European allies. In order to avoid falling 
into a resistance/collaboration reduction, this chapter will depart from recent studies that 
have fruitfully demonstrated the various ways in which Italian fascists sought to gain 
adherents in the Arab world.210 Instead, the focus will be placed on local interactions 
between fascists and a variety of Arab actors. 
One way in which to go beyond the reductive question of whether certain Arabs 
were fascist sympathizers or not is to view their interactions with individual components 
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of fascism rather than as a coherent whole, which even historians of fascism have struggled 
to define. This allows us to separate out the specific elements of fascism that appealed to 
some Arabs, and examine how these elements could be interpreted and evaluated by non-
Italian actors. In the case of an illiberal and authoritarian ideology like fascism, such an 
approach also converges with Yaseen Noorani’s desire to undermine the binary of a liberal 
and universal Western modernity opposed to a failed non-Western modernity. According 
to Noorani, the discovery of modern norms in the Middle East that grew out of pre-modern 
and non-Western societies instead of being imposed or borrowed from Europe can help 
reveal aspects of European modernity that have been marginalized in order to maintain the 
liberal and universal ideal.211 Though Noorani is largely concerned with how an individual 
ethics of nationalism rose in the Middle East through interior rather than exterior 
influences, his comment on the underside of European universalism raises interesting 
questions. While fascism is certainly not a forgotten part of the European experience of 
modernity, its mere presence as a highly publicized competing alternative to liberalism and 
socialism offered Arabs a new interlocutor with Western modernity through which local 
experiences could be re-interpreted. If the Arab construction of a form of national 
consciousness implied a certain rejection of a blatantly hypocritical European liberalism 
which, as Abdeslam M. Maghraoui has pointed out, “invalidated the principles it 
announced”212, then a movement like fascism could present an intriguing image as a new 
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type of modernity similar to that undertaken by Arab political and social reformers. The 
fact that Italy was still a fairly young nation that constantly trumpeted its desire to escape 
the shackles of liberal Great Britain and France could only add to the feeling of proximity 
with the Arab situation by those attracted to fascism. Consequently, fascism helped 
demonstrate that the European norms of liberal democracy were less universal than 
advertised, and that different forms of modernity in the Middle East could also have an 
equal claim to validity. Those Arabs who took up an interest in fascism can thus be seen 
less as blind admirers than as actors attempting to use aspects of a novel European 
modernity to help justify and bolster their own political and social visions. 
Alternatively, fascism could emphasize the exclusivist elements of liberalism. 
Maghraoui argues that Egyptian liberals borrowed from European thinkers like Gustave Le 
Bon and Hippolyte Taine in order to demonstrate that the essence of their country was 
Western, and based on a Pharaonic rather than Islamic past. Such views tended to denigrate 
the existing traditions and beliefs of the Egyptian population and contributed to the 
imposition of Western forms of modernity with little popular support.213 Though fascism 
did not introduce the idea of a people constituted as a Western-oriented nation, it did re-
present them as a norm now stripped of liberal connotations. This explains how fascism 
was more attractive to a younger nationalist like Ahmad Husayn, and less so to the liberal 
modernist Taha Husayn.214 
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In order to highlight the variety of ways that fascist ideas circulated in the 
Mediterranean, this chapter will focus less on the mechanism of propaganda/reception in 
order to look at more specific, often individual cases of Arab experiences with fascism. 
Because these experiences varied nationally, this chapter will examine two countries from 
different vantage points. In the case of Egypt, a rapidly modernizing country with a rich 
interwar political culture, we will see how the Italian fascist model served as a template for 
a variety of political actors to examine possible answers to the problems of modernization. 
And perhaps most importantly, the Egyptians presented here largely sought out information 
from Italians rather than being exposed to fascist propaganda. This allows us to specify 
which elements of fascism most intrigued a variety of Egyptians. In Tunisia, where colonial 
control was tighter than in Egypt, and where Italian expansionism posed a larger threat, 
fascism was less attractive as a competing form of modern political organization. Yet the 
large Italian community, in the midst of integration into fascist institutions, brought fascism 
into everyday affairs between Tunisians and Italians, with mixed results for Italy’s 
aspirations towards Tunisia. The Egyptian and Tunisian experiences with fascism were 
uniquely important for several reasons. Bordering the Italian colony of Libya to the east 
and west, Egyptians and Tunisians had the greatest opportunity to follow the events of the 
brutal Italian occupation of the former Ottoman provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. 
Furthermore, once secured in their new colony, the Italians presented a military menace to 
both of its new Mediterranean neighbors. And indeed, as early World War II plans drawn 
up by Italian ministries indicate, the Italian Mediterranean empire would be heavily based 
on new relationships of authority and power over Egypt and Tunisia. Consequently, these 
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countries would therefore see some of fascist Italy’s most wary detractors, as well as a 
particularly intense Italian propaganda campaign. These factors combined to make the 
topic of fascist Italy a commonly debated one amid political circles in both countries.  
EGYPT 
I. Egypt and the West 
Modern Egypt, though geographically a part of North Africa, is culturally and socially 
closer to the Mashriq than to the Maghreb. Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals, in particular, 
played a critical role in the Nahda, the Arab revitalization and modernization movement of 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries.215 Yet for many decades, particularly in Cairo and 
Alexandria, Egypt felt the powerful currents of European influence brought by the presence 
of Greek, Italian, Maltese, French, Russian, and British communities. Ever since the 
modernization efforts of Muhammad ʿAli in the first half of the nineteenth-century, 
Europeans had been drawn to Egypt as technical advisers, financiers, merchants, architects, 
engineers, and small tradesmen. The construction of the Suez Canal from 1859-1869 
intensified Egypt’s Western connections by drawing in foreign investments and loans while 
heightening the strategic importance of Egypt to Great Britain.216 Egyptian ties to Europe 
continued under the British Protectorate (1882-1922). But the nationalist uprising of 1919, 
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the end of the Protectorate in 1922, and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 all served as 
steps toward independence that put Egypt’s future relation to Europe in question. 
From the perspective of many Egyptian nationalists during the interwar years, 
Egypt was firmly grounded neither in the Maghreb nor the Mashriq, but in the West. 
Intellectuals like Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Salama Musa, and Taha Husayn, inspired 
by the creation of a secular and modernizing Turkish state and the Egyptian Revolution of 
1919 that would weaken British rule and establish a liberal constitution, articulated a vision 
of Egyptian territorial nationalism. By stressing the geographically determined and 
timeless nature of the Egyptian identity, these intellectuals minimized the importance of 
Arabs and Islam on their history.217 
 The Egyptian nationalists’ decision to distance themselves from the East was a 
means of justifying an advocacy for European-style modernity. Through a revised 
historical narrative that situated the birth of Western Civilization in Pharaonic Egypt, these 
intellectuals could claim that the modern elements they hoped to borrow from Europe were 
simply a return of what Egypt had created.218 In his influential book, The Future of Culture 
in Egypt (1936), the liberal thinker Taha Husayn clearly summarized this view in firmly 
situating Egypt in a Western, Mediterranean world instead of in the Orient, declaring that 
“our country has always been a part of Europe as far as intellectual and cultural life is 
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concerned, in all its forms and contents.”219 Afraid that cultural connections with Beirut 
and Damascus would hold Egypt back, some intellectuals even hoped that Syrian and 
Lebanese involvement in the Egyptian press would be curtailed.220 As the 1930s 
progressed, the unified current of Egyptian nationalism prevalent in the 1920s became 
increasing fractured, and the notion of a Western-oriented Egyptian civilization saw 
challenges from Muslim and pan-Arab thinkers that re-asserted the importance of the 
East.221 Yet the continued presence of a territorial national identity was enough to shock 
visiting pan-Arab activists.222  
The Italians certainly paid attention to the Western-oriented Egyptian nationalists. 
Though he recognized the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic groups that gravitated towards Cairo, 
the future Italian Plenipotentiary Minister to Egypt, Roberto Cantalupo, argued that 
“modern Egypt is too close to the West, too Westernized itself, to be in complete solidarity 
with all the Islamic forces of the distant and Asiatic East.”223 For the Italian advocate of 
Eurafrica, Paolo d’Agostino Orsini di Camerota, Egypt was a “filo-European” nation which 
would play a critical role in the European-led development of Africa. After centuries of 
being turned towards the Levant under Arab and Ottoman rule, Muhammad ʿ Ali had swung 
Egypt decisively towards the West once more, with profound implications for the nation’s 
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future.224 However, whereas Egyptian nationalists stressed that Pharaonic Egypt had 
helped create the West, Orsini di Camerota maintained that it was Greece and Rome which 
had brought Egypt out of the East. Similar appraisals dictated Italian plans for Egypt during 
the heady summer of 1940, when officials believed that victory over Great Britain was 
imminent. The Ministry of Italian Africa, the Foreign Ministry, and the Army all concocted 
schemes by which Italy would greatly expand its formal and informal empire. In all of 
them, Egypt was left an independent state, since officials feared that imposing Italian rule 
would result in pan-Arab unrest while simultaneously challenging a nation with a “strong 
spirit of independence”. Nonetheless, Italians would seek to exchange Egyptian 
independence from Great Britain for some form of Italian control over the Sudan, as well 
as the Suez Canal, as protecting entrances to the Mediterranean had long been a fascist 
geopolitical goal. During the war, Orsini di Camerota hoped that an Italian-controlled 
Eastern Mediterranean and East Africa would make it the primary partner in the continuing 
modernization and Westernization of Egypt.225 
Italian hopes that Egypt could be firmly brought within their sphere of regional 
development can be seen in the plans for the cancelled Italian Exhibition to be held in Cairo 
in 1939. An Italian exhibition in Cairo and Alexandria attended by King Fuʿad had already 
been held in 1927; along with demonstrating Italian publications on Egypt, it included 
conferences on syndicalism, fascist culture, and the role of Rome in history.226 By the late 
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1930s, a much more ambitious exhibition was envisioned. With the backing of the fine-
arts figure Muhammad Mahmud Khalil,227 the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Cairo and 
the Italian Legation hoped to succeed where previous exhibitions in Egypt had failed by 
using a “vivid presentation” to excite the public.228 Clearly, the Italians hoped to employ 
the highly-developed exhibition techniques employed by fascists in Italy to impress 
Egyptians. One of the aims would be to demonstrate that Italy was uniquely suited to aiding 
the development of Egyptian agriculture and industry, highlighting specifically how the 
success of Italian heavy industry had not “suffocated and destroyed artisans”, the 
“aristocracy of labor” who manifested the “artistic tradition of the race”.229 Italy would 
then portray itself to Egyptians as the guiding light of a form of a controlled modernity that 
limited excesses and respected the past. In short, the exhibition would make the argument 
of Orsini di Camerota that Italy was the best partner for Egypt in the ongoing process of 
development and modernization. Though the lack of available funds and political 
uncertainty scuttled the event,230 its outlines were indicative of the importance Italians 
placed on Egypt in their Mediterranean plans, as well as how their connections with figures 
like Khalil could be potentially leveraged into political propaganda projects. 
One reason why Italians saw Egypt as too modern to be brought under direct 
imperial rule was their desire to congratulate themselves. A substantial Italian community 
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had lived in Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez for many decades, and was given 
considerable credit by fascists for the modernization of Egypt. Though a few Italians were 
favored as architects by Egyptian patrons, and occupied key positions in cultural 
institutions,231 the majority were poor immigrants from Southern Italy and Sicily seeking 
higher wages.232 During the 1930s, the Italian population in Egypt likely hovered around 
50,000, the second largest foreign community to the Greeks, who numbered 75,000. A 
1930 report indicates that the Italian population in Cairo was between 18,000 and 24,000, 
with most living in the Bulaq, Shubra, and Ismaʿiliya districts.233 The fact that few lived in 
the posh suburbs of Garden City, Zamalek, or Heliopolis indicates that the Italians were 
more likely to live with Egyptians than the French or British. Indeed, since many Italians 
in Cairo took on jobs as machinists in small-workshops, they formed a strong presence in 
the industrial-commercial center of Bulaq. Some even remained into the post-war years.234 
Another 25,000 lived in Alexandria, often in poorer quarters like ʿAṭṭarin and Labban.235 
Although Italians had initially taken key positions in sanitary and postal institutions, by the 
interwar years they had long been relegated to manual labor and clerical work. More 
wealthy elites could be found in the Greek than in the Italian community.236 As recent work 
                                                 
231 Michael Haag states that Italians, “more than any other community were the architects and 
engineers of modern Alexandria”, Alexandria: City of Memory (New Haven, 2004), p. 134. 
232 Francesca Fauri, “Italians in Africa (1870s-1914), or How to Escape Poverty and Become a 
Landowner”, The International History Review, Vol. 37, 2 (2015), pp. 324-334. 
233 ASMAE, Rapp. Egitto, B. 243, F. Scuole 3, Rapporto 3931/374, 12 June 1930. 
234 Janet L. Abu-Lughod, Cairo: 1001 Years of the City Victorious (Princeton, 1973), pp. 91, 
115, 199. 
235 Robert Ilbert, Alexandrie, 1830-1930, Histoire d’une communauté citadine, Tome 1 (Cairo, 
1996), p. 398. 
236 Haag, Alexandria, pp. 134-135. 
 107 
on Egypt’s foreign communities has shown, class was a more important determinant to 
population distribution than nationality. The majority of residents in the wealthier 
“European” quarters were Egyptian.237 As such, Italians were more likely to live beside 
poorer Egyptians and Greeks, though individual streets tended to be dominated by one 
group.238 
 Given the poverty and diversity of the Italian population in Egypt, which included 
5000 Greeks, 5000 Eritreans, and 5000 Levantine Jews,239 creating a fascist community 
was no easy task. The fascio organizations in Cairo and Alexandria saw frequent infighting 
and transgressions of Italian consular authority during the 1920s.240 And while many 
Italians in Egypt had demonstrated strong patriotic sentiments before the rise of fascism, 
authorities feared that increasing numbers of youth would be drawn away from an Italian 
identity. Since Italian children were more likely to find opportunities through French 
schools, consulates and local fascists began an effort at “rounding-up” (rastrellamento) 
Italian school-children to ensure the maintenance of an Italian national identity. The same 
drawbacks to Italian schooling also meant wealthier Egyptians preferred to send their sons 
and daughters to French schools.241 Even when Italian schools mostly targeted Egyptians, 
                                                 
237 James Moore, “Making Cairo modern? Innovation, urban form and the development of 
suburbia, c. 1880-1922”, Urban History, 41, 1 (2014), pp. 102-104. 
238 Ilbert, Alexandrie, pp. 405-406. 
239 Ibid., Tome II, pp. 616-617. 
240 ASMAE, Rapp. Dipl. Egitto- Many of the folders regarding the Egyptian fascio during the 
1920s are more concerned with these organizational squabbles and accusations than the tasks of 
organizing the Italian community. 
241 ASMAE, Rapp. Dipl. Egitto, B. 243, F. Scuole-3, Consulate-Alexandria to MAE, N. 2320-
297, 19 April 1930. 
 108 
as in Catholic-run schools in Upper Egypt, they faced competition from French and 
American competitors. Those Egyptians that did attend Italian schools tended to be less 
well-off.242 Perhaps this was reflected in the popular quarter of Bulaq in Cairo, where 
Egyptian youth ranged from a quarter to a fifth of all students between 1931 and 1933 in 
the main Italian elementary school.243 Even if Italians struggled to attract Egyptian 
students, their shift to a more nationalist education did not preclude the continuing presence 
of locals. 
 Fascist youth organizations like the Balilla and Avanguardisti also targeted Italian 
students. As early as 1931, the Cairo fascio could claim to have signed up 1278 Italians to 
these organizations. The poverty of Egypt’s Italians deepened the community’s embrace 
of fascist authorities who not only delivered subsidies, but also provided opportunities for 
their children to take advantage of group tours in Egypt and trips to Italy.244 Egyptians and 
other foreign communities living in proximity to Italians then had a more intimate 
experience with fascist institutions than offered by newspapers and newsreels. At times, 
Italian youth from Italy came to visit the famous sites of Egypt while showcasing a 
revitalized Italian nation. In 1931, for example, six hundred Avanguardisti visited the 
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citadel, Muhammad ʿAli mosque, and pyramids of Giza in Cairo before returning to 
Alexandria where they paraded through the streets. Cantalupo reported that their behavior 
impressed Italians and Egyptians alike.245 
II. Egyptians in Contact with Fascism 
Given the size of the Italian population in Egypt, its proximity to Egyptians, and its 
adoption of fascist institutions by the start of the 1930s, it is not surprising that fascist ideas 
circulated among Egyptian nationalists and political activists. In the nineteenth-century, 
Italy had overcome its own foreign occupiers to unify and assert itself as a European power. 
As a Mediterranean country with a long history, the re-establishment of Italian dignity 
clearly offered a hope to Egyptian nationalists. Now their fascist government promised to 
carry on the Risorgimento ideal of creating Italian subjects to match the unified state. This 
project could now even be seen outside of Italy, on the streets of Cairo and Alexandria. 
While James Moore has rightfully argued that the growing interwar nationalism of foreign 
communities in interwar Egypt must shoulder some blame for the decline of Egyptian 
cosmopolitanism,246 it also offered an at times paradoxical opportunity for borrowing and 
appropriation. Even if Egyptians often looked at Italian nationalism with a critical and 
concerned eye, it still offered both a normative model for their claims to modernity, as well 
as ideas for how to mobilize national identity and resources through state organizations.  
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 Wilson Chacko Jacob has demonstrated the importance of sports, masculinity, and 
physical culture to Egyptians in search of a modern subjectivity capable of resisting 
colonialism and asserting Egyptian independence.247 The Egyptian nationalists’ concern 
with the body then opened an opportunity for fascists to advertise their own efforts at 
national regeneration. At times, fascist organizations participated alongside other local 
groups. For instance, when a sports organization run by Princes ʿUmar Ṭusun and ʿAbbas 
Ḥilmi held a series of competitions in 1929 with French, Armenian, Greek, Italian, and 
Egyptian athletes, Italians won 12 of the 17 events. The consulate of Alexandria was 
excited that they had given such a good account of themselves, especially since their 
organization had recently been incorporated into the fascist Dopolavoro recreational 
institution.248 In 1934, the Port-Said fascist youth were finally invited to join Maltese, 
Greek, and Egyptian Boy-Scout groups for an annual gathering to salute Prince Farouk.249 
Yet it was not in the realm of sport that fascism drew the most youth interest, but rather in 
more political organizations. 
 Though it was recognized by many Egyptians as a geopolitical threat, Italian 
Fascism also offered a potential set of ideas, practices, and institutions for Egyptian 
political activists looking for new political forms in a period of apparent deadlock among 
the nationalist Wafd party, the conservative monarchy, and the British. Immediately upon 
                                                 
247 Wilson Chacko Jacob, Working Out Egypt: Effendi Masculinity and Subject Formation in 
Colonial Modernity, 1870-1940 (Durham, 2011), pp. 44-124. 
248 ASMAE, Rapp. Dipl. Egitto, B. 232, F. Untitled, Consulate-Alexandria to MAE, N. 3558-
470, 31 May 1929. 
249 ASMAE, Rapp. Dipl. Egitto, B. 283, F. Fascio Anno 1934, Consulate-Port-Said to Legation-
Cairo, N. 675-14, 13 February 1934. 
 111 
the founding of a student-led Wafdist paramilitary group, called the Blue Shirts, feelers 
were sent out to Italy. In January 1936, an ex-deputy and president of Alexandria’s Wafdist 
youth organization, Mamduḥ Riaz, asked the Italian Legation for publications on the 
technical aspects of fascist youth organizations and the Dopolavoro.250 Seeing an 
opportunity to find potentially pro-Italian voices in a country upset by Italian aggression in 
Ethiopia, the Italians sent Riaz one book on youth education and eight defending Italian 
actions in East Africa.251 The case highlights the Italian clumsiness in dealing with 
potentially friendly Egyptians: one can imagine Riaz’ surprise when he received a probably 
unwanted stack of literature on Ethiopia when his concern was purely with social 
organizations. Yet the episode reveals the desire of a younger generation of Egyptian 
political actors to study the institutions of the Italian regime. Similarly, a young student 
largely responsible for the organization of Cairo’s Blue Shirts, Muhammad Bilal, openly 
admitted he had followed the Italian model.252 
The Blue Shirts’ interest in fascist youth groups went beyond mere technical 
matters for some. An Egyptian literature student writing in the Wafdist paper al-Jihad 
placed the Blue Shirts in a universal trend that had originated in the Italy of Garibaldi and 
Mazzini and found its fruition in the Black Shirts. According to the author, the Black Shirts 
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had “a social role, as the defenders of public morality and of virtues”, while inculcating a 
national spirit in Italians. After listing other countries where similar organizations were 
taking root, the student concluded, “One can foresee that we will be like Italy and Germany 
shortly. As in these two countries, the institution of colored shirts will assure Egypt the 
future of which it is worthy.”253 If as Gilbert Achcar notes, fascism had some admirers 
among the Egyptian middle-classes, it was because it offered a model of action for 
supposedly oppressed peoples. Still under British military occupation and sympathetic to 
the struggles of Palestinians,254 Egyptians could see something in the Italian response to 
their own “mutilated victory” of World War I. Squadrismo culture, which operated as a 
sacred act of national salvation in the minds of dedicated Italian fascists,255 could then 
appeal to the colonized seeking their own independence and experience of national and 
personal regeneration. Ironically, this would go against Italian interests, who would prefer 
an Egyptian government amenable to heavy Italian influence. Yet, as Wolfgang 
Schivelbusch writes, the enthusiasm for renewal generated by a “culture of defeat” tends 
to manifest itself as a universal model to be copied by others.256 This contradiction can be 
seen in the actions of Italians in Egypt, who were happy to share information about the 
Black Shirts, yet privately expressed criticisms of the Egyptian youth squads. 
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It is also important to note that the Italian example was not one that was only 
followed from a distance. Thanks to the efforts to fascistize Egypt’s Italians, many urban 
Egyptians would have had some firsthand contact with fascist demonstrations of power 
and youthful energy. The newspaper Kawkab al-Sharq expressed one possible reaction to 
such experiences when writing that “the citizens of Cairo, with their sincere admiration for 
the new generation placed in the Wafd’s youth organizations, almost seem to get revenge 
on prior governments that impeded the creation of such groups, forcing the Egyptians to 
watch with jealous eyes the fascist Italians that traversed with great pride the streets of 
Egyptian cities, without the Egyptian youth being able to imitate them.”257 With the arrival 
of the Blue Shirts, Egyptians could now express their nationality through the public 
displays of order and discipline introduced in Egypt by the Italian immigrant community. 
Yet despite the claims of some Blue Shirts that they were following in the footsteps 
of fascists, the Italians were not fooled, and correctly interpreted why the movement came 
about and what its limitations were. As James Jankowksi has shown, the Wafd assented to 
the creation of the Blue Shirts so as not to avoid losing the increasingly radicalized youth 
to groups like Ahmad Husayn’s Young Egypt, while also channeling the political energy 
of the late 1935 protests against the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.258 As a result, a tense 
relationship existed between the moderate Wafd leaders and its more radical Blue Shirt 
members who pushed for more forceful public political action. Ten months after the 
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founding of the organization, the Italian Legate noted that the “Wafd will have to remedy 
this centrifugal tendency if it does not want to see a force that it has nourished rise up 
against it.” Though the Legate thought that the Blue Shirts could play a disruptive role, he 
also believed they were still quite distant from Italian squadrismo, as well as other similar 
European movements.259 
The paternity of the blue shirts idea was contested however. The President of the 
Egyptian Nationalist Party, Hafiz Ramaḍan Bey, took credit for the idea, stating that his 
Nationalist Youth Association had been wearing blue shirts since 1932. Though Ramaḍan 
Bey’s Blue Shirts remained separate, the Italians believed he was pleased with the Wafd’s 
gamble, since the youth would soon be disillusioned with the moderate Wafdists and move 
to his own youth movement, which had been espousing a radical interpretation of youth 
politics all along.260 According to a 1934 report by the Italian Legate, Ramaḍan Bey’s 
group was openly modeled after fascist organizations and included 1500 students and 
recent graduates. Though he kept them from playing an open political role, which surely 
allowed the Wafd to later appropriate the use of the blue shirts, the Nationalist Party leader 
used this group to experiment with fascist ideas. Ramaḍan and some of his followers had 
studied a wide variety of material sent from Italy on corporate institutions, with the hopes 
of “adapting fascist corporatism to local conditions and applying them gradually in 
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agricultural centers to demolish the Wafd party.”261 In a letter to Mussolini asking for his 
word that Italy had no claims on Egypt, Ramaḍan expressed his desire that “Egyptian 
fascism will be able to follow in the glorious path of its elder sibling, Fascist Italy.”262 
However, despite Ramaḍan Bey’s attempts to ingratiate himself with the Italians, they were 
skeptical. The Legate described Ramaḍan Bey as “a man of superior quality, but a theorist 
and intellectual without people by his side capable of complementing those qualities”. And 
after a long meeting with the Nationalist leader, the Legate decided that “the affinities and 
sympathies of the nationalist party for fascism do not seem very solid, or at least are limited 
to its spiritual leader, who otherwise does not appear to have the energetic and dynamic 
personality needed to create a party of notable importance in the life of the country.”263 
Associated with Ramaḍan Bey’s Nationalist Party was a more radical, intransigent 
movement, Young Egypt, founded in October 1933 by Ahmad Husayn. Young Egypt’s 
paramilitary youth organization, the Green Shirts, employed the same fascist style and 
language as the other youth groups, but with a similarly radical party leading it. Gershoni 
and Jankowski, working from British documents, recognize that Young Egypt had some 
contacts with Italy, and possibly received Italian money to subsidize their newspapers as 
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well as a trip Husayn took to Italy.264 The Italian documents give us a more extensive 
picture of the relationship between the two sides. 
The Italians were rightfully circumspect with a party that advocated a xenophobic 
platform that could harm the interests of Egypt’s Italian population. Furthermore, open 
Italian support for a party with little chance of taking power could needlessly harm Italian 
relations with Great Britain and the Wafdists. When Young Egypt sent out feelers to the 
Italian Legation in September 1935 regarding support for an anti-British position, the 
Italians balked: “...what they would like from us is to tangibly contribute to favoring a 
greater activity of the Association, which would end in a violent anti-British campaign with 
inevitable British reactions. For now, it does not appear to me that the local situation allows 
us to pass from vague commitments, which I have not failed to give, to concrete 
agreements.”265 As such, it was Young Egypt that at times looked to Italy for assistance, 
and not only as a potential ally against the British. Husayn also wanted to study fascist 
institutions. 
II. Institutional Borrowings 
As Egyptian politicians and officials gained more freedom from British control, it 
became easier to shape policies and institutions. Other nations undergoing similar 
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modernization efforts, like Turkey and Iran, provided potential models to follow. At times, 
Italy was counted among these countries, as fascist initiatives aimed at tying the nation 
together through economic programs and infrastructural development were highlighted to 
the international press. The subject of institutional borrowing helps us to escape the overly 
simplistic labelling of Egyptians as fascists or anti-fascists. As we will see, Egyptians from 
many political backgrounds at times believed they could extract useful lessons from Italy. 
In her study of Meiji-era Japan, D. Eleanor Westney has argued that institutional borrowing 
is not a matter of clever copying, or dictated by a “rational shopping” model. Instead, she 
proposes that institutional borrowing can be complex-sometimes limited by accessibility 
of information and influenced by new trends-as well as subject to significant alterations 
upon adoption.266 While Great Britain, France, and Germany would remain obvious 
influences on government institutions and reforms, and Turkey offered a blueprint of how 
to secularize an Islamic country, Italy could be attractive to those interested in a more 
interventionist state with nationalist instead of socialist tendencies. 
Despite Italian hesitations to aid Young Egypt, Ahmad Husayn hoped to learn from 
the Italian example. Undeterred by a disappointing trip in Italy in 1934,267 Husayn decided 
to send a 28-year-old Ministry of Finance functionary, Abdul Daiem Abul Ata, to Italy to 
learn firsthand about fascist institutions in the summer of 1936. An Italian Interior Ministry 
document allows us to track Ata’s time in Italy. After attaining a leave from his ministry 
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to learn Italian, Ata received permission from Italian hierarchs to register for the University 
for Foreigners in Perugia, whose courses he attended “occasionally” in July 1936. He did, 
however, forge relations with local fascist figures, and “interested himself especially in 
Syndical and Corporative structures.” Ata even made inquiries into the possible purchase 
of explosives and other weapons for Young Egypt. Such nefarious concerns, whether they 
were suggested by Husayn or not, made Ata nervous about his mission. When Il Giornale 
d’Italia ran a picture of Ata with local fascist hierarchs on a trip to visit Spoleto’s 
Dopolavoro section, he worried that it might be noticed in Egypt. Yet the Italians did not 
see a circumspect political agent, but a “megalomaniac who is mentally wound up and 
disordered”.268 This judgement was perhaps vindicated upon Ata’s return to Egypt, where 
his open bragging about Italian contacts forced the Egyptian Finance Ministry to move him 
from Cairo to the provinces.269  
Between July and August 1938, Husayn spent two weeks in Italy as part of a tour 
of Europe, including Great Britain, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. For this tour, Husayn 
received much more support from the Italians, possibly thanks to telling the Italian Legate 
that the name Young Egypt was inspired by Giuseppe Mazzini’s Young Italy, and that 
Mussolini was the “maestro” of the era.270 Accompanied by Dr. Selim Cattan, who worked 
in the Italian Foreign Propaganda service, and with a car at his disposal, Husayn 
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extensively toured all the spaces in which Fascist Italy projected its societal vision to both 
Italians and foreigners. The Ministry of Popular Culture reported that in Rome, Husayn 
visited the Royal Academy, the University City (La Sapienza), Cinecittà, the Forlanini 
Institute, the National Dopolavoro Exhibition, the Augustan Exhibition of Romanità, the 
Ministry of Aeronautics, the National Institute for Maternity and Child-Care, the seaside 
summer camp at Ostia, and the Stadium of Marble Statues/Fascist Academy of Physical 
Education. Husayn then joined Abul Ata, who had returned to Italy to study at La Sapienza, 
for tours of the industrial centers of Terni, Turin, and Genoa.271 Husayn came back from 
this trip quite impressed with the Italian (and German) models, and praised the 
dictatorships for their efficient rule and for placing their people before capitalist 
interests.272 The grand-tour of Italian institutions and set-piece projects likely made an 
impression on Husayn. 
Less radical Egyptian administrators and politicians also took interest in various 
Italian institutions and projects. As early as 1927, the liberal journal al-Siyasa al-Usbuʿiyya 
ran an article extolling the recent fascist legislation on maternal and infant care. The 
journalist, Ṭaha Fawzi had been ordered to investigate the matter by the former Wafdist 
politician,273 Dr. Hafiz Afifi Bey, who hoped to pass similar legislation. Fawzi, a trusted 
friend to the Italians who had been recommended for Italian knighthood, had been given 
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all the materials necessary to assist Afifi.274 The mid-1930s saw more frequent studies of 
Italian institutions and reforms. In late 1936, the Cairo Legate bragged that a Wafd proposal 
for a new propaganda ministry was largely inspired by the Italian model. An unnamed 
member of the Wafd government, “inspired by philo-Italian feelings and an admirer of 
fascism”, had asked the Legate for details on the Italian ministry. Furthermore, Dr. Ahmed 
Farid al-Rafai claimed that in examining the press offices of 25 nations, he had taken 
particular note of the Italian model, along with those of Germany, Bulgaria, and Turkey.275 
Government officials also held conferences focusing on fascist programs. In June 
1935, Fuʿad Abaza Bey, the director of Egypt’s Royal Society of Agriculture, presented a 
report on the highly-touted Italian “bonifica” project to a “numerous audience consisting 
mostly of experts on agricultural questions” after a tour of Italy.276 Fu’ad Abaza was born 
in 1890 to a family of influential landowners, and by the 1930s, was an internationally 
recognized expert on Egyptian agriculture.277 During the interwar years, Egyptian 
agriculture was in something of a crisis. The pre-war move to intensified cultivation had 
wrought changes to soil and water tables that required capital investments and loans from 
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the state.278 With small farmers struggling and state intervention needed, Italy, engaged in 
its “battle of grain” to salvage its agricultural sector and discourage urbanization, was a 
clear model. The Italian agricultural projects, particularly in the swampy Agro-Pontina 
outside of Rome, were presented as experiments in totalitarian fascist planning that would 
create ideal fascist citizens. It is no wonder they impressed Abaza, who “conceptualized 
rural reform as a total social plan that would encompass the improvement of peasant 
housing, health reform, education reform, and the raising of the social and economic 
standard of living of the peasantry.”279 Indeed, the director was intimately involved in the 
creation of three model farming villages in the mid-1930s. Visiting the Italian planned 
agricultural centers like Sabaudia therefore presented Abaza with an invaluable point of 
reference to his own efforts. In his conference report, soon published in Arabic, and 
complete with photos offered by the Italian Ministry of Propaganda, Abaza demonstrated 
the success of fascist propagandists in portraying their agricultural reforms as a universal 
model. Abaza Bey was particularly impressed by Mussolini’s ability to inject new pride 
into the rural lifestyle, arguing that in order to attract more Italians to the countryside, 
Mussolini  
toured Italy from north to south carrying out in front of the peasants [fellaheen] the 
hardest agricultural tasks of plowing, sowing, and managing a variety of 
agricultural machinery; thereby encouraging people to love agriculture…while 
increasing the number of those willing to farm. And this is the greatest and noblest 
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occupation in our time in which industry has swept away the old guilds and brought 
people to love the luxurious urban life. 
Aside from an appreciation of the re-valorization of the countryside as opposed to the city, 
Abaza also asserted the need for a strong and active state, bewailing the lack of necessary 
resources in Egypt. In contrast, Abaza, speaking of the Agro-Pontina land reclamation, 
approved of “the amount of speed in the execution of great projects, which shows the 
importance of the state in various reforms.”280 For Abaza, beyond the technical 
achievements of Italy lay a regime which understood the importance of rural values and 
could support them through decisive action. 
A visit to the Pontine marsh project also impressed the Wafdist Minister of 
Agriculture, who told the Egyptian Gazette that he intended to send a team of experts to 
Italy to study the program more closely.281 Despite this interest, technocratic interest in 
Italian rural planning was not indicative of Egyptian fascism, but of the possible uses of 
Italian means to solve Egypt’s agricultural problems. Furthermore, Italy was not alone in 
trying to protect the rural economy through state intervention and the valorization of a 
simple, traditional lifestyle. Even the New Deal experimented with such programs. 
Egyptian technocrats thus participated in an international push to “restore the balance and 
harmony between nature and the economy, and between technology and culture”.282 This, 
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and not abstract authoritarianism or fascism, made the Pontine marshes so intriguing to 
Egyptian agricultural experts. 
Other conferences were focused more on fascist propaganda than on studying Italy 
as an exemplar of modernity. A member of the Egyptian Royal Academy staying in Rome 
told minister of Press and Propaganda Galeazzo Ciano that an “Egyptian political figure in 
a high position” had requested materials to hold a conference on the origins of fascism, its 
party organization, and its corporatist system. Though Ciano promptly sent seventeen 
publications, it is unclear if the conference was held.283 Nonetheless, the desire of Egyptian 
figures to hold conferences on Italian institutions and policies speaks to the success of the 
mid-1930s Italian effort to present their “revolution” as containing universal values. Yet 
the primary appeal of Italy stemmed from the image of the authoritarian state as a force for 
institutional modernization. Therefore, the interest of Egyptian administrators should be 
seen in light of A. James Gregor’s interpretation of Fascist Italy as a “developmental 
dictatorship”, since their focus was less on the ideological nature of the regime than on its 
institutional methods of rapidly building a cohesive and modern nation.284 Politicians and 
administrators like Dr. Hafiz Affi Bey and Fuʿad Abaza can hardly be considered fascists 
for taking an interest in particular programs of state-intervention and social-welfare; these 
were cases of institutional borrowing facilitated by both the fascist desire to propagate their 
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ideas and the status of Italy as a developing nation more akin to Turkey and Egypt than to 
Great Britain or France. 
Yet in other instances, administrators went beyond merely citing Italy as a model, 
and served as useful propagandists for Italy. The Young Egypt admirer of Italy, Abul Ata, 
compared the march on Rome to the hegira in a 1935 conference for The Association of 
Egyptian Government Functionaries.285 Abbas al-Sayed Husayn was another Egyptian 
who returned from Italy with a proselytizing zeal. An inspector in the Ministry of 
Education, Husayn sought Italian backing for a conference which would “highlight the 
gigantic fascist bonifica works” he had seen while touring Italy. Husayn hoped the Ministry 
of Popular Culture could send him a film to complement his presentation, which was duly 
sent, with English subtitles. Two years later, Husayn again asked for support. A journal he 
ran for teachers and students, which the Italian Legate estimated printed 6,000 copies, 
needed color photos for a series of articles on Italian cities, which would show Egyptian 
students the “artistic beauties, economic activities, and achievements of Fascism.” Husayn 
was even willing to let the Italians write the articles themselves. Given his prior 
connections to Italy and the potential influence of his journal, the Ministry of Popular 
Culture sent Husayn his requested sets of photos along with articles on various Italian 
cities. 286 
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IV. Seeking Help from Italians: Students and Journalists 
Radical political movements and administrators looking for foreign models were 
not alone in seeking out information and advice from the Italians. Individuals also 
approached the Italians with proposals. In the midst of the Ethiopian War, Ibrahim Hamdy, 
a 50-year-old engineer educated in England, and working at the Ports and Lighthouses 
Administration, sent a proposal written in English to the Italian Ministry of Propaganda. 
Declaring himself an admirer of Mussolini, and vouched for by two Italians, Hamdy 
proposed that the Italians help him set up a secret Italian Propaganda Office in Egypt under 
the cover of a name such as “The International Travelling Bureau”. The success of such a 
project would be ensured by Hamdy’s connections “with all the educated classes in Egypt, 
especially the Government employees and the students” and his “trusted agents in the 
different ministries and schools who will always talk for Italy.” Finally, the office could 
sponsor student exchanges to promote closer relations between Italian and Egyptian youth. 
Though the Alexandria Consulate reported that Hamdy was morally blameless and pro-
Italian, the Cairo Legation advised the Ministry of Press and Propaganda that his proposal 
could not be taken into serious consideration.287 
The Italian rejection of Hamdy did not mean they were unwilling to let Egyptians 
speak on their behalf. In late 1937, Sobhi Wiheda, an Egyptian student studying law in 
Rome, wrote “Thought of a Leader”, a collection of writings by Mussolini translated into 
Arabic.  The book was published in Egypt with the Italian Legation pleased by its 
                                                 
287 ACS, Minculpop, DGSP (1930-1943) 18/7 B. B, 62 Egitto 1936-1938 F. 1936 SF. 
Propaganda Italiana in Egitto, Letter from Ibrahim Hamdy to Ministry of Press and Propaganda, 
28 February 1936, R. Legazione d’Italia to Ministry of Press and Propaganda, 20 April 1936. 
 126 
successful reception. Wiheda also wrote an article for Il Popolo d’Italia, entitled “Italy and 
the Islamic Orient”, in which the student asserted that Fascist Italy, thanks to “its 
reinstatement of spiritual values, which are declining in so much of Europe” was uniquely 
positioned to understand the “Orient”. For Wiheda, the values that Egypt could learn from 
Italy would merely be the return of what originated in the East: “The conception of a man 
of state as a reformer of peoples, educator of spirits, and father of his generation, is a 
typically Oriental conception that will return to triumph in the Islamic Orient when its 
people will have attained their full national consciousness and understood the spiritually 
noble value of their mission”.288 Wiheda thus proved adept at employing a fascist language, 
while subverting the Italian claims that only their civilizational history could provide a 
framework for a new collaborative structure between East and West. Whereas many 
political modernizers sought to identify Egypt with Europe, Wiheda asserted the primacy 
of authentically Oriental values that had moved to Italy and would now return to their 
birthplace.  
Curious students provided a potentially fruitful means of propagating fascist ideas 
and perspectives among educated Egyptian classes. In 1937, a group of six French educated 
students from a variety of disciplines asked the Alexandrian consul to pay for a trip to Italy 
to “see Roman antiquities, to closely observe modern Italian civilization, and to meanwhile 
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initiate ourselves in its beneficial discipline”,289 while another four, inspired by Italian 
propaganda directed at “Oriental students”, asked to finish their degrees in Italy.290 One 
Egyptian Christian applying to attend Rome’s Military Academy, sent a personal letter to 
Mussolini in which he praised the Italian leader for standing up to communism and to a 
coalition of nations during the Ethiopian War. Insisting upon his fascist beliefs, the student 
continued, “my country is in the grip of so many misfortunes and can only liberate itself 
by means of fascism, which can give it strength and glory. As a result, I live for 
fascism…[and] serve God, my country, and fascism with total sincerity.”291 
In other cases, fascist officials took a more active stance with regard to Egyptian 
students. When a group of engineering students toured Italy in the summer of 1938, the 
Fascist University Groups (GUF) tasked with hosting them were told of the importance of 
the visit for propaganda purposes.292 Upon the arrival of the students in Brindisi, the GUF, 
along with a representative from the Propaganda Ministry did not disappoint, leading the 
Egyptian students to pay homage at the Monument for the Fallen and at the National 
Monument for the Italian Sailor, before going to see Roman monuments, fascist public 
works, and a Naval College.293 In fact, before this trip, the Italian Legate had already 
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proposed to the Ministries of Propaganda and Foreign Affairs that between 500 and 800 
Egyptian students from the University of Cairo be encouraged to visit Italy with discounted 
ticket prices on ships. Though such plans were shot down by objections from the shipping 
companies that generally aided state institutions in such projects, the Italians were diligent 
enough to see that there were students among the Egyptian educated elite that were 
interested in Italian institutions, and that visits could be invaluable propaganda tools. 
However, between budgetary constraints and the breakout of war in 1940, there was not 
enough time or resources to experiment with this means of mutually desired interaction. 
While the Italians were clearly happy to exploit Egyptian students for propaganda 
purposes, it was necessary to maintain control over the political nature of their presence in 
Italy. Even a message sent by Italian students in Rome to students of Egypt was 
discouraged by Italian officials for possible unwanted political ramifications.294 The most 
prominent example of the Italian use and control of Eastern students was the Congress of 
Oriental Students held in Bologna from May 3-5 1936, which was attended by one hundred 
and thirteen Arab, Armenian, Chinese, Indian, Iranian, and Eastern Jewish students. Arabs 
formed the largest component, with thirty-six in attendance, including six Egyptians. 
The Congress displayed the ways in which Italian authorities sought to appeal to 
foreign youth through a universal vision of fascism. This meant walking a fine-line 
between asserting Italian superiority and appearing open to other cultures. The opening 
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address by the Orientalist scholar, Carlo Formichi, stated that Italy was historically and 
geographically destined to bridge East and West, Asia and Europe. Furthermore, he 
declared that distinguishing races according to odious and unjust suppositions of inferiority 
and superiority were foreign to the universal nature of Italian psychology. After defending 
the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Formichi concluded by encouraging harmony between 
East and West. The Congress then commemorated the centennial of the birth of the Indian 
mystic Ramakrishna before a moment of silence for the recently deceased Egyptian King 
Fuʿad. 
Yet for all these appeals to the sensibilities of the students, the aim was to position 
Italy as the decisive center of East-West relations. A report for Mussolini declared that the 
Congress was important for completly banning all foreign languages, for “clearly and 
spiritually inserting” students from so many backgrounds into the life of the regime by 
allowing them to “participate in fascist manifestations on the same footing and with equal 
enthusiasm to their Italian comrades, and for the students’ recognition that Italy and its 
Duce would create “a new order in the world” as well as fulfill its “millenary task of 
mediating between the universal ideals of East and West.” In line with typical regime 
claims, Fascist Italy was not to be part of a global project of nationalist regeneration, but 
its epicenter. 
But what were the reactions of the students themselves? Unfortunately, we have to 
remain within the perspective of fascist officials, but even so we can get a glimpse of the 
voluntary nature of the students’ pro-fascist position. The students gave their own 
presentations on a variety of topics, from the aspirations of Syrian students to the Iranian 
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perspectives on Roman civilization, to the fascist tendencies of Egypt. It is possible that 
the students viewed the Congress as an opportunity to ingratiate themselves with the regime 
in order to strengthen their country’s cause with high-ranking Italian figures. This was 
clearly evident in the conflict between the Arab and Jewish students at the Congress, since 
the former denied that the latter were representatives of Palestine. Undoubtedly, tensions 
were exacerbated by the initial events of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. The authorities 
initially sided with the Arab students, hoping to feign ignorance of the addresses of 
interested Jewish students, but had to relent for fear of creating a backlash in the “Jewish 
world”. In order to avoid any embarrassing incidents during the Congress, the parties 
agreed to name members to a committee that would study the Palestinian question and 
submit a proposal at the next Congress. Furthermore, the Arab and Jewish students were 
allowed to review each other’s speeches. 
The Italians recognized the desire of the students to have their voices heard despite 
the restrictions: “The fact that we exerted editorial control does not take away anything 
from the freedom [spontaneità] of the oriental youth, who approved the texts submitted to 
them with irrepressible acclamations, and whose enthusiasm it was actually necessary to 
contain, at least in appearances, within the limits of an exquisitely cultural event, to avoid 
political stumbling blocks that would have created repercussions abroad.” Such enthusiasm 
led the author to tell Mussolini, rather optimistically, that the Confederation of Oriental 
Students “represented a political tool of the first order, capable of reaffirming throughout 
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the whole oriental world our truths.”295 If the Confederation was an effective tool, it was 
not one that the Italians were willing to risk wielding again, as the expected future 
Congresses were not held. And yet it was not for lack of student willingness, as the Ministry 
of Education reported receiving repeated requests from students throughout Europe about 
the next Congress.296 
Students were not alone in their willingness to approach Italian authorities. 
Journalists did so as well. Observers at the time understood that the Italians subsidized 
some papers in exchange for the printing of propaganda pieces. But it is important to recall 
that these contacts were often initiated by the journalists, whose motives ran from sincere 
admiration to the short-term need for subsidies. For example, Ismail Taher, an Egyptian 
journalist for the moderate liberal-constitutionalist paper al-Siyassa, wrote a series of 
articles praising Italy after a trip to Libya and Italy. He then proposed to the Italian Legation 
that he could publish a book using the articles and additional photos. The Italians would 
subsidize the effort by buying 500 copies out of a suggested printing run of 2000. Though 
it is not clear if Taher’s plan went through, the Legation was in favor, given the lack of 
material in Arabic at the time on Italy.297 The fact that Taher had gone to such lengths 
without any Italian support suggests that his was a case of a sincere admirer. 
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Similarly, a long-term relationship existed between Karim Thabit, an editor for the 
influential paper, al-Muqaṭṭam, and the Italians. It began in 1929 when an interview with 
Mussolini impressed the Egyptian journalist. 298 Two years later, the Italians gladly 
accepted Thabit’s proposal to write a book on the Italian dictator. The Legate, Roberto 
Cantalupo, noted that Thabit was dedicated to Italy and would use approved Italian books 
to construct his narrative. For the Italians, Thabit’s offer was a blessing: by subsidizing the 
print runs, the Italians would have an effective piece of propaganda written in Arabic, and 
by an Arab. Finally, Cantalupo believed that the focus on Mussolini as “the protagonist of 
our present historical moment [would] fully respond to the oriental mentality.”299 Thabit 
would return to Italy in 1933, where he interviewed several hierarchs and toured the new 
model city of Littoria.300 And when Thabit became the co-founder of the pro-Wafdist paper 
al-Miṣri in 1936,301 he continued to vouch for Italy, arguing that the Wafdist Blue Shirt 
threat was exaggerated, since the Italian Black Shirts had shown they were a force for order 
and stability rather than anarchy.302 Meanwhile, the Italians provided him with a 50 
Egyptian lira monthly subsidy.303 Finally, as a show of their faith in the pro-Italian reporter, 
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Thabit scored another interview with Mussolini, who confirmed Italy’s peaceful intentions 
regarding Egypt while affirming Islam’s role as a bulwark against communism.304 
Another pro-Italian journalist, Jallal al-Awf, suffered for his faith in Italy. As the 
director of the Jaffa newspaper al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya, Awf hoped to gain Italian support 
for his anti-British stance during the Arab revolt in Palestine. Awf was a member of the 
group of journalists following Mussolini’s procession through Libya in March 1937, and 
was impressed by his trip to Libya and Italy, where he visited factories, cultural centers, 
and made contacts with Italian orientalists.305 Upon returning to Jaffa, Awf even sought to 
begin experimenting with fascist institutions by creating an unemployment office.306 
Facing increasing pressure from British authorities for his pro-Italian and anti-British 
stance, Awf also suggested to the Italians that he could create a new Telegraph Agency and 
Egyptian daily paper in order to facilitate Italian propaganda while continuing to criticize 
Great Britain. Though the Ministry of Propaganda believed the idea too ambitious and 
naïve, since its backers were too well-known as pro-Italian to maintain a mask of 
objectivity,307 the Consul in Jerusalem, Serafino Mazzolini, hoped to continue supporting 
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Awf even after the British expelled him from Palestine in June 1937. The cause of the 
expulsion was two articles run in Awf’s paper, that attacked Britain and compared its 
Islamic policies unfavorably with those of Italy.308 Mazzolini hoped that during the 
suspension of Awf’s paper, the Italians could provide a subsidy to repay the journal for 
having provided the Italians with 7000 anti-Italian pamphlets that were promptly burned.309 
Yet during his exile in Damascus, it appears that Awf did not receive support. A stream of 
letters sent to Awf’s Italian contacts demonstrated his flagging faith in Italy as an ally in 
his struggle against the British.310 
Other journalists however, were seen by the Italians as pens for hire. In the case of 
Antun Yacoub, a Copt of Syrian origin writing for various Egyptian papers, the Italians 
discovered the danger of cutting off a supply of money. During the Ethiopian War, the 
Italians decided to forego the services of Yacoub for a plethora of reasons: they suspected 
him of feeding information from the Italian Legation to Egyptian police, and they believed 
he was too unreliable in his reporting and pro-Italian in reputation to convince many 
readers.311 Yacoub quickly responded, asserting his loyaly by collecting his pro-Italian 
articles and completing a translation of Mussolini’s “My Life” from an English version. 
Yet when the Legation denied futher assistance, Yacoub resorted to a direct appeal to 
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Mussolini, citing his contacts with several fascist leaders, and his long-running work for 
Italy which began with the defense of its highly unpopular war against ʿUmar al-Mukhtar 
in Cyrenaica.312 Since the Italian Legation felt that Yacoub was no longer valuable, and 
was essentially using the Ethiopian War as an excuse to extract more in subsidies, his 
appeals were in vain. As a result, Yacoub set to work writing anti-fascist pamphlets for 
Spanish Republican groups. Due to Italian prodding, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry agreed 
to seize Yacoub’s pamphlets.313 The whole affair demonstrated the unstable nature of 
outsourced propaganda works: the operative would probably be in financial difficulties and 
potentially unreliable if not ideologically committed. 
So far, this chapter has focused on Arabs and Muslims looking to Fascist Italy for 
answers to a variety of questions posed by the mid-1930s crisis of Egypt’s social, political, 
and economic foundations. This led to a wide range of interest in the Italian model for 
social organization, technocratic planning, and political institutions. As we have seen, the 
Italians were keen on exploiting this curiosity to burnish their own image among the rising 
Egyptian middle-classes, while trying to avoid alienating any of the competing political 
movements. While this framework highlights the Egyptian desire to learn from Italy, it has 
largely ignored an important mechanism in the transfer of fascist ideas and practices from 
one side of the Mediterranean to the other: the role of local Italian communities. With that 
in mind, we will explore the case of Tunisia, where the predominance of Italians among 
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the European population demonstrates the quotidian exchanges by which fascism as an 
opportunity and threat were experienced by Italians and Tunisians. 
TUNISIA 
While the Italians hoped to bring Egypt into its sphere of influence, Tunisia was a 
long-term goal for colonial expansion, and possibly even direct-rule. Just as fascists hoped 
to redeem Italian honor in Ethiopia after the disastrous defeat in Adowa in 1896, so too did 
they hope to avenge the French establishment of a protectorate in Tunisia in 1881. Before 
the French decision, Italians who fervently advocated a colonial vocation for their young 
nation had their eyes set on Tunisia. Not only did the probably underestimated 1881 census 
count of eleven thousand Italians significantly outnumber the few hundred French, but 
history and geography were supposedly on Italy’s side as well. Tunisia had been a Roman 
granary, and according to one geographer, a former piece of the Italian land-mass that a 
volcanic eruption had jettisoned. Public opinion had been so upset at the French that the 
Tunisian episode helped push Italy into the arms of the Triple Alliance with Germany and 
Austria-Hungary.314  
 In the forty years between the French conquest of Tunisia and the rise of fascism, 
the local Italian population expanded greatly, reaching 85,000 to 130,000, depending on 
whether one trusts French or Italian estimates. Despite periodic French attempts to limit 
Italian influence, the demand for labor on docks, mines, and railway construction required 
ever-greater numbers of Italian immigrants who came from impoverished areas in Sicily, 
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Naples, and Sardinia.315 As Julia A. Clancy Smith has pointed out, for those in search of 
work, travelling to Tunisia could be easier than moving across Sicily.316 These working-
class Italians, often speaking a Sicilian dialect mixed with Arabic words as a result of their 
frequent contact with Tunisians, joined a middle-class community with a longer history. 
Italian Sephardic Jews who had come to Tunisia from Livorno had long played an 
important role in the regency of Tunisia as bankers, professionals, and merchants. Starting 
in the mid-nineteenth century, other Tuscans joined the Jewish community and took on 
jobs as doctors, architects, engineers, and lawyers.317 
 Fearful of a possible faltering of Italian influence in Tunisia through French 
naturalization, fascists systematically took control over the diverse community with the 
goal of consolidating national sentiments. As Mary Dewhurst Lewis has argued, French 
sovereignty in Tunisia was never unquestioned. Instead, it had to pay a certain respect for 
the legal formalism of the Beylical state while also compromising with the extra-territorial 
sovereignty that Great Britain and Italy enjoyed over their nationals residing in the 
protectorate.318 The weak French position allowed the Italians to create something of a 
state within a state. The Livorno Jewish and Tuscan middle-class community that exercised 
leadership over the Italian community were targeted by fascists as liberal free-masons and 
systematically replaced in key posts. Meanwhile, all civic associations were integrated into 
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fascist organizations. As Rainero points out, the fascist program meant that the former 
clientele of the Italian elites now ran through fascist officials, who held access to work, 
credit, admission to schools and hospitals, and to the Italian government through the 
consulate.319 
 Although increasingly occupied with resisting anarchist and communist activists 
among the Italian working-classes during the 1930s, as well as the resurgence of middle-
class liberal anti-fascism, fascists made efforts to use their institutions and the Italian 
population’s proximity to Tunisians to convince the latter that French rule was unjust, and 
that Italians truly had the interests of Tunisians at heart. As seen in Chapter One, the 
increasing unlikelihood of fruitful collaboration with the French, even under the guise of 
Latinity, intensified the drive to win the hearts and minds of Tunisians. During the interwar 
years, daily contacts between Italians and Tunisians could become instances of Italian 
propaganda, as well as of the Tunisian reception and rejection of fascist entreaties. 
Studying these interactions in light of the Italian efforts to lay the foundations for eventual 
rule over Tunisia helps us understand the modes and limitations of spreading fascism 
beyond an Italian audience. 
 The Italians faced a challenge in gaining Tunisian friends. As the 1930s progressed, 
Tunisian political activists and their growing number of supporters steadily hardened their 
opposition to French rule and began to advocate for independence. A conjunction of events 
eroded the French position: climactic conditions devastated crop yields from 1930-1932, 
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while the world crisis pushed down prices for Tunisia’s central exports of wheat, wine, 
phosphates, and iron. Urban artisans had few customers given the depressed wages, and 
struggled to compete against French products. Meanwhile, the cadres of educated 
Tunisians were systematically denied administrative positions in a bloated bureaucracy 
dominated by the French.320 In this context, the liberal-constitutional party, the Destour, 
founded in 1920, fractured as younger Tunisians demanded more radical action. The 
Destour’s leaders had been more concerned with pan-Arabism and pan-Islam, and often 
came from religious, agricultural, and commercial backgrounds. A younger generation, 
which largely drew its leaders from professional classes with more pro-Western views, 
founded the Neo-Destour with the goal of mobilizing the Tunisian population through 
mass-politics to achieve independence.321 
 The leader of the Neo-Destour, Habib Bourguiba, upon returning to the political 
scene in May 1936 after two years of detention, hoped to work with the leftist Popular 
Front government. In a speech delivered in Paris to a collection of important Popular Front 
figures, Bourguiba noted the danger of both French and Italian fascist propaganda. 
According to Bourguiba, the lack of French funding for the education of Tunisians gave 
Italians an opportunity to provide free schooling and even trips to Italy. The Neo-Destour 
leader believed that “the Tunisian people distrust Italian colonization, in so far as it presents 
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a real danger to them from a demographic point of view.” Yet, he warned the audience that 
only substantial reforms from the Popular Front could remove the threat, stating that “with 
the procrastination and hesitation of the Popular Front government, fascist propaganda, 
whether French or international, waits for the exasperation of the masses to throw the 
Tunisian people towards a solution of despair.”322 As hopes for reforms diminished, the 
Neo-Destour began to clash with the Popular Front, and public disorder and violence in 
1938 brought recriminations from the left that Bourguiba and company were acting as 
agents of fascist Italy to the detriment of a democratic France. While Italians sometimes 
received discrete promises of friendship and sympathy from Destour and Neo-Destour 
members, the official line of these parties remained quite critical of both fascism as a 
regime and its colonial rule in Libya and East Africa.323 The Italians were not fools, and 
understood that Tunisian nationalists wished to use the threat of Italy to put pressure on 
France. But Bourguiba feared that in a desperate enough situation, Italy could rely on 
positive local relations to foster just enough support to replace the French. 
Given the neo-Destour’s position regarding Italy, as well as its popularity, fascists 
had precious little wiggle room to find potential collaborators for such a project. One 
potential target was Chedly Khairallah, a veteran Destour activist and journalist who the 
Neo-Destour deemed too moderate for a leadership position.324 As a largely independent 
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actor, Khairallah appears to have entertained the notion of an alliance with the far-right. 
After being exiled to Italy as part of Governor-General Peyrouton’s crackdown on the Neo-
Destour leadership in 1935, Khairallah collected publications on fascism while living in 
Rome.325 Upon returning to Tunisia in 1937, Khairallah argued in his paper, La Voix du 
Tunisien, that France was returning to Catholic traditions of faith, order, and harmony. As 
Europe, “chewed up by materialism and divided by greed” continued to struggle, a united 
Islamic world would offer it a means of regeneration. Mussolini, by claiming to be a friend 
of Islam, had recognized as much, and other Europeans would likely follow in order to gain 
such strong allies. France would have to adopt more generous policies towards its own 
Muslims if it wished to compete.326 Khairallah was then trying to gain leverage over the 
French by appealing to the worldview of the far-right. This unusual strategy did not 
preclude openings to Italy. Khairallah also penned articles describing the various youth 
institutions in Italy, while unfavorably comparing French reforms in North Africa to Italian 
actions in Libya and in defense of Egypt at the 1937 Montreux Conference.327 The Italian 
consulate believed that Khairallah was slowly becoming sympathetic to the fascist regime 
while seeking to work with French nationalist parties to negotiate reforms to the 
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Protectorate.328 Meanwhile, French intelligence believed that Khairallah, under the 
influence of the far-right, had become anti-communist, and wished to dissociate North 
African nationalist movements from any ideological alliance with the left.329 Despite his 
flirtation with fascism, Khairallah did not proceed much further: he strongly condemned 
the Italian claims on Tunisia made in November 1938, and declared that, given the nature 
of fascist rule, France was certainly the lesser of two evils for Tunisians.330 The fact that a 
political actor with few solid foundations maintained so many reservations regarding 
fascism indicates the low probability that an Italian substitution for French rule would 
generate any enthusiastic support. 
At first, the Italians, recognizing the inherent difficulties, made few efforts to woo 
Tunisians. In a December 1930 report for the Tunis consulate, Ilio Tonci cited a Destour 
activist who explained how his comrades mistrusted Italy, while suggesting that the Italians 
could at least publish pro-Italian materials in Arabic to get their viewpoint across. Tonci 
then suggested various ways in which the Italians could ingratiate themselves with 
Tunisians.331 However, a response by Foreign Minister Dino Grandi signaled Italian 
hesitancy to commit seriously to political machinations with Tunisians. There were several 
reasons for Grandi’s position. Firstly, Italy was carrying out an intensified version of the 
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French colonial program for Tunisia in Libya, and could hardly project itself as an 
alternative. Furthermore, the application of fascist “rigid discipline” to the Libyans would 
not be well-received by Tunisians accustomed to the liberties of the press and of political 
organizations. Aside from the fact that the French often restricted these liberties whenever 
the colonial order was threatened, Grandi believed that the Tunisian elites had firmly 
adopted French liberal values and would not look fondly on those of fascist Italy. In terms 
of a friend-enemy distinction then, Tunisian political activists had been lost to liberalism. 
Finally, even if Italy were to support the position of Tunisian nationalists in order to weaken 
the French, unrest in Tunisia could have serious ramifications in Libya. As a result, Grandi 
approved of the small measures Tonci had in mind to encourage Tunisian-Italian relations, 
but discouraged any ambitious programs.332 
Despite these concerns, as the 1930s progressed, the Italians became increasingly 
interested in preaching the benefits of fascism and the new model of colonialism on display 
in Libya. In sparsely populated Southern Tunisia, individual Italians brought the message 
of fascism. An Italian military intelligence report shines light on the techniques employed 
by such agents. In the case of Rene Saada, born in Gabès, Tunisia, and a “devoted Italian 
and enthusiast of Mussolini and fascism”, we can see the workings of a consular agent who 
received little recognition from Italian authorities. Saada, who spoke Arabic, travelled 
around Southern Tunisia countering anti-Italian propaganda and portraying Mussolini as a 
strong-man who had brought stability, peace, and justice to Italy. According to the report, 
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“many natives showed up at the Consulate to see the large portrait of Mussolini and they 
have seriously labelled him ‘Lion-Face’.” When two shaykhs in Gabès questioned Italian 
propaganda, Saada personally drove them in his car to Tripoli, where their discussions with 
Libyans assuaged prior concerns. Afterwards, the impressed shaykhs spread their positive 
view of Italian Libya to other Tunisians. The author of the report expressed remorse that 
the consular authorities did little to encourage agents like Saada.333 But if Italian efforts 
along the southern Tunisian-Libyan border were weak, the same could not be said for the 
more populated regions of Tunisia, where a concerted effort was made in the 1930s to 
convince Tunisians of the benefits of fascism and Italian, rather than French rule. 
One of the primary areas of ideological contact between Italians and Tunisians was 
in the very institutions of Italian nationalization/fascistization. The network of Italian 
associations, mostly based on schools and cultural/recreational centers offered a place for 
interested Tunisians to learn about Italy, or at times, to confront Italian arrogance. The 
Dante Alighieri Society, which was dedicated to propagating Italian culture through 
conferences, exhibitions, and classes, was one such place. Though the society predated 
fascism, it had been co-opted by the regime, and largely served the political interests of the 
regime. In 1936, the French noted that an increasing number of non-Italians had begun 
attending the society’s events, including several Tunisians, who were given “special 
consideration”.334 The French Director of Public Instruction even believed the French 
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should establish a competing institution, partly because it was “raising the prestige of the 
Italians in the eyes of foreigners, and notably of Muslims”.335 By 1939, the Tunis Alighieri 
society had begun to make connections with radical Tunisian youth. In May, 39 out of 42 
Tunisian students passed an examination in Italian after taking free classes that often ended 
with talks on the history of Rome and the leaders of Italy. Two Neo-Destour activists, one 
kicked out of the elite Sadiki secondary-school, the other soon to be arrested, had advised 
the others to take the courses. To commemorate their participation, the students received 
propaganda works and an Arabic translation of The Divine Comedy, and had their picture 
taken with the Italian consul.336  
Even primary schools served an ideological purpose, as Bourguiba had warned. A 
French intelligence report from 1932 noted that Tunisian children going to Italian schools 
helped to spread pro-Italian propaganda after receiving special treatment: “They [the 
Tunisian students] pride themselves on being well-treated by their teachers and are quite 
satisfied with the education they received. The Italian leaders, to gain the sympathy and 
good graces of the indigène masses, chose among the best students those who are sent to 
Italy for summer camps at the Government’s expense.”337 The following year, Italian 
authorities discussed the potential pitfalls of increasing requests by Tunisians to send their 
children to Italian schools. Accepting a large number of Tunisians would alert the French 
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to possible Italian propaganda, and also raise questions in the Italian settler community 
who were sometimes told that the Italian schools did not have enough room for their 
children. Despite these concerns, the Italians agreed that a slight increase in the number of 
Tunisian students would be beneficial, both as sources of information on Tunisian 
opinions, and as potential propagandists for fascist Italy; a role that would have to be 
carefully obscured from French officials.338 
Yet the proximity of fascist social institutions also presented occasions for conflict. 
In the spring of 1939, as fears of a future Italian occupation hung over Tunisia, the 
Dopolavoro seems to have stoked resentments. In al-Funduq al-Jadid, Italians exiting a 
Dopolavoro room began a discussion about a speech by Mussolini they had just heard. 
When the local Tunisians began to praise France and attack Italy, the Italians retreated to 
their houses, whose windows were soon broken by rocks.339 A few weeks later, after a few 
Italians exited a Dopolavoro center in Soliman, a conversation ensued between the Italians 
and four Tunisians. When asked why they were so happy, an Italian replied that it was 
because they had just gained Albania, and would soon conquer Tunisia. A fight soon broke 
out between the groups.340 Though these were relatively minor incidents, they demonstrate 
how tense relations between Italians and Tunisians could become. And surely enough, the 
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French noted that Italians were ordered soon after to stop wearing Dopolavoro badges in 
public in order to avoid such occurrences.341 
For the Italians, tension on the streets could undo years of efforts to ingratiate 
themselves with Tunisians. Since many Italians in Tunisia were employed in small trades 
and in agriculture, there were ample opportunities to make contacts with Tunisians in an 
intimate way. The Italian consulate in turn sought to leverage these contacts into 
propaganda opportunities. The case of Giuseppe Barecca is instructive. Born in 1903 in 
New Orleans, Barecca left Chicago for Tunisia in 1921, where he began a taxi company 
with three cars, and learned Arabic. While dealing with customers, Barecca spoke in Arabic 
of Italy’s beneficent rule in Libya, encouraged Tunisians to send their children to Italian 
schools, and distributed pro-Italian brochures.342 Similarly, the Consulate also distributed 
its propaganda through a local grocer, Calogero Sferlazzo.343 The French sûreté even 
worried that the beach of Tunis’ banlieu served as a site for the rapprochement of fascist 
and Tunisian youth.344 One French report suggested that the focus on Arabic in Italian 
schools allowed Italian youth to effectively communicate fascist principles of authority and 
action to Tunisian youth, and that the French would have to start learning Arabic to 
compete.345 Even during World War II, when the French were generally confident in the 
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Tunisians’ contempt and hatred for Italy, Italian anti-fascists were less sure, telling French 
authorities that the twenty-nine percent of Italians who spoke Arabic posed a threat: “Due 
to this [their knowledge of Arabic], and because the great mass of Italian workers rubs 
shoulders with the masses of Muslim workers in workplaces, fascist influence is 
penetrating dangerously into the heart of the Muslim population.”346 
The strong presence of fascists within Italy’s professional classes meant that the 
local dissemination of Italian propaganda and goodwill was not limited to lower-class 
Tunisians. In early 1936, the French reported that Tunisian intellectuals interested in 
politics were being given Italian publications, most notably a collection of Mussolini 
speeches on corporate institutions.347 French police records give us a glimpse into how the 
professional classes made contacts with Tunisians.  In one instance, a police agent listened 
in to a conversation between three Italian teachers and three Tunisians who thought they 
were alone while drinking coffee and wine. When one of the Italians said she was a fascist 
at heart, and hoped Italy would take Tunisia, the Tunisians responded that they wanted to 
learn Italian, and would support an Italian occupation. As the party became tipsy, they 
attacked French policies.348 Similarly, French police believed that the Neo-Destour 
treasurer, Baḥri Qiqa, frequently met with young fascist intellectuals for coffee.349 The 
                                                 
346 CAD-N, 1TU/1/V/2361-2362, “Notes comuniquées par le groupe antifasciste détenu à la 
prison civile de Constantine”, 17 December 1942. 
347 CAD-N, 1TU/1/V/2137, R.G. N. 168-6, “A.S. de la situation italienne pendant le 2eme 
semester 1935”, 17 January 1936. 
348 Ibid., Chef de Police Mahdia to Commissaire Divisionnaire, N. 8793, 21 December 1939. 
349 ANOM, Algérie, Oran, 5I/55, F. Tunisie, N. 2192/K, “Attitude du nationalisme indigène vis-
à-vis de l’Italie”, 18 October 1937. 
 149 
French also worried that these professionals could serve as mediators between the Italian 
Consulate and the Neo-Destour party. Indeed, in Sfax, the Vice-Consulate relied on doctors 
who frequented the Arab quarters to provide information on Tunisian attitudes.350 And 
sometimes the contacts between doctors and Tunisians could take on a decidedly political 
nature: a French officer in Gabès reported that two fascist doctors were caring for Neo-
Destour members, going so far as to give free treatment for those in financial straits so long 
as they presented a party card.351 
How successful was this Italian push to employ daily interactions in the service of 
propaganda? An optimistic report from the Italian Vice-Consul in Bizerta highlights the 
small ways in which the Italian campaign was vindicated and is worth quoting at length for 
showing the social complexity of thinking about fascism in colonial Tunisia: 
…in the city’s coffeehouses and markets, along the streets, even in the smallest of 
agricultural centers, the news is spreading that Mussolini will arrive with the 
Italians, while the most informed in current political affairs add that Germany will 
take Morocco. I could provide dozens of symptomatic episodes, but a few will 
suffice. A native merchant from Metline, having arrived in Bizerta for business, 
told a co-national that it is the time for Italy to strike because everyone expects it; 
a worker cleaning my car, between furtive smiles and signs of agreement, directed 
a long discourse at me, which when translated, was found to be a reverent nod to 
the power of Italy, which having taking Abyssinia, will now take Tunisia; 
yesterday, a Muslim, having given me a perfect fascist salute, stopped me to ask in 
a rather fluent Italian to re-show the film on the Duce in Libya since many of his 
fellow Muslims were disappointed for having missed it; in Ṣuq al-ʿArba, two Arab 
teachers and a notary presented themselves to the consulate asking if it was possible 
to move to Libya, “because we can’t take the French anymore”; in Ghardimaou, on 
the border with Algeria, the natives are restless for news concerning Fascism, and 
likewise in Mateur, and in the countryside of Ferryville, and in Beja, where two 
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Muslim notables having returned from Libya on the cruise ship “Biancamano” have 
become extremely active propagandists in our favor, and continue to tirelessly 
describe, just like all the others who were on the cruise do in other centers, the 
wonderful sights to small audiences of fellow Muslims, who then repeat the 
declarations of “someone who saw firsthand.352 
But this Italian view, though demonstrative of how fascism was talked about and 
communicated in so many different ways, was a rather optimistic one. Even at the height 
of the effort, the French believed that the Tunisians who admired Mussolini were a 
minority, and that most looked suspiciously on the Italian activities given the regime’s 
stated interest in occupying Tunisia.353  
Certainly, Italian aggression in Libya and Ethiopia, along with thinly veiled threats 
regarding Tunisia, meant that Italians seeking sympathy among Tunisians had a tough 
uphill climb. Tunisians found small ways to snub their noses at Italian ambitions, whether 
it be applauding the appearance of Haile Selassie in a newsreel to the protest of whistling 
Italians,354 or giving two sous for a Muslim charity to see a merchant’s display of a naked 
image of Mussolini in a compromising position in front of the exiled Ethiopian leader.355 
And in some cases, outsourcing propaganda efforts to local Italians could backfire 
spectacularly. When a twenty-seven-year old Giuseppe Calabrese arrived in Sousse in 
October 1938 to run an oil factory, he immediately set about demanding loyalty to fascism. 
In December he fired four Tunisians, accusing them of participating in an anti-Italian 
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demonstration. According to the fired workers, Calabrese had made his political motives 
clear, telling them, “Yesterday, you celebrated, you protested with French and Tunisian 
flags and cried, ‘Vive la France’, so go ask the French for bread, Mussolini has none for 
you.” The Tunisians also told the French police that Calabrese had earlier forced two 
workers to go home for half of a work day for not giving the fascist salute upon entering 
the factory.356 
Despite the mixed success of the Italian charm offensive, many fascist authorities 
were fairly confident in the early months of World War II that they would be welcomed by 
the Tunisian populace. According to one colonial police report, “a favorable expectation 
of [an Italian occupation] is increasingly spreading among the native populations, and proof 
of it can be found in the interest and respect shown by everyone when our officials, both 
in uniform and in plainclothes, pass through Tunisian territory.” Such a report was not 
entirely naïve, as it recognized that in Tunis, “open and fiery hostility against Italians” had 
been replaced by a desire for an Italian occupation to improve economic conditions, rather 
than out of love for Italy or fascism.357 
During World War II, the Italians were in the dark as to the degree to which they 
could work with the Neo-Destour. In August 1940, an intelligence report for the Italian 
Armistice Commission stated that in the case of an Italian occupation, the representatives 
and followers of the party hoped that Bourguiba would take over political and religious 
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control of the country, but also that the Fascist Arab Youth program based in Libya be 
extended to Tunisians, along with the inclusion of all Tunisian workers in the same 
corporatist system that existed in Libya.358 Yet other reports indicated that the Neo-Destour 
was not so inclined to take fascism as a model. A long Armistice report from 1940 tried to 
dismiss such rumors, stating that,  
in reality, the Destour is fundamentally oriented towards a democratic spirit, and 
fights fascism just as it fights the French, or any other foreign domination over 
Tunisia. The cries of “Long live il Duce”, and “Long live Italy” often repeated in 
Destour protests must not be attributed to the natives’ desire to substitute our 
dominion for that of the French, but rather to irritate the French…359  
Similarly, the President of the Armstice Delegation in North Africa, B. Mengarini, called 
Bourguiba “notoriously and fiercely anti-Italian”, and believed that other Neo-Destour 
members would strongly oppose an Italian occupation in favor of complete Tunisian 
independence.360 
Nevertheless, there was a tentative willingness from members of both sides to work 
together. While Bourguiba and other Neo-Destour leaders hoped that Germany could 
pressure Italy into acceding to Tunisian independence, the Italians hoped that the Tunisian 
nationalist movement would be willing to accept a limited form of independence under 
                                                 
358 ASMAE, Tunisia, B. 12, F. Rapporti Politici, Delegazione di Armistizio Africa Settentrionale 
to Commissione d’armistizio con la Francia, N. 143, “Situazione politica in Tunisia”, 16 August 
1940. 
359 ASMAE, Tunisia, B. 11, F. Sottocomm. per lo studio delle questioni territoriali-1940, 
“Tunisia”, Undated, p. 23 
360 ASMAE, MAI Gabinetto Segreto, B. 143, F. Tunisia, Presidente della Delegazione di 
Armistizio to Roberto Lerici, 19 August 1940. 
 153 
broad Italian control. At first, the Italians hoped that applying pressure on the French to 
release imprisoned activists would raise Tunisian faith in Italy’s intentions. 
Early in the war, the fascist journalist Dr. Carlo Ciucci, who had spent time in a 
French prison with Bourguiba and other Neo-Destour figures, tried to leverage his contacts 
into pro-Italian action. Ciucci at first hoped that he could secure the release of Toumi Ben 
Toumi, head of a Southern Tunisian Neo-Destour cell, who had received a five-year 
sentence for political activities. After receiving a letter from Toumi, penned by an 
imprisoned French communist leader due to the former’s inability to write in French, 
Ciucci proposed to Mussolini that the Armistice Commission secure Toumi’s release.361 
Though no action was taken, Ciucci served as a mediator between the Neo-Destour and the 
fascist regime in other ways. In December 1940, he forwarded a letter written by an 
anonymous Neo-Destour leader to Mussolini. The goal of the letter was to convince 
Germans and Italians to bring Tunisian nationalists to Europe where they could begin 
working on negotiating Tunisia’s place in the post-war order. For our purposes, the letter 
is striking in its use of a fascist worldview to justify Tunisian independence. From the 
beginning of the letter, Tunisian history was summarized as one of a proud and cohesive 
national identity alternating between moments of glory and victimization by foreign 
powers. Once the eternal nature of Tunisian nationality had been established, the author 
then explained why it was necessary to work with the Axis, writing that “We are happy to 
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declare the defeat of democratic politics, the cause of all our evils. If we continue to suffer 
with courage the machinations of our oppressors, the intrigues of a still effective Judaism, 
the will of capitalists, hunger, and poverty, it is because we are certain that the hour of our 
liberation is near.”362 Despite these tentative feelers, the Italians did not turn to the Neo-
Destour as a tool until late 1942, when the Axis’ situation in North Africa was extremely 
precarious. Having freed Bourguiba from French imprisonment, the Italians brought him 
to Rome, where he was fêted. Yet Bourguiba understood that the Axis chances of victory 
were growing smaller, and demanded that any co-operation with Italy be predicated upon 
the recognition of full Tunisian independence.363 
In the end, the Italian claims on Tunisia made any truly meaningful co-operation 
with the Neo-Destour impossible. Though the Italians argued among themselves in a 
struggle to figure out exactly what an Italian occupied Tunisia would look like from an 
administrative and juridical point of view, all options provided Italy with effective 
sovereignty over the country. The nationalist longing for independence was largely 
ignored, with one report arguing that fascist institutions and top-down hierarchy would 
bring order: “The experiment carried out in Albania, a country much less developed than 
Tunisia, shows that a certain level of local autonomy is not incompatible with the fullness 
of our control [dominio], and that the Fascist Regime, with its ability to insert people into 
institutions [virtù inquadratrici], can successfully adopt formulas that would fail in the 
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hands of liberal regimes, under whose control the agitation of the dominated are but the 
reflection of the subversive ideas that poison the powerful.”364 The Italians’ flippant 
disregard for Tunisian nationalists would have led to a calamitous occupation, a historical 
possibility rendered moot by the Allied victory over Axis forces in Tunisia in May 1943. 
CONCLUSION 
Italy’s role as a revisionist power during the interwar years offered the opportunity 
of forming a pro-Arab/Islamic policy aimed at increasing Italian influence at the expense 
of Great Britain and France. Furthermore, in Tunisia and Egypt, large Italian communities 
targeted for fascist integration served as local representatives for a nationalist revolution 
aimed at creating a unified and disciplined political community. While Italy sometimes 
gained some plaudits for its stance against Great Britain and France, its pro-Italian 
propaganda largely fell flat, as Egyptian and Tunisian nationalists understood the nature of 
fascist expansionism and racism. In Egypt, the greatest draw of fascism was as a model of 
non-socialist state-backed modernization. Egyptians of all political persuasions could cite 
Italy to normalize their own plans for new institutions or state-run initiatives. Whether it 
was welfare, or propaganda, or agriculture, one could study or borrow from fascist 
experiments without necessarily becoming a fascist, or even a fascist sympathizer. Even 
those Egyptians that professed admiration for fascism often did so while maintaining their 
own particular interpretation; their understanding of fascism seems to have been informed 
by a desire to find an alternative to the authoritarian liberalism that had seemed to paralyze 
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Egyptian politics in the 1930s. Italian universalism was then taken in the wrong way. 
Instead of demonstrating how only Italy could offer a way beyond capitalism and 
socialism, Egyptians tended to see Italy as just another modernizing country that could 
provide some insight into their own autonomous project. 
 Tunisian nationalists on the other hand, still had to focus almost entirely on the 
struggle for independence. Fascist Italy was not a model to follow, but simply a possible 
short-term ally against France. Since Italy appeared to be a bigger threat than France, the 
Destour and Neo-Destour only considered working with Italians in desperate moments. At 
the same time, the Italian desire to replace the French inspired a push among local Italians 
to ingratiate themselves with the Tunisian population. Here the Italians again failed, though 
not without generating a certain amount of naïveté about potential Tunisian reactions to an 
Italian occupation. While the Italians could adequately point out French flaws, they could 
never elaborate a program capable of calming Tunisian apprehensions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 157 
Chapter Three: Courting Muslims: The Parti Populaire Français in 
French Algeria 
INTRODUCTION 
During November and December 1942, just weeks after the Allied occupation of 
North Africa, the Gaullist police chief André Achiary interrogated Ferdinand Canavaggio, 
the secretary of Yves Châtel, the last governor-general of Algeria appointed by Vichy. The 
goal of Achiary was to find evidence of direct collaboration between Châtel and the 
Germans. Much of Canavaggio’s revelations revolved around Châtel’s relations with 
Algerians in contact with French fascist political parties and German officials. In May 
1945, the same Achiary, as the sub-prefect of Guelma, would later play a leading role in 
the violent French repression of Algerians around Sétif.365 Achiary was not alone in his 
wariness of the connections between Algerian nationalists and fascists. Local communists 
joined him in the May massacres, and French and Algerian communist party papers blamed 
“servants of fascism” for the alleged Algerian insurrection.366 One Algerian Communist 
Party flyer argued that holdover Vichy fascists had worked with “unscrupulous” Algerian 
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nationalists to provoke an incident that would justify a fascist coup.367 Even the socialist 
governor-general of Algeria, Yves Chataigneau echoed these unfounded accusations by 
speaking of “hitlerite terrorists” and “disorderly elements of hitlerite inspiration”.368 
The French left soon pulled back from this position while the right continued to 
point to Moscow as the primary harmful influence on French Algeria. Yet the pairing of 
Algerian nationalists with fascism remained a potentially convenient one. In April 1956, 
as the war in Algeria raged on, Robert Herly wrote in the Nouvelle Revue Française 
d’Outre-Mer that “a great number of their [Pan-Arabists] leaders were politically raised in 
the pan-Germanist school and many among them were remunerated agents of Hitlerism.  
They assimilated his methods and decided to make use of them… Pan-arabism was 
profoundly influenced by pan-Germanism which offered itself to it as a model.”369 
Recently, the question of possible Algerian complicity with fascism and Nazism has 
returned with the novelist Boualem Sansal, who has explored his country’s repressed moral 
responsibility for the Holocaust in his 2008 novel, Le village de l’allemand.370 
Scholarly work on the reception of fascism and Nazism among North Africans, and 
for the purposes of this chapter, Algerians, has largely concentrated on the Nazi side of the 
equation. The first step was taken by Charles-Robert Ageron, whose 1979 article outlined 
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the German campaign to gain support from North Africans.371 In 1990 the French 
journalists Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer placed an emphasis on Algeria in their book 
that explores the “alliance” between Islamists and Nazis and its post-war consequences.372 
While these works (and most contemporary literature from the “Islamo-fascist” school) 
focuses on German fascism, a recent book by Samuel Kalman on French Algerian colonial 
fascism touches on the attempt by French fascists to appeal to Algerians. Kalman’s main 
thesis is that the interwar French Algerian right formed a unique form of colonial fascism, 
differentiating itself from French metropolitan variants. According to Kalman, the colonial 
variant was more vehemently anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and racist than metropolitan fascist 
movements, while lacking the “revolutionary” aspirations of the latter in favor of 
maintaining the colonial status-quo. In order to curry the favor of the naturally rightist 
French Algerian electorate, the two primary rightist parties, the Croix-de-Feu/Parti Social 
Français (CdF/PSF) and the Parti Populaire Français (PPF) had to ditch their larger 
platforms and conform to colonial desires. As a result, any promises of reforms held out to 
Algerians could only be a mask for reactionary intentions. From this perspective, the story 
of the French rightist appeal to Algerians is one in which the French colonial right attempts 
to dupe Algerians, who are too politically astute to be swayed, with the exception of some 
misguided individuals.373 
                                                 
371 Charles-Robert Ageron, “Les populations du Maghreb face à la propagande allemande”, 
Revue d’histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, 114 (April 1979), pp. 1-39. 
372 Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, Le Croissant et la Croix Gammée: Les secrets de l’alliance 
entre l’Islam et le nazisme d’Hitler à nos jours (Paris, 1990). 
373 Kalman, French Colonial Fascism, pp. 140-150.  
 160 
A closer look shows a different perspective in which the most radical French rightist 
party, the PPF, opened up a realm of discourse and action that could be appropriated by 
Algerians. The PPF discourse, though limited at times by the colonial concerns enumerated 
by Kalman, stressed a vastly renovated imperial system along authoritarian and statist lines. 
Consequently, the PPF positioned itself as a radical rightist critique of the colonial status-
quo, and faced suspicion even from Vichy administrators working to carry out a scaled-
down version of the PPF imperial platform. Algerian political activists took notice of the 
PPF’s critique with varied responses. 
FRENCH ALGERIA AT A CROSSROADS: THE CRISIS OF THE 1930S 
During the first six months of 1930, French Algerians celebrated the centenary of 
the conquest of Algiers in 1830. A series of parades, speeches, conferences, and other 
special events throughout the country focused on the triumph of French civilizing efforts 
while nearly erasing the presence of Algerians in their own country.374 While the Centenary 
may have comforted French Algerians, it was humiliating for Algerians who saw the 
previous hundred years as a period marked by physical violence, appropriation of land, 
interference in religious affairs, and exclusion from civil equality, not one of military glory 
and civilizational progress. The lack of accompanying reforms for Algerians simply 
continued a trend of French unwillingness to change a status-quo built upon the exclusion 
of Algerians from civil and political equality. 
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By the mid-1930s, Algerians had responded in several ways to the political 
impasse. One strategy favored by well-educated Algerians, known at the time as évolués, 
and often practicing law or medicine, was assimilation. Led by figures like Ferhat Abbas 
and Muhammad Salah Bendjelloul working in organizations such as the Fédération des 
Élus, these more moderate Algerians initially rejected Algerian nationalism and sought to 
emphasize Algerian loyalty to France in order to hold the French accountable for their 
supposedly universal values of justice and equality.375 A different sort of reform movement 
officially began in 1931 with the foundation of the Association of ʿUlema. The focus of 
the ʿUlema was to purify and modernize an Algerian Islam deemed to be compromised by 
centuries of superstition, ignorance, and more recently, by French interference. As such, 
the ʿUlema’s cultural and social agenda led them to a political stance that steadily took on 
an Algerian nationalist tone in order to protect Islam and the Arabic language against the 
dangers of secular assimilation, the surveillance of Islamic practices, and the dominance of 
the French language.376 Finally, under the leadership of Messali Hadj, and with the initial 
support of French communists, the Etoile Nord-Africaine (North African Star, ENA, and 
from March 1937 on, the Parti Populaire Algérien), founded in 1926, became the first 
explicitly Algerian nationalist party. Though at first limited to Algerian migrant workers 
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in Paris, and suppressed from 1929 to 1933, the ENA-PPA would later tap into urban angst 
in Algeria, resonating particularly among lower-class tradesmen and youth.377 
While Algerians began to enter into mass politics, the French Algerian political 
world also underwent profound transformations. Gone was a longstanding political system 
of patronage described by David Prochaska; in its place came more ideologically driven 
party affiliations.378 From 1934-1935, the right-wing veterans’ movement-turned-party, 
the Croix-de-Feu and the populist farmer’s party, the Front paysan, gained much traction 
in Algeria, partly due to their taking up of traditional settler grievances with Parisian and 
administrative interference in local affairs.379 The socialist and communist parties also saw 
a concurrent growth as Algeria’s working-classes continued their efforts to organize.380 At 
the start of 1936 then, both Algerian and French political scenes had grown more 
ideological and fractured. With the election of the leftist Popular Front coalition in May 
1936, the aspirations and tensions of all these political movements unleashed a political 
crisis in Algeria. 
Discarding the usual French hesitancy to promise any significant or specific 
reforms for Algerians, the Popular Front made a series of promises that the eminent 
historian of Algeria, Charles-Robert Ageron, has characterized as unrealistic and 
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irresponsible.381 Flush with enthusiasm, the disparate Algerian movements briefly unified 
in June 1936 through a Muslim Congress, which hoped to work with the new government 
to radically change French Algeria. Yet even if the Popular Front could maintain its 
promises, the Muslim Congress was likely to split up, since the differences among the 
moderates open to assimilation, the ʿUlema, and the openly nationalist Etoile were too 
broad to paper over with vague rhetorical calls to unity. The difficulty of the coalition was 
made clear when the Etoile leader Messali Hadj unexpectedly called for Algerian 
independence in front of a large crowd shortly after the founding of the Congress. 
Similarly, French leftist parties did little to encourage a truly broad coalition. Though the 
Socialists had become more open to reform, the new anti-fascist line saw the communists 
prioritize the maintenance of the French empire at the expense of the liberation of colonial 
peoples. And no matter the official stances, many French Algerian communist and socialist 
party members were wary of supporting potentially nationalist Algerians like Hadj.382 
The primary political issue that drove a wedge between this diverse set of political 
parties and movements was the electoral reform project sponsored by prime minister Léon 
Blum and a former Algerian governor, Maurice Viollette. The Blum-Viollette proposal 
would allow about 20,000-30,000 Algerians who were decorated veterans, officers, elected 
representatives, or diplômés to vote in the same college as the French without having to 
renounce their personal status.383 Previously, a Muslim Algerian could only gain full 
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French citizenship if they accepted French civil law instead of their traditional Qurʾanic 
statutes. Since only the most assimilated Algerians took this step, the personal status 
question was the immediate roadblock to political and civil equality for Algerians. The 
Popular Front promised to remove that obstacle, but only for a limited number of Algerians. 
While socialists, communists, and moderates like Abbas supported the reform, the ʿUlema 
were hesitant to throw their weight behind it, and the Etoile was adamantly opposed on the 
grounds that it would solidify an Algerian elite with few connections to an overwhelming 
majority still deprived of rights.384 
Amid the constant quarrelling between Algerian and French leftist parties, the 
French Algerian right reacted in force to the electoral victory of the Popular Front. The 
Croix-de-Feu made much of the wave of strikes that followed the election and saw Algerian 
and French workers marching under the same banners. In the eyes of many French-
Algerians, the whole colonial edifice was at risk of collapsing, and order had to be re-
imposed. At a local level, this saw the rise of demagogic figures like the mayor of Oran, 
Gabriel Lambert, who sought to unite the entire Algerian right behind an umbrella 
organization, the Rassemblement National. The Blum-Viollette proposal, seen by many 
rightists as a stepping stone to an electoral system dominated by the Algerian “masses”, 
further mobilized resistance to the left. Street violence, disruptions of political meetings, 
and poisonous language in newspapers characterized the daily hashing out of issues 
between right and left during the Popular Front period.385 
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An economy and society in crisis accompanied the political turbulence. For 
decades, large French landowners had expanded their control over the most fertile lands at 
the expense of small French farmers and the Algerian rural population. By 1930, the 
average European landholding was over seven times larger than that of an Algerian.386 
Furthermore, the focus on viticulture in the 1880s and 1890s created an export-reliant 
agricultural economy that was shattered by the Great Depression. With the collapse of 
wheat and wine prices, most rural Algerians fell into crippling debt.387 To make matters 
worse, the population growth rate of two percent among Algerians during the 1920s put 
crushing pressure on the food supply, leading to mass malnutrition.388 In sum, the structural 
limiting of Algerians’ agricultural opportunities coupled with the world depression laid the 
foundations for a social crisis. Masses of dispossessed and desperate migrants sought 
refuge and opportunities in coastal cities previously dominated by Europeans, while others 
took on industrial work in France. Such population movements burdened the French 
administration, disrupted traditional social relations, and ensured that the new forms of 
mass politics would have a substantial pool of frustrated actors to draw upon. In this context 
of rapid political transformation and socio-economic crisis, the French right hoped to draw 
upon Algerian support in a bid to reshape the basis for French imperial sovereignty over 
Algeria. 
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THE PARTI POPULAIRE FRANÇAIS MAKES ITS CASE TO ALGERIANS 
Though the Croix de Feu (later the Parti Social Français) and Gabriel Lambert's 
Rassemblement National both made efforts to appeal to Muslims, neither went so far as 
the Parti Populaire Français (French Popular Party, PPF). Founded in June 1936, in the 
midst of a tense political situation following the Popular Front's electoral victory in May, 
the PPF positioned itself as a more extreme alternative to the rightist parties that had failed 
to stem the tide of the left. The founder and leader of the PPF, Jacques Doriot, had earlier 
been a popular and influential figure in the French Communist Party (PCF). The young 
radical gained national attention as the most boisterous opponent of the French and Spanish 
campaign against ʿAbd al-Krim’s Rif Republic in the early 1920s, thus becoming a hero 
for those who sympathized with the party’s anti-colonial stance.389 However, in 1932 
Doriot was expelled from the PCF for advocating an alliance with socialists. As a result, a 
man whose dedication to the Komintern earned the praise of Gregory Zinoviev, who called 
him France's first authentic Bolshevik,390 began to shift his sympathies to fascism. Doriot's 
working-class background and popular base of Saint-Denis, where he served as mayor, 
gave the PPF a proletarian sheen largely missing from other French rightist parties. 
Furthermore, some of Doriot's lieutenants and working-class supporters followed him first 
into political exile, and then into fascist extremism. Whereas the Parti Social Français 
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constituted a more moderately conservative, middle-class populism, the PPF served as a 
gathering point for working-class rightists, the more extreme petite bourgeoisie, outcasts 
from leftist parties, and wealthy industrialists looking for a tool to protect their interests. 
Those who left the PSF in hopes of finding a more fascist party were not disappointed. The 
PPF attacked parliamentary democracy, clamored for a leadership cult (with Doriot clearly 
in mind), and furiously attacked Jews.391 
The extremism of the PPF made it an especially attractive party on Algerian soil. 
By the mid-1930s, the Algerian right had become quite powerful and vocal. Since the 
Popular Front's domestic and colonial agenda appeared to confirm the worst fears of many 
French rightists, the intransigent positions of the PPF quickly brought it great success. 
Along with southern France, Algeria constituted one of the PPF’s strongholds.392 
According to Algiers Sûreté, after a late 1936 Doriot visit, PPF membership in that city 
had reached one thousand, including one hundred Algerians. Almost all members were 
working class, with the head of the Sûreté estimating that one-third came from the Popular 
Front, while the other two thirds came from the recently dissolved rightist leagues.393 Fears 
of the left inadvertently stoking Algerian nationalism may have caused some Popular Front 
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supporters to turn to the right. The PPF hoped to take advantage of European fears, while 
also seeking recruits among the disaffected Algerian working class.394 
At first, the PPF was rather clumsy in addressing Algerians. On 21 October 1936, 
a private PPF meeting at the Grand Café in Oran gathered 1800 attendants, including 
around 100 Algerians. Zine Bentabet introduced Doriot’s Algerian chief and longstanding 
political partner, Victor Arrighi, in Arabic, proclaiming that Doriot and Arrighi’s 
Communist history and campaign in favor of ʿAbd al-Krim during the Rif War served as 
proof of their noble intentions regarding North Africans. Yet, to Bentabet’s visible surprise, 
Arrighi quickly moved to distance himself from his earlier communism before asserting 
that France was not yet so weak that it could not buy enough cannons and machine guns 
for the 800,000 French Algerians to withstand a revolt of eight million “indigènes”. 
Lambert quickly tried to soothe the offended Algerians, but the incident is illustrative of 
how little thought the PPF Algerian delegate had initially put into the “indigène” 
question.395 
Yet this rather frank element of PPF discourse never truly disappeared. Even in 
May 1938, in front of an audience of two hundred in the city of Médéa, Doriot gave the 
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following warning to the twenty-one Algerians in attendance: “Muslim friends, I press you 
to my heart to show you how much I love you. I must tell you strongly and without 
acrimony that your policy of politics of independence must cease. We are in Algeria and 
we will stay here, whether it pleases you or not…Choose from the bottom of your 
conscience the regime that will please you the most, but remember that it’s better for you 
to see the smile of the benevolent Frenchman than the little moustache of Hitler or the boot 
of Mussolini.” The police officer in attendance reported that while some Algerians 
applauded this threat, five others who had spent time with the PPA or the PCA lowered 
their eyes in embarrassment.396 
Despite these rare admissions that any questioning of French sovereignty was a 
transgressive line that would turn amity into enmity, the PPF generally avoided such 
antagonistic claims. Instead, PPF discourse for Algerians revolved around the positive 
goals of economic improvement and protection of religious traditions and negative attacks 
against communists and Jews. Targeting these latter two groups also served to shield 
Algerians from PPF criticism; any anti-French actions on the part of Algerians could be 
attributed to the subversive influence of Judeo-Bolshevism. In turn, this view, depicting 
Algerians as naïve victims, deprived them of agency, since their aspirations to autonomy 
and a national identity were largely ignored. But the PPF had few other options. Any 
acknowledgement of Algerian agency would implicitly recognize the legitimacy of their 
demands outside of the context of the fight against Bolshevism and international 
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capitalism. And yet, the PPF’s whole campaign was predicated on Algerians making a 
political choice to ally with the French right instead of its competitors. This could only be 
done by winning them over with some sort of program. Here the PPF leaders greatly 
underestimated, like most Europeans of all political persuasions, the strength of the 
Algerian desire for independence.  
The first step to establishing a program for Algerians was to focus on economics. 
The PPF had three reasons to call for the amelioration of the material plight of Algerians. 
Firstly, the party could position itself as saviors in the traditional model of the “civilizing 
mission”. Secondly, by shifting the focus from political rights to economic conditions, the 
hated Blum-Viollette proposal could be rejected while offering an alternate reform 
program. Finally, the PPF could portray the poverty and starvation-stricken countryside as 
the perfect incubator for communist agitation, thus calling their French members and 
sympathizers to take economic reform seriously.  
The official policy towards Algerians was broadly established at the 1st North 
African Congress of the PPF, held between the 2 and 3 January 1937 in Algiers. The party 
resolution set the tone for the next six years of PPF propaganda by "calling for the 
realization of a new and bold social policy to satisfy the legitimate economic demands of 
the Muslim world" and "proclaiming the necessity of giving… bread, housing, and 
instruction to the laboring masses" since "elevating the standards of living for millions of 
Algerian workers has more importance in the eyes of the Parti Populaire Français than 
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granting political rights to a minority of favored electors."397 Not all members were on 
board; during a discussion of the motion, Arrighi received implicit pushback from a leader 
of the PPF section of Sidi-Bel-Abbès, Félix Roquefère, who asserted that communists 
could not tempt Algerians in villages, since the latter were well remunerated by colons. 
Arrighi, careful to avoid upsetting French colons, diplomatically blamed the government's 
policies for providing a basis for communist agitation before stating more bluntly that the 
PPF, though protective of colon interests, would teach such landowners how to forfeit 
excess profits to increase the social welfare of Algerians.398 
Shortly after the resolution, Arrighi  scored a success by attaining the agreement of 
twenty colons from Lamoricière to raise the salaries of Algerian laborers by fifteen to 
twenty percent.399 An internal PPF notice stated that a similar increase was obtained around 
Mercier-Lacombe.400 A few weeks later, Arrighi reported that he had also instructed 
Oranais landowners to prefer Algerian workers over foreign labor.401 Since many of these 
laborers were Spaniards with connections to the recently nationalized French, and often 
received preferential treatment, Arrighi was implicitly asking some colons to show more 
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support for Algerians than for their former Spanish compatriots.402 Meanwhile, PPF posters 
graced the walls of Algiers decrying the plight of two million Algerians suffering from 
famine and tuberculosis.403 The proposed response was not just higher salaries, but also 
agricultural reform that would leave large French landholdings intact. During the party’s 
2nd North African Congress, held in Algiers in November 1938, Gaston Guigon, a doctor 
who recently became the party’s federal secretary in Constantine, outlined the proposed 
measures for Algerians. These included agricultural schools, corporative funds for crises, 
state funds for young husbands looking to farm, and professional offices to cut out 
exploitative middlemen. Guigon even painted a picture of his ideal Algerian agricultural 
society, which would begin as small state projects: 
So, why not envisage the establishment of experimental zones, limited in space, but 
where a total and simultaneous work could be done? It would be possible to delimit 
several of the most populated indigène spaces, and to develop roads, hygienically 
conceived villages provided with simply styled and comfortable houses; to create 
agricultural institutes and model farms, schools, artisanal centers, youth clubs, 
athletic organizations, musical societies, study groups…what else can I 
say?...provided that the standard of indigène life is raised and that the education of 
the body, spirit, and soul is equally and simultaneously pursued. And how can we 
forget the example of Rome which liberally provided its veterans with fertile land? 
Are not the indigène veterans designated to create colonies, in the etymological 
sense of the word?404 
                                                 
402 Anne Dulphy, L’Algérie des Pieds-noirs, Entre l’Espagne et la France, (Paris, 2014), pp. 24-
33. 
403 ANOM, Algérie, Départment’Alger 1k/72, “Rapport” Sûreté Départementale d’Alger N. 
3585, 20 May 1937. One PPF member suggested that the party explore the possibility of a new 
cloth that would allow for more weather-proof tents for the Algerians. Such an innovation would 
secure sympathy while providing new work for textile factories. ANOM, Algérie, Départment 
d’Alger, 1F/391, Letter to Bureau Africain, 29 January, 1937. 
404 ANOM, Algérie, Départment d’Alger, 4I/24, Le Pionnier, “Le fait algérien et le problème 
social”, p. 5. 
 173 
While the administration of aid to Algerian farmers was common to the 
prescriptions of a wide array of colonialists, the notions of a harmoniously organized and 
healthy rural society shared much with the Italian rural planning projects of the time. 
Furthermore, his call for veteran Muslim agricultural colonies foreshadowed Italo Balbo’s 
efforts in Libya the following year. Finally, Guigon’s vision shares much with the failed 
“Arab kingdom” program initiated by Louis-Napoleon in the 1860s with the backing of 
Arabophile military figures and Saint-Simonians. The latter in particular, through the 
works of Prosper Enfantin and Ismaÿl Urbain, argued that a Franco-Algerian civilization 
could be built if Algerian communal land in the interior of the country was split into private 
plots and protected from rapacious French settlers. From there, a modern agricultural 
civilization would develop with the help of French industry and technology, allowing the 
Algerians to slowly discard what the Saint-Simonians viewed as the feudal and theocratic 
elements of Algerian life.405 The question was whether a program that had little backing 
from French colonialists and Algerians during the 1860s would be any more popular in the 
1930s. According to Guigon, the current French colonial administration knew what had to 
be done, but lacked the willpower to act decisively. Only the PPF could fulfill the necessary 
reforms. 
Guigon was not alone in protesting against the incompetency of the French 
administration. In January 1938, in front of forty three Algerians from Médéa, Jean Fossati, 
the party secretary for Algiers, attacked the nearby Ghrib dam project for expropriating the 
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land of four hundred Algerians while still imposing taxes on lands that were no longer 
owned.406 
Despite the apparent benevolence, a close look at PPF discourse reveals practical 
concerns. In a May 1937 bulletin, the party bragged that it was the first to alert public 
opinion of the “urgent measures to take to not let men living under the tricolor flag to starve 
to death” and “to demand the dissolution of the communist party whose hateful propaganda 
pushes those exasperated by famine to rise up against France.”407 Bringing attention to the 
issue was therefore a tool to apply pressure on the French administration to crack down on 
communists. Furthermore, the image of the protective French flag framed the suffering of 
Algerians not as a humanitarian disaster, but as a challenge to the strength and dignity of 
the French nation as a consolidated community. Finally, agricultural reform would be 
based not on redistributing large French estates, but rather through the breaking up of 
collective Algerian lands as well as those whose ownership was unclear.408 Hence the PPF 
could couch controversial land reform in the long-term French project of privatizing 
Algerian land ownership and use in the name of modernization and liberalization. Thus, in 
the agricultural sector, the PPF was not an advocate of maintaining Algerian land-usage 
traditions. Instead, it hoped to keep Algerians out of cities through small individual plots 
backed by the state. Instead of forming an urban proletariat exposed to communism, these 
farmers would then serve as a reservoir for loyal and healthy soldiers. 
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Even with these efforts to shift the focus on economic and material issues, Doriot 
and Arrighi were constrained to offer an alternative to the Blum-Viollette electoral reform 
project. The primary goal for the PPF was to differentiate itself from its rivals on the right, 
particularly La Rocque’s PSF. Fortunately for Doriot, La Rocque took a rather 
unimaginative line in his own proposal. Given the PSF’s attempted turn to moderate 
nationalism, La Rocque wanted to keep open the possibility of assimilation, but without 
accepting Viollette’s admission that Algerians adhering to the personal status should 
become full French citizens.409 Other rightists proposed that a separate electoral college be 
created for 400,000 Algerians, rather than allow for the entrance of 20-30,000 in a single 
college. Doriot and Arrighi took the idea of a separate college further, and proposed that it 
be based upon universal suffrage. Such a stance allowed party leaders to rail against the 
aristocracy of voters that all the other plans would supposedly offer.  In his speech to the 
First North African Congress, Arrighi criticized the notion that elites must be drawn from 
the ranks of the educated, distinguishing between a privileged elite and an elite of 
courageous and patriotic men, declaring that "The man who is part of the elite [l’homme 
de l’élite], he is maybe illiterate; courageous and humble, he is the man who works, who 
fights".410 The PPF could then continue to portray itself to Algerians as a form of French 
nationalist populism that included poorer Algerians. Most importantly, by advocating the 
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separate college, the PPF was securing that political control would remain entirely in the 
hands of the minority French. 
For the purposes of appealing to Muslims, the unique college allowed the PPF to 
entirely drop the rhetoric of assimilation. Like many rightists, the PPF chiefs feared that 
assimilation would inevitably lead to a small group of Algerians living between French and 
Algerian cultures. The resulting alienation would then lead these figures to such anti-
French ideologies as communism, Algerian nationalism, and pan-Arabism/pan-Islamism. 
And while the right could still portray themselves as the bearers of French civilization, the 
basis of such claims rested largely on technological and organizational capabilities. Why 
would the PPF want Muslims to assimilate into a French culture that most party leaders 
thought was decadent and corrupt? The pursuit of wealth, equality, and liberty in urban 
settings could only lead to harmful results for a party dedicated to hierarchy, discipline, 
and individual sacrifice to a community. The response was a more extreme form of 
association. For most French colonial figures and moderate politicians, association 
accepted the gaping differences between French and colonial societies, and sought to 
bolster French rule by accommodating these differences where possible. Assimilation was 
not entirely rejected, since many held on dearly to the idea that Europe was at the forefront 
of a universal civilization, but one whose inclusiveness was pushed into a distant and 
nebulous future.411 Contrary to this version of long-term assimilation, the PPF offered a 
more static vision of association. For the PPF, association was not a means to an end, but 
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an end itself, since it allowed for the maintenance of authentic communities in the face of 
modernity’s corrosive elements. Modernity would be limited to an economic customs-
union and a greater metropolitan focus on colonial economic development, which would 
be presumably facilitated by a more authoritarian government.412 In that sense, the PPF 
hoped to combine the failed modernization proposals of Albert Sarraut, who sought to 
employ French capital to create an economically consolidated imperial community,413 with 
rightist notions of hierarchy, discipline, and totally distinct cultures. 
 As such, the PPF argued that association did not just guarantee French sovereignty, 
but also the protection of Islamic culture from the French. Arrighi even acknowledged that 
this line would require more tolerance and understanding from French Christians, stating 
that "We don't have the right to get involved in such things [Muslim customs and laws]; 
they are sacred. We cannot allow ourselves to compare religions: they are neither superior 
or inferior to each other; they are simply different, and all respectable."414 For a moment 
in early 1939, French intelligence believed that the Algerian ʿUlema appreciated the PPF’s 
stance against assimilation as a boost to their own efforts to advocate for a profound Islamic 
and Algerian identity.415 However, one must be wary of reading too much respect and 
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sympathy into PPF positions. For colonial societies would theoretically be in permanent 
need of French support, since only the technologically advanced French culture could 
provide economic and military support and protection. As Doriot stated in 1938, “we are 
here to command, and we will not leave to anyone else our task and duty to command.”416 
ALGERIAN PPF LEADERS 
Yet Doriot, Arrighi, and associates were not the only PPF members to speak to 
Algerian concerns. The party showcased several Algerians as leading figures. The most 
significant leader was Djillali Bentami, a naturalized Algerian born in Mostaganem in 
1896. Bentami studied medicine in Lyon before entering politics in Algeria as a Municipal 
Counselor in his home city and as a vice-president in the Oranie section of the Fédération 
des élus musulmans. A look at Bentami’s subsequent political career highlights the fluid 
nature of Algerian politics, as well as how an Algerian could balance membership in a far-
right party with the defense of Algerian interests. 
Despite holding an influential position within the Fédération des élus musulmans, 
Bentami soon differed from most of his colleagues by opposing the Popular Front and the 
Blum-Viollette proposal. Given his family history, his stance is perhaps not so surprising. 
His brother Belkacem had taken a very moderate and pro-French position during the reform 
debates of the 1920s. At that time, the Emir Khaled had rejected assimilationist reform in 
favor of a platform that would protect the identity of Algerians while still claiming the civil 
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rights of French law. Belkacem Bentami spearheaded efforts to marginalize Khaled among 
the Algerian elite, claiming that he represented an Algerian threat to France.417 Following 
in his brother’s footsteps, Djillali rejected the mid-1930s reform proposals for being too 
radical. Shortly after his dismissal of both the Popular Front and the Algerian-led reform 
efforts that hoped to work with the French government, the younger Bentami became a 
member of the Central Committee of the PPF while retaining his post as a Counselor until 
1941. At that point, the mayor of Mostaganem refused to consider Bentami for a position 
as the Algerian mayoral adjunct. Despite, or perhaps because he was a fervent backer of 
the PPF, Bentami found himself without an official post. In response, he sought to make 
himself an unofficial mediator between Mostaganem’s Algerians and the local 
administration.418 
Bentami soon proved himself rather adept when applying himself to mass politics, 
as he positioned himself as a leader of the local youth through his patronage of Algerian 
athletic associations. Furthermore, he championed the Algerians when it came to protecting 
Islam. In early 1942, when the construction of a road resulted in the partial destruction of 
a Muslim cemetery and the desecration of tombs, Bentami quickly arrived at the scene and 
communicated the offense to local officials. During the 1930s, key debates concerning the 
naturalization of North Africans and the respect owed to Islam by the French had revolved 
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around the cemetery as a sacred place.419 Taking advantage of such a grievance could 
therefore solidify Bentami’s position as a trustworthy mediator. Shortly after, Bentami also 
made his displeasure known when French, and not Algerian children were the beneficiaries 
of a distribution of chocolate. According to French intelligence, these interventions were 
widely commented upon in the city and surrounding area, and exploited by his friends.420 
Though his affiliation with the PPF and his unauthorized mediation made Bentami 
a target for police surveillance, he was still of use to Vichy officials. When the Algerians 
of Mostaganem protested the French failure to provide sheep for the holiday of Mawlid, 
Bentami suggested to the sub-prefect that the French were at fault for publicizing the 
availability of victuals instead of being honest about the real lack of supplies. According 
to Bentami, such mistakes were damaging the reputation of France, especially since there 
was no effective counter-propaganda. Furthermore, Bentami even met with Vichy’s 
influential Interior Minister, Pierre Pucheu, to inform him of the pitiful state of 
Algerians.421 
During this time, Bentami still worked with the PPF, and French authorities noted 
his unsuccessful efforts to draw Islamic notables to Doriot’s party. In late 1942, Bentami 
travelled to France for a party congress, and was unable to return as a result of the Allied 
occupation of Algeria and Morocco in November. His actions in France at this time are not 
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clear, but he is said to have participated in demonstrations for Marcel Déat’s 
collaborationist party, the Rassemblement nationale populaire while sending money to his 
family in Algeria through his contacts with the PPA. 
Despite his involvement with collaborators, Bentami was acquitted by the Civic 
Chamber of Oran in June 1945, and returned to political life as a candidate for Ferhat 
Abbas’ moderate-nationalist Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) which 
advocated for Algerian independence within a federal French system. With his eight-year 
association with the French far-right at an end, Bentami was able to quickly align himself 
with Abbas and regain his status as an influential figure in the Mostaganem region.422 The 
fluidity of such a political career makes it difficult to discern the sincerity of Bentami’s 
convictions, or the precise reasons why he stayed on with the French right for so long. But 
his ability to present himself alternatively as a French nationalist, a protector of Algerian 
interests, and as a mediator for authorities demonstrates how his practical political 
engagements allowed him to cross between the political categories typically employed by 
historians to understand interwar and wartime Algeria. A close look at one of Bentami’s 
key speeches on behalf of the PPF sheds light on how it was possible to rhetorically situate 
himself in-between the more common Algerian political platforms.423 
Bentami, like all the PPF's Algerian speakers, had the challenging task of speaking 
to multiple audiences: Algerians looking for reforms and respect and French Algerians 
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protective of their interests and status. In his November 1938 speech at the 2nd PPF 
Algerian Congress, Bentami both emphatically affirmed his French identity and the 
necessity of maintaining French colonial sovereignty while also criticizing various 
elements of colonial policy. One of his central arguments was that the concept of a "Muslim 
policy" was harmful for two reasons. The first was that any specific policy, be it "Catholic", 
"Protestant", or even of "free-thought" must in reality be a "French" policy placing national 
interests above all else. But this was not simply a means of asserting French nationalism. 
Bentami quickly asserted the totally independent basis of Muslim authority:  
It is truly a heresy from our perspective as believers to give the qualifying term 
"Muslim" to laws, decrees, and rules that have nothing to do with the Muslim faith. 
Muslim politics is entirely contained in the Qurʾan. Its expanse, limits, modalities, 
and principals are those that the Holy Book precisely determines...It is a grave error 
to continue to confuse the temporal and spiritual, and all this in the name of so-
called "secular" [laiques] regimes. 
And to conclude, he expanded on these ideas: 
As much as any others, if not more, the Muslim population is profoundly attached, 
as you all know, African comrades, to its traditions. There can be nothing here that 
stops his emancipation, and France would have been able to successfully conclude 
its mission, if, as paradoxical as it seems, it had not in some regards had a "Muslim 
policy" literally opposed to the dogma of Islam. Whereas France applies the 
separation of Church and State, here in Algeria an incomprehensible attitude is 
adopted, a source of profound and grave troubles to which we have perhaps not 
sufficiently taken into account. It is necessary to boldly and without delay give to 
Muslims the ability to organize and direct their religion [culte]; to organize 
everywhere their places of worship, to allow them to administer habus properties, 
to control the use of these resources, and to avoid their alienation; it is necessary in 
sum to respect the laws of Islam. 
Here Bentami touched upon a point critical to Algerian reforms for decades: the particular 
application of the 1905 Separation of Church and State law in Algeria. As Raberh Achi has 
shown, the French Algerian administration had no desire to respect such a separation and 
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thereby cede its longstanding political and surveillance powers over Islamic organizations 
and events. The administration therefore altered the law in its Algerian application to allow 
for continued French control over fields ranging from subsidies for local Imams to 
authorizations for Qurʾanic schooling.424 The ʿUlema reformist movement in particular 
highlighted this non-application of the spirit of the 1905 law as a critical point of contention 
with French rule. Though it was not unusual for an Algerian reform program to demand a 
fair application of the 1905 law, Bentami making such claims in a large hall full of devoted 
supporters of French sovereignty is striking. After all, for French Algerians the whole 
purpose of continued political control over Islam was to prevent Islam from turning into 
an anti-colonial force. By calling for true religious freedom in such a setting, Bentami was 
then pushing the PPF’s discourse of respect for Islam to its limits: would a party dedicated 
to maintaining French sovereignty allow for religious freedom if it felt its own sovereignty 
threatened? For the moment at least, Bentami hoped to see if his partnership with the far-
right could secure one of the longstanding goals of Algerian reformists.  
Bentami was not only calling for the restitution of Muslim control over their affairs, 
but also for the end of legal structures that differentiated groups based on religion. The 
three main examples Bentami cited were the Cremieux Decree that established a legal 
difference between Muslims and Jews by making the latter full French citizens, the code 
de l'indigénat that placed Algerians under a permanent state of legal exception, and the 
unequal wages Algerians earned compared to Europeans in both factories and 
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bureaucracies. With regard to wage inequality, Bentami countered the typical settler 
arguments of differences in productivity by stating that Algerians could not be as 
productive when the state did so little to educate, train, and nourish. As a result, the need 
for wage equality necessitated a much broader reform of societal structures. 
The Congress also included a clearly staged conversion event, in which a young 
Algerian, Foudil Larabi, dramatically announced his decision to join the party in front of a 
large audience. Larabi was an important catch for the PPF: he was well educated in French 
and Arabic, and had political experience as a founding member of the Etoile Nord-
Africaine.425 The new PPF convert referenced his ENA past by admitting he had been 
involved in several political movements which had all ended in disappointment. Feeling 
aimless and without direction, Larabi ascribed his political reawakening to the voice of 
Doriot in terms that clearly acknowledged the role of a charismatic leader in providing a 
purpose to life.426 According to French intelligence, Larabi quickly got to work on a 
Muslim section for the Algiers Branch of the PPF, with the particular goal of detaching 
urban Algerian workers from the leftist CGT.427 
Though Larabi seems to have drifted into the PPF through dissatisfaction with the 
alternatives, he was quick to pick up the rightist world-view. In a series of articles for the 
PPF’s North African paper, Le Pionnier, Larabi outlined the role of Algerians in a French 
empire run under the PPF’s principles. In his description of the ideal imperial structure, 
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Larabi appears to have been inspired by the morphological view of world cultures made 
popular by Spengler. According to the influential German pessimist, every culture has an 
idea that determines its flowering and eventual decay.428 Following the German 
philosopher’s main claim, Larabi argued that the European French and Mediterranean 
Islamic cultures represented organic units that should grow naturally. The goal of 
imperialism should be the co-operation between these cultures, such that each would 
“attain the plenitude of their strength”. Drawing further from rightist vocabulary, Larabi 
argued that the PPF imperial doctrine followed “logically, inexorably [fatalement]”, and 
could be summed up as an imperial community of separate units, with opportunities for 
organic sharing: “Each of the units [Algerian and French], evolving freely in harmonious 
parallel, will find suitable elements, elements that the nature of their constitutions can 
easily assimilate, and which will be imposed by their personalities. In this way, 
collaboration will be maintained and kept by a well-understood sense of common interest 
and the community will be guaranteed by mutual comprehension and reciprocal 
esteem.”429 Such an analysis also led Larabi to fault Jews and foreigners for fomenting 
discord between Muslims and the French. In his view, Jews did not form an organic unit 
of their own, and so risked corrupting those around them.  If these “intermediary elements 
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that clutter the way” were removed, a true policy of association could follow.430 Larabi’s 
quick grasp of rightist thinking demonstrates that at least some Algerians in the PPF took 
the potential alliance with the nationalist right seriously. 
Both Bentami and Larabi demonstrated how a strong commitment to the right could 
lead to a solid understanding of what the French right desired while maintaining 
interpretations that could benefit Algerians and North Africans, possibly against 
entrenched colonial interests. Each would continue in their leadership positions into World 
War II, as Larabi left Algeria with Bentami in 1942 for the national PPF Congress. Yet 
despite the presence of one of the two at most major PPF meetings, and their many 
speeches, often in Arabic, attracting Algerians to the PPF proved to be a difficult task.  
As a result, the PPF sought to change tack and appeal to rural Algerians as well as 
those who were politically engaged in cities. With this in mind Jean Fossati and Larabi 
came to Algiers to visit Shaykh Mustapha Kassimi, the head of the al-Rahamaniyya 
confraternity in El Hamel, and his cousin Abdelkader Kassimi. The reformist ʿUlema 
strongly opposed figures like the Kassimis, who they believed to represent a corrupted form 
of Islam too beholden to French interests. The Kassimis fought back, with Abdelkader 
editing a journal, al-Rashad, that attacked the ʿUlema.431 Perhaps the PPF believed an 
alliance with the ʿUlema was unlikely, and hoped to work with Muslims without such 
strong aspirations to national independence. Though Mustapha excused himself from 
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politics due to old age, he allowed Abdelkader to work with the PPF, deeming it during 
World War II to be the party that best represented Pétain’s vision. The PPF tried to use 
Abelkader’s adhesion as a propaganda victory, but the French authorities were not too 
worried, since Abdelkader was deemed an opportunist with little standing.432 During the 
war, Mustapha would try to work with the regime to bolster his influence.433 His PPF 
associations may have served as proof of his dedication to France. The PPF also recruited 
Shaykh Mohamed Zouani, a competitor for head of the al-Amariyya confraternity, which, 
according to the exaggerating PPF officials, had 400,000 members across the Islamic 
world. In reality, the confraternity was fractured and according to French intelligence was 
of little import, only finding recruits among the poor [le bas peuple].434 In a meeting 
between Zouani and Doriot in March 1942 on the Prophet’s birthday, Mawlid, Zouani 
emphasized the importance of France in protecting Muslims from atheistic communism. 
At the end of the ceremony, Doriot became an honorary member of the confraternity.435 
Around the same time, Zouani, along with other Algerian figures met with Cardinal Alfred-
Henri-Marie Baudrillart to discuss the necessity of a Muslim-Christian alliance against 
communism. French intelligence wondered what Doriot’s plan was, since other Shaykhs 
contested Zouani’s title as head of the al-Amariyya confraternity, and the other Algerian 
                                                 
432 Ibid., “L’activité indigène dans le départment d’Alger”, May 1940, October 1941. 
433 Ibid., September 1941. 
434 Ibid., August 1941, June 1941. 
435 ANOM, Algérie, Départment d’Alger, 4I/24, Le Pionnier, “La fête du prophète et l’union des 
musulmans avec la France”.  
 188 
PPF leaders were either “crooks” or nationalists seeking independence. “Is the PPF blind 
or stupid?” wondered a French intelligence officer.436  
Nevertheless, Doriot and Fossati continued to push for an alliance with rural 
Algerians, hoping to bring two to three hundred Algerian delegates as well as the prominent 
moderate Algerian leader and effective rural mediator Muhammad Salah Bendjelloul to 
their November 1942 Congress.437 The French North African governor-generals hoped to 
limit this number significantly, though Fossati believed the Algerian governor-general 
Yves Châtel would acquiesce in the end.438 Unlike the earlier Vichy governors, Châtel 
sought the support of the PPF, and ignored the advice of intelligence officials wary of 
Algerian activists in order to pursue a friendlier policy towards Algerians.439 Perhaps 
Châtel hoped to outbid the Germans for Algerian support. Whatever the case, Châtel’s 
opposition to the French Algerian administration led him to rely on the PPF’s networks of 
Algerians. And despite the fact that Abdelkader was still working his connections with 
local Muslim institutions to raise support for the PPF in the summer of 1942440, the PPF’s 
play for rural influence fell far short of expectations. 
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Despite Larabi’s claim that the PPF had three thousand Algerian members in late 
1940, this number was probably significantly lower.441 Understanding the numerical 
participation of Algerians in the PPF is rather difficult. Overall membership in the party 
fluctuated in the late 1930s, and the Vichy Regime, though sympathetic to elements of PPF 
ideology, was suspicious of its political activity and sought to limit its influence, thus 
driving down membership. Claims made by PPF members, such as Larabi, must not be 
taken too seriously. Furthermore, party lists of adherents and French police lists also pose 
problems. Some Algerians joined out of curiosity toward a new political movement, while 
French intelligence officers claimed that many others joined out of pressure from bosses 
and landowners. Thus, the numbers cannot tell us the level of commitment made by these 
PPF members, and whether those who adhered maintained any sort of lasting relationship 
with the party. A list of PPF members in Algiers from 1942 shows 94 Algerian members 
out of a total of 424, or 22% of the local section. About half were day laborers or employees 
who may have been pushed into enrollment. The other half consisted of small shop owners 
or those engaged in local trades, particularly chauffeuring. Algerian participation in PPF 
meetings during the war was low, and sparked concern among PPF leaders. Perhaps some 
members had quickly lost faith in the party platform or ability to carry out reform, while 
others had never intended to be involved. For example, in early 1938, a group of thirty 
Algerian members of the Médéa section, including two in local leadership positions, 
announced their demission in a letter sent to the socialist paper, La Lutte Sociale. The two 
                                                 
441Ibid., N. 1.892 C.I.E. “Fodil Larabi et P.P.F.”, 21 December 1940. 
 190 
important reasons for their renouncement was the PPF’s demand that Algerians vote in a 
separate electoral college, and that there was no program to drastically change the “feudal 
colonialism” under which most Algerians suffered.442 
THE PPF’S PRO-ALGERIAN POLITICS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
Certainly, these former members, who hoped to assimilate while remaining 
Muslim, came to understand what PPF policies would actually mean if implemented. The 
PPF did not offer much beyond certain social and cultural protections, amounting to a 
certain “protected” status for Algerians within the French imperial state. Yet as we have 
seen with Arrighi’s critique of colons and Bentami’s speech, PPF discourse often flirted 
with more radical ideas. As a result, the PPF helped to normalize certain positions while 
opening up a space in which Algerians could attempt to appropriate PPF discourse and 
practices for their own ends. That Doriot’s desire to recruit substantial numbers of 
Algerians was a failure is clear. But there were still moments of interaction between 
Algerian radicals and the PPF that should be studied. For those Algerians who were 
frustrated at the failure of the Popular Front to enact even limited reforms, a party dedicated 
to a charismatic leader and engaged in a radical critique of French society and political 
institutions must have raised considerable curiosity. Despite being a nationalist party that 
hoped to stifle anti-French sentiments, the PPF provided more maneuverability for 
Algerian radicals. 
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By attempting to satisfy certain Algerian demands in order to forestall Algerian 
nationalist sentiment, the PPF ended up undermining a French colonial order that could 
hardly provide needed social services. In the city of Blida, the local PPF leader sought to 
gain Algerian adherents by teaching illiterates how to read and write. 443 The recruiter, 
Ameur Mohamed, was a working-class painter, a former communist and son of a French 
officer, and taught a course on militancy twice a week for the PPF’s Blida youth group.444 
The PPF also exposed some Algerians to rightist social prescriptions, as in a 1937 meeting 
on corporatism in which seven of the ten participants were Algerians.445 In 1941, the sub-
prefect of Mascara threatened to send Henri Allegre, a PPF member, to a concentration 
camp for inciting Algerian distillery workers against their boss.446 Allegre had talked to 
these workers at a café, inquiring into their wages and possible mistreatment.447 Even after 
the Allied occupation of North Africa, the PPF militant Henri Jean Wallimann encouraged 
his comrades to make contact with young PPA members in order to organize resistance.448 
These examples show some of the ways that local PPF actors sought to build 
bridges to work with Algerians. According to French police, who were very keen on 
determining the Algerian reaction to rightist overtures, the responses varied. The Oran chef 
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de sûreté noted that in a meeting at Bou Sfer, the two hundred Algerians out of three 
hundred in attendance were clearly brought there by their employers, and failed to applaud 
or respond at all to a speech in Arabic given by Zine Bentabet criticizing the Popular 
Front.449 At times, the resistance shifted from passive to active. In a March 1939 meeting 
of the PPF’s Muslim section of Sidi-Bel-Abbès, an Algerian counter-speaker challenged 
the PPF’s positions, claiming that they would prefer Algeria to be administered locally by 
incompetent and uneducated Frenchmen rather than capable and well-trained Algerians. 
Furthermore, their claims to be pure French were belied by the fact that many local PPF 
members were naturalized Spaniards with more loyalty to Franco than to France. The 
rhetoric of Latinity apparently made it hard for some Algerians to take French right-wing 
nationalism seriously. Finally, the Algerian speaker asserted in Arabic that “Islam, whose 
refined civilization has shone on the world, has not fallen so low that the ex-communist 
Doriot can pretend to raise it by his bestowal of miserable bags of grain!” The main PPF 
speaker did not know how to respond while the Algerians in attendance applauded his 
challenger.450 
Perhaps the most intriguing interaction was that between the PPF and PPA 
members. Since the PPA had been established by Messali Hadj in Paris as an Algerian 
movement intimately connected to the PCF, it is common to trace the history of the PPA 
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and its influence on the post-war Front de Libération Nationale as one partly determined 
by the original form shaped by communist notions of organization and militancy.  This 
raises the question of the PPF’s possible influence in normalizing and encouraging the 
PPA’s move towards an intransigent and exclusive nationalism that separated it so clearly 
from the more moderate Algerian reform parties. In the late 1930s, the basis for PPA 
support came from younger, urban Algerians working as small tradesmen and in petty 
commerce. As Omar Carlier has demonstrated, this political constituency was eager to find 
political alternatives to traditional parties, while also engaging in an emotionally-driven 
public participation. Yet the failure of the Popular Front to deliver reforms brought much 
disappointment, with many PPA members and sympathizers rejecting democracy and 
embracing a secretive and instrumental form of politics.451 Given the PPA’s characteristics, 
the rightist PPF must have been an intriguing curiosity. Here was a party that tried to recruit 
from similar working-class social circles, critiqued French democracy, the communist 
party, and engaged in its own secretive politics to avoid government suppression. Despite 
the fact that the PPF’s prioritization of protecting the French Empire was at direct odds 
with the PPA’s Algerian nationalism, there existed a mutual interest. A closer look at how 
the PPF and PPA interacted in local situations will help clarify the similarities and 
differences between the two radical parties. 
The PPF itself tried to reach out to the PPA when the latter came under attack from 
communists. During the late 1930s, the communist line on French colonialism softened 
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considerably. The same anti-Fascist coalition that led to the Popular Front also meant that 
for communists, a reformed colonialism had to be maintained for the sake of the security 
of a France acting as a bulwark against Germany and Italy. Thus, in the minds of 
communists, the radical demands of Hadj and the PPA threatened to play into the hands of 
the fascists who promised Arabs independence in exchange for help in dismantling the 
“plutocratic” empires.452 In an article in Le Pionnier, the PPF acknowledged its concerns 
regarding the Algerian nationalism of the PPA, but attacked the Popular Front and 
communist figures for rigging an election to ensure Hadj lost, causing his arrest, and 
looking the other way at his mistreatment in prison. The author concluded: “Ah, if the PPA 
was not only anti-communist but also pro-French, how we would wish it good luck!”453 
Furthermore, the article represented a general party line, as PPF orators often brought up 
similar points. The PPF even backed two sympathizers of Messali’s party for municipal 
elections in November 1938 in Algiers against the communist and socialist candidates.454 
By portraying the communists and an Algerian administration beholden to the Popular 
Front as the primary enemies of the PPA, the PPF hoped to become the sole mediator 
between radical Algerians and France. 
The PPF aroused both curiosity and anger from the PPA. About fifty young and 
poor Algerians, many of whom were reported to be involved in “extremist circles” attended 
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a PPF meeting in Blida to learn about Doriot’s proposal for a Muslim electoral college.455 
In a 1938 meeting in Tiaret in which Doriot was present, a report sent to the prefect 
estimated that the majority of the 100 to 150 Algerians in attendance were PPA members. 
Yet, when Doriot explained that the policy of association could be likened to living in the 
same house without sharing the same bed, a young Algerian challenged him, replying that 
“the French take the bed, and the Arab must content himself with the rug”, at which point 
he was expelled from the room. Needless to say, the incident did not make a good 
impression on the PPA members.456 At another meeting, three of the forty Algerians in 
attendance, all “known for their commitment to the PPA”, refused to take off their hats to 
sing the Marseillaise. Some PPA members clearly participated in PPF events as critical 
observers, trying to learn about the party’s platform, and where it fit into the quickly 
changing political constellation of late 1930s Algeria.457 
One Algerian informant for a French intelligence service reported on why some 
PPA members sought a rapprochement with the PPF during the early period of World War 
II. By initiating contacts with the PPF, these Algerians hoped to push the PPF to attack the 
leader of the influential ʿUlema movement, Shaykh al-ʿUqbi, for being too soft on the 
Jewish community. The PPF would be happy to pursue any anti-Semitic leads, while the 
French administration would become more suspicious of a figure they hoped to work with. 
Since the PPF under Vichy was the only political party with any ability to operate publicly, 
                                                 
455 ANOM, Algérie, Départment d’Alger, 4I/24, “Le P.P.F. et les Indigènes”, 29 March 1938. 
456 ANOM, Algérie, Départment d’Oran, //84, “Réunion que Doriot a donnée à Tiaret le 12 
courant”, 18 May 1938. 
457 ANOM, Algérie, Départment d’Alger, 41/24, “Réunions publiques”, 27 January 1938. 
 196 
some PPA members could continue to play a wily political game aimed at destabilizing 
French rule. The officer in Algiers who received the report was familiar with the PPA’s 
clever use of French far-rightists, noting that “Already before the war, a certain number of 
PPA militants adhered to the PPF or the PSF in order to ‘cover themselves’ against the 
suspicions of the authorities, while at the same time taking lessons in organization.”458 
Such was the case of an Algerian arrested in Azazga for speaking out against France in 
September 1939; apparently proof of PPF membership did not constitute a get out of jail 
free card.459 As a result of the PPF opening up this (admittedly limited) space for radical 
Algerian politics, Pétain’s delegate to North Africa, General Maxime Weygand, ordered 
the governors of French North Africa to crack down on political groups, and to particularly 
limit the PPF’s appeals and “demagogic propaganda” directed at Algerians.460 
THE FAR-RIGHT AND ALGERIANS IN FRANCE 
And yet the far-rightist campaign to appeal to Algerians continued in Nazi-occupied 
Paris, where a sizeable community of North African immigrant workers constituted a 
tempting target. It was here that Hadj originally began his political career, and it was in the 
working-class suburb of Saint-Denis that Doriot had built his political citadel. Yet the PPF 
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was not the only rightist group at work in immigrant and working-class Paris. Pierre 
Constantini, the leader of the collaborationist group La Ligue Française, sought to make 
contact with North Africans in Paris. By the spring of 1942, the increasing stakes of World 
War II inflamed the rhetoric and promises that such campaigns entailed. In a meeting of 
the Ligue’s North African Section, Ramdani, Constantini’s former chauffeur and head of 
the section, called for the full legal equality of Muslims, as well as the “total elimination 
of Jews and of Anglo-Saxon capitalists”. 461 Next Muhammad Masri, a professor of 
theology at the University of Cairo, explained how the Ligue possessed the only French 
political doctrine compatible with that of Islam. Constantini then described how the 
geographical position of North Africa would determine the outcome of the war, before 
beginning a long appeal to the North Africans in attendance. Not only was Islam “the most 
powerful force in the universe”, but the current “world revolution” was a repetition of 
Muhammad’s struggle against the Jews. Following these broad claims, Constantini looked 
to a shared history between the French and Muslims that went back to a Napoleon 
remembered as an Islamophile. Finally, the religious divide could be overcome, as 
Constantini argued that the Qurʾan itself calls Christianity the closest religion to Islam.462 
French intelligence did not make too much of these recruiting efforts, since most 
members were said to have joined as a sign of gratitude to French rightists who had found 
them jobs.  Though Doriot and Constantini often spoke publicly together at this time, their 
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organizations showed little co-operation, as they competed with each other for North 
African adherents. Furthermore, an attempt by PPA members to infiltrate the group had 
failed, once again demonstrating how rightist organizations were seen as potential areas in 
which Algerian nationalists could throw around their political weight.463 Though one report 
suggested that their North African membership reached 2,000 by early 1942, this figure 
appears to be inflated, certainly with regard to active participation. 
Yet some Algerians, like Bentami and Larabi in the PPF, had a much more long-
standing and deeper relationship with the right. The most notable was Mohamed el-Maadi, 
a naturalized officer born in 1902 to an Algerian qaʿid and French mother. Though his 
political experience began in the Etoile Nord-Africain, el-Maadi soon began to identity 
himself with the right. An avid reader of the right-wing press and a member of the Action 
Française living in a hotel run by a PSF member, el-Maadi soon made connections with 
the radical French right that would provide him with a series of rather dubious projects 
until the end of World War II.464 At first, he was arrested by the police as a suspected 
member of the Cagoule, a small clique of insurrectionary rightists who engaged in 
assassinations and destruction of property from 1936-1937 to create the climate necessary 
for a reactionary coup. El-Maadi declared he had been given 15,000 francs to recruit 350 
men for an imminent operation.465 With the start of the war, el-Maadi hoped to act as a 
mediator between the French right, the Nazis, and North African nationalists. An attempt 
                                                 
463 Ibid., N. 381, 18 April 1942. 
464 ANOM, Algérie, Départment d’Alger, 1K/38, Dir. SGA to Préfet d’Alger, 28 October 1937. 
465 Philippe Bourdrel, La Cagoule, 30 ans de complots (Paris, 1970), p. 213. 
 199 
to convince Hadj of the necessity of collaboration was a failure. Yet his contacts with the 
Cagoule’s founder, Eugène Deloncle, continued, and he also remained associated with the 
renegade socialist Marcel Déat. Through these influential collaborators, el-Maadi gained 
enough trust with the Germans to help organize the North-African Brigade, a unit of a few 
hundred North Africans recruited in the same Parisian working-class district used by Zola 
as the setting for L’Assommoir. After being engaged in a few anti-partisan operations, the 
Brigade was caught in an ambush in which most perished. With the fall of France, el-Maadi 
escaped to Germany before eventually finding a safe haven in Egypt where he died in the 
early 1950s.466 
But el-Maadi’s involvement with the right should not automatically lead us to 
believe he was unsympathetic to many of the claims made by radical Algerian activists. In 
a long report on “The social and material situation of North-African indigènes” given 
during the 1941 Congress of Déat’s Rassemblement nationale populaire, el-Maadi 
delivered a scathing critique of French colonial society. An analysis of his report will allow 
us to see how el-Maadi could position himself as an uncompromising critic of the French 
colonial status while maintaining his close ties to the French right. 
El-Maadi warned of the French false sense of complacency and deliberate attempt 
to mythologize Algeria, declaring that the “lazy and negative patriotism that lacks courage 
and initiative…is finished”, and that the “false speeches, the memory of banquets held in 
honor of the Algerian Centenary, the memory of the belly dances of the Colonial 
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Exposition, will not impede the truth from coming out”. Without a “conquest of the hearts”, 
the French would soon see the Algerians rightfully rebel. Yet any attempt by North 
Africans to demand or suggest the smallest reform always led to immediate rejection and 
a general outcry. According to el-Maadi, the burgeoning Algerian political parties did not 
seek independence as so many claimed, but merely reforms that France should have 
delivered long ago. Colonial defenders were mistaken when they commonly attributed 
strikes and social disorder to foreign powers rather than to the miserable conditions of 
Algerian life. As a result of French inaction, this Algerian social condition was 
“horrifying…The mass of indigènes, composed of dispossessed fellahs and impoverished 
artisans, wanders, starving, on the outskirts of cities.” El-Maadi’s list of demanded reforms 
included an abolition of the laws of exception, obligatory bilingual education, an increase 
in North African participation in the administration, the full application of all metropolitan 
social laws in North Africa, the amnesty of all political prisoners, and the implementation 
of a vast development program for the North African countryside. 
Given how critical el-Maadi was of the French colonial lobby, and by implication, 
the majority of supporters of nationalist parties in North Africa, how could he hope to forge 
a common bond with the fascist right in France? His anti-semitism was a start, as he blamed 
Jews for certain abuses in colonial society, such as usurious interest rates, corrupt 
administrative figures, and the misleading promises of the Popular Front. One of his 
demands was therefore the expulsion of Jews from North Africa and the redistribution of 
their property to fellahs. Yet he did not see the Jews as entirely responsible, and shifted his 
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language where appropriate from “the Jews” to the deliberately vague “one”, or “they”, 
when referring to conservative French colonialists.  
El-Maadi also nuanced his critic of French faults by highlighting certain positives: 
the establishment of law and order as opposed to inter-tribal violence, the mise en valeur 
of uncultivated land, the establishment of roads, hospitals, ports, and dams, and the 
introduction of French culture. Despite asserting that North Africans had not enjoyed the 
benefits of these advantages, el-Maadi’s admiration of French accomplishments 
demonstrated his willingness to remain within the French colonial narrative, albeit with a 
critical eye. His rightist credentials also gave him impressive leeway from a Vichy 
government that had arrested many Algerian nationalists, particularly from the PPA. When 
he visited Algeria to research an article that would attack the French Algerian 
administration, Governor Châtel’s secretary Canavaggio pleaded with him to tone down 
his rhetoric and take into account Châtel’s differences with administrators. El-Maadi 
complied by softening his language and speaking positively of the governor.467 According 
to Canavaggio, el-Maadi impressed Châtel, who allegedly spoke of the ambitious Algerian 
as “a courageous and seductive, but still loyal man”.468 
Perhaps most interestingly, el-Maadi sought collaboration with the French fascists 
by sharing popular notions of geopolitical units. He stated that “North Africa, by its 
geographic position, by its geological formation, is European. Let us make of it an 
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extension of European France.” El-Maadi was careful not to distinguish too neatly among 
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, since he viewed North Africa as an organic sub-unit that 
ideally existed within the larger European space. This unity was constituted by “a common 
physiognomy: the orographic form, the climate, the products, the nature of the populations, 
their history, customs, religion; all this calls forth unity.” Only a party that understood this 
unity could enact a “just” North African policy. For el-Maadi, this shared history was very 
much a tragic one, in which “we are, very simply, from East to West, from Tunis to 
Marrakech, a Mediterranean people who for two millennia, have been successively 
dominated by Carthage, Rome, Vandals, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks, and the French.” Yet 
these conquering forces had at least given North Africa access to civilization which the 
French were now trying to deny. By calling for North African unity, el-Maadi gave voice 
to certain North Africans who had advocated the unity of the Maghreb, as Hadj’s ENA did 
from time-to-time in the mid- 1930s. Yet this common space belonged to a larger trans-
Mediterranean unity dominated by Europe. As a result, el-Maadi placed himself, and 
Maghrebi unity within the fascist conception of Eurafrica as a possible unified political 
space in which regional cultures could defend themselves military, politically, and 
culturally.469 In the spring of 1943, with the Allies in control of North Africa, el-Maadi 
expanded on the importance of Muslims for the success of any “Eurafrica” political project 
in a book, L’Afrique du Nord: Terre d’histoire, published by France-Empire. 
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The central purpose of the book was to suggest exactly what European-Muslim 
cooperation would look like. The first step was to integrate North Africa’s Arab and Berber 
population into the narrative of European history. According to el-Maadi, “the Arabo-
Berbers who occupied Spain and Southern France for centuries, are without a doubt, 
responsible for [à l’origine de] modern European civilization”.470  Despite this initial 
challenge to popular European narratives,471 el-Maadi quickly mimicked nineteenth 
century French depictions of Algeria by portraying Africa as a largely empty, uncultivated 
land with significant untapped resources. The advance of Europe into Africa was an 
inevitable “destiny”.472 Africa, as the fascist Eurafricanists had argued, would serve as an 
open geopolitical space in which Europe could channel its energies and send its excess 
populace, thus providing a common project upon which to build a unified Europe. But the 
role of North Africans in these schemes had always been relegated to a footnote. For el-
Maadi, it was precisely North Africans that would make the whole project work.  
As el-Maadi was aware of, Eurafrica planners were cognizant of the problems in 
exporting European populations to Equatorial Africa. Indeed, this obstacle was one of the 
topics addressed in the Italian’s 1937 International Congress on Africa. The answer was 
clear for el-Maadi: it would not be Europeans colonizing Equatorial Africa, but Arabs and 
Berbers. The settler/soldier myth would be taken up by an Arab/Berber race and Islamic 
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culture perfectly suited for the historic role.473 In a twist, el-Maadi re-elaborated the settler 
defense line of the French General Thomas-Roger Bugeaud, infamous for his brutal tactics 
in the conquest of Algeria. Before attempting to lower the risk of rebellion by fixing 
Algerians to the land, Bugeaud had hoped that mass French colonization of the country 
would form a wall protecting the French community from Algerian raids, and freeing 
French soldiers for continental duty.474 Now el-Maadi positioned Algerians as the new 
settler line of defense, this time along the Sahara. Thus, the North-Africans could play a 
key role in the grand European geo-political project. An anti-capitalist and anti-Bolshevik 
Europe free of Jews could only function peacefully if Western Europe had its own zone of 
imperialism to compliment German eastward expansion. Yet, the hinge to the entire 
Eurafrica project was the North African population. And while such schemes may appear 
absurd given the Axis’ state of siege, the skill of el-Maadi in negotiating fascist ideology, 
discourse, and geopolitical assumptions is a revealing demonstration of how the most 
racist, exclusivist ideas could be appropriated by marginalized actors. 
CONCLUSION 
The world of Algerian politics was heavily fractured during the late 1930s, and the 
PPF hoped it could find a platform capable of drawing in Algerian adherents and 
sympathizers. In hindsight, their attempt appears rather naïve; yet it was one of the critical 
party projects in Algeria. Just about every meeting and comprehensive speech touched on 
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“indigène question”, often at length. In short, the PPF did not fail for a lack of effort, but 
for a fundamentally flawed political premise that Algerians would give up political and 
civic power in exchange for economic and cultural protection. The decision was made all 
the easier by the fact that the PPF had little chance of taking power and enacting its reforms. 
It instead appeared to be a mere tool to rally rightist French Algerians to maintain the 
colonial status-quo. At the same time, however, the PPF did open a space that saw curious 
Algerians studying a competitor, politically marginalized activists experimenting with an 
alternative movement, and conservative Algerians allying with the far-right to bring about 
their own brand of reform. In that sense, the PPF campaign to capture the hearts of 
Algerians was aided by their lack of power; by playing an insurgent role in French politics, 
the PPF would allow its Algerian followers to join them in attacks on the French 
administration, colonial practices, and religious policing, so long as these critiques were 
framed so as not to question French sovereignty. Once the French Algerian right did come 
to power under Vichy, it had to immediately face the backlash of failed expectations, as 
we will see in Chapter Five. But first, we will turn to the Italian efforts to gain Libyan 
loyalty through their own ideas of fascist-inspired governance. 
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Chapter Four: Governing Muslims I: Incorporating Libyans into the 
Fascist Mediterranean Empire 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1919, after eight years of political strife and military campaigns, the Italian 
occupation of the Libyan provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica had been limited to the 
coastal cities of Tripoli and Homs. The liberal governments of Vittorio Orlando and 
Francesco Nitti sought to come to an agreement with the self-proclaimed Tripolitanian 
Republic and with the Senussi Sufi order, led by Muhammad Idris. For the time, the Italian 
concessions to Libyan demands were stunning: the freedom of press and association were 
guaranteed, the Arabic language was to be given equal status to Italian, obligatory military 
service was abolished, and most importantly, both provinces could elect a majority Arab 
parliament with the power to set taxes. Yet by 1922, the compromise was falling apart, as 
tensions increased between Italian authorities and the tribes of Tripolitania, who were 
themselves engaged in constant infighting.475 Furthermore, when the Tripolitanian 
Republic offered Muhammad Idris the title of Emir, the Italians feared the creation of a 
unitary Libyan state opposed to their interests. Even before the fascist march on Rome, 
liberal Italy began to assert its sovereignty through the conquest of several cities. With the 
unwavering political and military support of a fascist government, the total conquest of 
                                                 
475 For a detailed history of this brief period in Libyan history, see Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, The 
Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance (Albany, 2009), pp. 
124-136; and Angelo Del Boca, Mohamed Fekini and the Fight to Free Libya, trans. Antony 
Shugaar (New York, 2011), pp. 61-107. 
 207 
Tripoli and Cyrenaica began to proceed apace in a series of conflicts that would last from 
1923 to 1932.476  
Yet once the fascists had imposed Italian sovereignty over Libya, they faced a 
difficult question. What would the role of Libyans be in a fascist Libya? The assimilationist 
model was out of the question, given the fascist contempt for civil liberties and their 
understanding of Libyan civilization as inferior to that of Italy. So was the federal system 
that the liberals had reluctantly consented to before undermining. Furthermore, as we have 
seen in Chapter One, Libya was to be a site of the historic unfolding of the Italian nation’s 
narrative. What role could Libyans possibly have in the Italian re-discovery of their Roman 
past, or in the Italian use of Libya as a new frontier to send the unemployed and landless, 
or most ominously, in a space in which Italians would learn how to create a stronger race 
through the practice of commanding? From any fascist viewpoint, the Libyan role would 
have to be a subservient one. The early years of fascist rule in Libya bluntly reflected this, 
as the lapsed accords between local elites and the liberal government were not replaced 
with a new legal order until 1927. In the interim, Italy acted essentially outside of any 
established norms. Afterwards, Italy formally enshrined its direct rule, whereby a governor 
representing the metropole would rule over the colonies of Tripoli and Cyrenaica without 
intermediaries. Libyans were relegated to second-class status with respect to metropolitan 
Italians.477 Further reforms in 1934 would combine Tripolitania and Cyrenaica into one 
colony consisting of four coastal provinces, with the southern territories ruled by the 
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military. Finally, in 1939 the coastal provinces (Derna, Benghazi, Misurata, and Tripoli) 
were absorbed directly into the Italian state.478 With the legal framework in place to secure 
total Italian control over Libya, the question of the role of Libyans remained.   
The early years of fascist rule in Libya were draconian by any measure, as Italians 
executed combatants, bombed indiscriminately, and confiscated land and property. Yet 
domestic and international considerations forced the Italian fascists to offer some sort of 
positive definition of Libyans vis-à-vis the Italian nation, and why they were better off 
under Italian fascist rule. Domestically, such a vision aimed to co-opt and redirect anti-
Italian nationalist and religious movements into depoliticized forms of civic and religious 
engagement, while internationally, it was critical to pose as friends of Arabs and Islam in 
order to open up space for political action elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Beyond the still 
common tools of repression, the central fascist strategies were threefold. The first was to 
integrate a small Libyan elite into fascist institutions while providing access to a form of 
privileged citizenship. Using a word popular with the regime, we can call this the 
inquadramento strategy, one that consisted of inserting citizens into state-run organizations 
while subsuming their individual interests into those of the state.479 Inquadramento offered 
a fascist solution to the problem of colonial citizenship. In British and French colonies, 
debates over citizenship offered colonial subjects a chance to assert their rights and to find 
roles in governmental and administrative posts despite constant obstruction and the use of 
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occasional violence in the name of maintaining colonial hegemony.480 Yet fascist 
principles would brook no such opposition. As a result, new solutions had to be found to 
keep Libyans, particularly those living in the coastal cities, from political dissent. Italians 
hoped that slowly introducing Libyans to fascist institutions would inspire loyalty and 
consent. 
The second strategy, connected to the refusal to grant the legal rights enjoyed by 
Italians, was to frame the rejection of assimilation as respect for Islamic traditions and 
culture. Italy could then present itself as a new model of colonial rule opposed to the so-
called materialist universalism of liberal democracies and the Soviet Union. To this end, 
Italy openly adopted the doctrine of association that had gained increasing support from 
both French and British colonial administrators. Association stood in contrast to 
assimilation; it promised to maintain traditional hierarchies and social structures at the 
expense of the educated, Westernized elites. Advocates of association often looked to 
traditional local leaders to outsource colonial governance, although these leaders often 
formed a new class created by colonial administrators. Such a strategy would allegedly 
ease colonial subjects into modernity, and protect them from predatory Europeans while 
cutting costs and ensuring that European sovereignty was not challenged by European-
educated urban elites.481 For more benevolent Europeans, as Raoul Girardet put it, 
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association demonstrated respect through the belief that “each culture taken in its 
uniqueness, studied for its originality, possesses its own value, its own riches.”482 In reality, 
as historians have shown, association and assimilation were never clearly distinct, as 
colonial practice was always fuzzier than theories of governance.483 Since the Italians 
favored direct rule, their claims to association mostly rested on the protection of local 
religious beliefs and traditions. However, the Italian claim to protect Islam in Libya belied 
an attempt to depoliticize the religion and make it more amenable to Italian rule. 
Finally, the Italians wished to make Libya appear to be a model colony. Libya itself 
was not much of an economic asset to Italy,484 and served instead as a planned jumping-
off point for expansion into Tunisia and possibly Egypt.485 This meant that the regime had 
to carefully control the movement of Libyans living and travelling abroad. By limiting the 
damage of anti-Italian exiles and emigrants, and encouraging the movement of pro-Italian 
Libyans, Italy hoped to use the transnational movements of Libyans to their advantage. 
This chapter will examine each of these strategies in turn, focusing on the 
opportunities and limitations of governing a colonial space using the fascist strategies of 
de-politicization through hierarchical political integration, strict control over the 
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movements of subjects, and the reification of tradition to counteract the dissolving 
tendencies of the modern processes of secularization, urbanization, and rationalization. In 
doing so, this chapter will examine questions of colonial citizenship, transnational 
networks and contacts, and the nature of the relationship between Islam and the Italian far-
right. 
A MENACE AND AN OPPORTUNITY: LIBYANS ABROAD 
I. Policing Libyan Migrants 
The Italian invasion and occupation of Libya greatly destabilized the country. As 
the initial war against the Ottomans turned into a struggle against the Senussi order during 
the World War, and then into a final Italian assault aiming at total control over Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica, many Libyans were displaced. Thousands left to find more stable economic 
employment, particularly in Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, while others fled after years of 
armed resistance. In 1931, around thirty thousand Libyans were living abroad, with seven 
to eight thousand in Tunisia and Algeria, and twenty thousand in Egypt.486 
The presence of so many Libyans abroad offered opportunities and dangers for 
Italian authorities. In the minds of many of those working in North Africa and the Middle 
East, the idea of a vaguely unified Arab and/or Islamic world487 was taken seriously. 
Roberto Cantalupo, an Italian expert on Middle Eastern affairs, and the Legate to Cairo in 
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the early 1930s, viewed Islam as a temporarily stagnant force that still had great potential. 
Though Cantalupo recognized the divisions between Arab states, he believed that  
this purely accidental situation, subtly provoked by non-Muslim forces intent on 
dividing the Arabs to render them prone to economic manumission, does not rid us 
of the question of their future function with regard to a divided West and a sickly 
East. On the Indian trade routes there exist armed peoples, proud sultans and 
powerful sects. The Islam of the Indian Ocean can communicate with that of Syria 
and Mesopotamia by way of Yemen and the Hejaz. The Islamic cycles take place 
over continents. 
According to Cantalupo, the individual forms of Arab nations could manifest themselves 
in a variety of ways, and Italy could only anchor itself solidly amid them all by remaining 
outside any conflicts internal to Islam.488 
A functionary in the Consulate in Jedda echoed Cantalupo’s thoughts a few years 
later, proclaiming that thanks to the divine nature of the Arabic language in Islamic culture, 
the  
European powers must be wary and circumspect in their relations with Muslims, 
because Arab journals are read throughout the Islamic world, and whatever the 
differences between sects and their mutual hostilities, an act committed against a 
part will have immediate and profound repercussions throughout the Muslim 
world... Islam is therefore a compact and homogenous whole despite its internal 
fissures and discordances. It is therefore necessary to consider it as a block even if 
one is in contact with a single part of it. This is so clearly true that if an Islamic 
grouping starts to become a Western nation, as in contemporary Turkey, it removes 
itself from Islam. The Turks do not come anymore to Mecca for the pilgrimage.489 
Given this view of Islam as a unified culture sharing a broad historical destiny, it is no 
surprise that the Italians were particularly concerned with the ability of Libyans to spread 
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word of Italian atrocities and maladministration in neighboring countries. Such fears 
seemed to be realized in the early 1930s, as the Italians resorted to extreme coercive 
measures in order to subjugate Cyrenaica. In a spectacular display of harshness aimed at 
preventing Eastern Libyans from aiding the resistance leader ʿUmar al-Mukhtar, Governor 
Pietro Badoglio and General Rodolfo Graziani oversaw the forced internment of one 
hundred thousand Libyans, constituting nearly half the population of Cyrenaica, in a series 
of camps placed in the desert of Sirtica. Between June 1930 and September 1933, forty 
thousand Libyans died in the camps, with a total death toll possibly reaching sixty 
thousand.490 And in September 1931, the Italians hung the captured ʿUmar al-Mukhtar in 
one of the larger camps, inciting waves of public protests in Arab cities around the 
Mediterranean.491  
As Anna Baldinetti has demonstrated, the substantial number of exiles coupled with 
the Italian atrocities sparked the creation of a variety of anti-Italian associations, 
particularly in Egypt and Syria. Figures like Bashir al-Saʿdawi, working in Syria, 
championed a Libyan national identity as part of a broader Arab nationalist movement.492 
Thus, Italian misrule helped create politically-driven exile communities that threatened to 
disrupt Italian rule in Libya as well as its reputation in the larger Arab world. In this context, 
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the Italians sought to keep a close watch over Libyans abroad, in the hopes of either using 
them as propaganda pieces, or of limiting the potential damage they could inflict. Such a 
task proved difficult, as seen in the example of the Tripolitanian community in Tunisia. 
Following the Italian conquest of the southwestern territory of Fezzan in February 
1930, around 2800 members of the Rojeban, Zintan, Misciascia, Ulad Bu Sef, and Orfella 
tribes escaped to French Algeria. With leaders like the indefatigable Muhammad al-Fekini, 
the men of these tribes had fought the Italians for many years as mujahidin. Now they had 
to make their way through inhospitable terrain to join an already sizeable Tripolitanian 
community in Tunisia.493 In the first year alone of the Italian occupation, 35,000 Libyans 
fled to Tunisia, mostly from poor nomadic tribes along the border. The new arrivals joined 
migrant laborers as well as other tribes that had already been living in Tunisia for many 
years.494 Cognizant of the danger of so many Tripolitanians in a French-held territory, Italy 
hoped to repatriate as many emigrants and exiles as possible once it had suppressed all 
armed resistance. Even before the conquest of Fezzan, a pardon had been issued to all who 
would submit to Italian sovereignty.495 The Italians believed that doing so would weaken 
the ability of Libyan political exiles and French authorities to harm Italian interests. Italian 
officials worried that political exiles inflamed anti-Italian opinion in Tunisia by spreading 
rumors that travelled by word of mouth and through the press.496 French authorities 
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appeared to relish in the Italian discomfiture. In the case of the Fezzan exiles, a Franco-
Italian accord ensured a prompt disarmament, along with the offer of temporary work in 
Tunisian mines while preparations were made for their return to Tripolitania. Yet by 1931, 
the Governor of Tripoli, Pietro Badoglio, and the Minister of Colonies, Emilio De Bono, 
both expressed concerns that the French were prohibiting the re-entry of the Libyan exiles 
and economic migrants. They accused the French government of forcing around 500 
Libyans to stay in the mines without even letting them contact other Libyans. The French 
efforts frustrated the Italians, who believed that most exiled Tripolitanians no longer trusted 
their leaders to provide food and shelter, and preferred to return home.497 Beyond throwing 
up roadblocks to repatriation, the French also allegedly used an Arab functionary to meet 
with the miners during a strike to attack Italy’s colonial policies.498 In the eyes of the 
Italians, the presence of Tripolitanians in Tunisia offered the French a tool to potentially 
destabilize and threaten the Libyan border region while guaranteeing a cheap labor supply 
for Tunisian mines. 
The tension between the two colonial powers continued into 1933, as the Italians 
again tried to encourage the resettlement of the five thousand Tripolitanians remaining in 
Tunisia. The Italian consul in Tunis, Enrico Bombieri, believed that the French were 
opposed to repatriation “for reasons of prestige, having always studied ways to spread the 
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most alarming news on the living conditions of Arabs in Libya. This is done to combat 
nationalist and Destour propaganda that denigrates the action of the French government in 
Tunisia.” Bombieri also surmised that the French wanted to keep the Libyans as a cheap 
labor pool for Tunisian mines.499 When the Government of Tripolitania examined the 
situation, it saw a different threat arising from the maintenance of a Libyan expatriate 
community in Tunisia. According to Tripoli’s informants, Soviet and orthodox Islamic 
propaganda in Tunisia was “having an effect on our exiles…and they do not show a desire 
to return, persuaded like many others that the moment of the reawakening of Islam is near.” 
In order to convince the exiles to return, select Libyans had been sent to Tunisia and Algeria 
to engage in pro-Italian propaganda, but this was deemed by Tripoli and the Ministry of 
Colonies to cause more harm than good, since many were not well equipped for propaganda 
work, or were of questionable loyalty. Interestingly, some agents allegedly worked “on 
their own initiative”, which probably caused more concern than optimism among Italian 
officials.500 
The presence of so many Libyans in Tunisia therefore posed potential threats to 
both French and Italian authorities. Events like the Destour’s hosting of a meeting of 
Libyan political exiles in 1933 permitted anti-Italian Libyans to make contacts with other 
political movements that could harm Italian’s reputation among Arabs and Muslims.501 
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Exiles also spread word of Italian injustice in newspapers across the Arab world. For 
instance, one Libyan who had left for Egypt and then Tunisia after attempting to return, 
explained to a correspondent for the Pan-Islamic Congress’ newspaper al-Jamʿiyya al-
Islamiyya how Italian rule was exploitative, adding that the Italians ensured that little 
information about what they were doing reached the rest of the world.502 For those 
interested in the fate of Libya, figures like this interviewee were one of the few 
unauthorized sources of information. And though, as Baldinetti has argued, Libyans in 
Tunisia were less politically involved than those in Egypt and Syria, where more elites 
tended to find succor, a branch of the Damascus-based Association for the Defense of 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica engaged in anti-Italian propaganda efforts. Seeing an 
opportunity in this activism, the French encouraged its organizers, who were only able to 
gather 700 participants, possibly because of the clear French involvement.503 
Even with these concerns, the Italians opted to let Libyans return “naturally” so as 
not to put too much stress on the Government of Tripoli. Throughout 1933, almost one 
thousand exiles in Tunisia came back to Libya, raising the total since the proclamation of 
amnesty to over seven thousand. By August 1934, the Italian consulate in Tunisia was 
working with the French administration to aid repatriation efforts, thanks to the French 
desire to get rid of excess labor in an economic downturn.504 Yet the French still would not 
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allow the exiles to cross the border with their livestock, forcing the Italians to try and 
moderate the number of returnees. The Ministry of Colonies, though in favor of 
repatriation, required a vetting process to lessen the burden on the Tripolitanian 
government, given a potential scarcity of resources.505 As a result, emigrant Libyans found 
themselves in a web of conflicting national interests as their traditionally transient borders 
had transformed into hardened state lines where French and Italian political and economic 
interests held sway. 
Despite the Italian hesitations to welcome back what authorities called an “exodus” 
in one fell swoop, the emigrant Libyans continued to pour into Libya, even illegally 
crossing the border when the Tunisian consulates were slow to adhere to their demands for 
repatriation documents. Upon returning to their tribes, the Libyans provided testimony of 
their experience in Tunisia to the Italians. These documents show that Italian propaganda 
was not responsible for their return, but rather the arrival of the world economic crisis in 
Tunisia. While a large number of Libyans had simply crossed the border without 
documents, they found themselves working in mines or in the urban working classes. As a 
result, many of those returning had been dependent on the global economy, and suffered 
the consequences during its depression. According to one miner, the wages he could gain 
from piecemeal work had fallen from 18-20 francs a day to 2-3.506 Another Libyan, who 
worked as a construction worker in Sfax and Bizerte declared that all the Libyan workers 
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had been fired and that even the Tunisians had a hard time finding work.507 Italian records 
of those that chose to repatriate show that most brought their families with them, suggesting 
that the economic crisis, coupled with the first period of stability in Tripolitania in two 
decades, had prompted a permanent return. For some, Italian word of mouth propaganda 
did appear to have an impact; one worker who had jumped from job to job in Tunisia 
decided to return clandestinely “because the rumor began, even among Tunisians, that one 
lives much better in Tripolitania and with a cheap cost of living.”508 
The government of Tripoli reported that another critical factor in the return of so 
many emigrants was the fear of being enlisted in the French armed forces.509 In 1933, 
Bombieri had expressed concern to the French that many Libyans were unfairly subject to 
military conscription. This situation stemmed from porous Italian border controls from 
1912 until 1930 which allowed many Libyans to come to Tunisia without any documents 
proving their Libyan citizenship. The French Foreign Ministry responded that the borders 
of Tunisia were secure on the French side, and that Libyans were not allowed in without 
passports.510 
Though the Italians hoped to encourage the return of economic migrants, there was 
little leniency in the way of political exiles. The Government of Cyrenaica tried to ensure 
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that any emigrants applying for re-admission should be vetted for their political history, 
and in one instance, denied eight out of seventeen applications sent by Libyans in Haifa 
and Jaffa.511 And in the case of the elderly and blind resistance fighter, Muhammad al-
Fekini, exiled in Tunisia, the Italian government repeatedly refused his request to return to 
his former lands. The Italians would not budge on the issue of restoring al-Fekini’s 
confiscated property, and would only countenance his return on the condition that he live 
under surveillance far from his home and with a small 400 lira monthly allowance. While 
the Tunisian consul hoped that al-Fekini’s return would inspire other emigrants to follow, 
the government of Tripoli determined that the propaganda value would not be worth the 
price of compromising Italian authority.512 
Economic and political migrants constituted the two primary groups whose foreign 
experiences concerned Italian authorities, but small groups and certain individuals also had 
to be closely surveilled. Sometimes, Libyan immigrants themselves served as the catalyst 
for concerns, as when Abu Ray Ali Al-Mahdawi, a merchant in Egypt, denounced his 
brother in a letter to Mussolini for attempting to switch his nationality to that of Egypt. 
While al-Mahdawi admitted that he was prepared to stay silent on the issue, he had to take 
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action since his brother publicly denigrated Italy and threatened the family’s reputation as 
loyal subjects.513   
A particularly interesting case was that of Bello Vacca, an Italian born in Tripoli in 
1915. Vacca served as a cavalry officer and teacher at an Italo-Arab school before 
converting to Islam and taking the name Jamel ibn Yusuf Mazara. As a self-described 
“fascist-Muslim”, Vacca appears to have dedicated himself to bridging the two worlds. 
Having converted, Vacca travelled to Cairo to enroll in al-Azhar, where Egyptian police 
arrested him for possession of drugs and explosives. Vacca told the Libyan Government 
that he had sought to play a mediating role between Libyan exiles and the Italian Legation, 
though no official Italian institution had given him any such role. Vacca was also the likely 
author of an anonymous letter sent to Mussolini on behalf of Libyan students in Cairo 
which called for increasing property restitutions to exiled Libyans. Perhaps Vacca was 
trying to ingratiate himself with students from Italian colonies, as the Rector of al-Azhar 
believed Vacca to be rather unpopular.514 Upon his return to Libya, Vacca worried the 
Italian authorities, since his contacts with Libyans and his Syrian-style clothes threatened 
to “seriously compromise Italian prestige among the populations of Libya”. Governor Italo 
Balbo and the under-Secretary for the Ministry of Italian Africa explored the possibilities 
of either forcing the convert to move to Italy or of placing him under police confinement. 
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Balbo decided that Vacca had not posed enough of a threat to warrant such measures, and 
only justified close surveillance.515 Undeterred by his struggles, Vacca would visit Rome 
for Hitler’s visit,516 and later explain to an Italian audience in the Libyan press how the 
reformist program of al-Azhar, supported by King Fuʿad I, was inspired by Italian 
schools.517 Vacca serves as an interesting example of the difficulties in merging Italian, 
Muslim, and fascist identities; he appears to have been distrusted by both Italian fascists 
and Arab Muslims. 
Italian authorities were concerned with other Libyan students at al-Azhar.  Vacca 
was not alone in his desire for reform at al-Azhar. In the effort to bring back the 
modernizing, but controversial rector, Mustafa al-Maraghi, al-Azhar students took to 
demonstrating in 1935.518 Despite the students’ success in re-instating al-Maraghi, the 
Egyptian police arrested some participants, including twenty Libyan students. The Italians 
decided to expel the most boisterous, Abdel Salem Omran. Though informants warned the 
local consulate that Omran had written anti-Italian articles for the Egyptian press and led a 
small anti-Italian faction within the Italian sponsored student housing building, the Vice-
Governor of Cyrenaica believed these were mere rumors. However, attempts to re-instate 
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Omran failed, and despite his prior personal and familial history of spotless political 
behavior, he remained under close surveillance in his hometown of Derna.519 Omran’s 
decision to engage in the heated debate over the future of al-Azhar thus lost him the support 
of the Italians, who preferred their students to stay out of trouble. 
II. Turning the Libyan Hajj into pro-Italian Propaganda 
Another critical area in which Italians tried to control the exposure of Libyans to 
foreign influences was the Hajj. And as with the exiles and emigrants, the danger of the 
Hajj was not only in the potential exposure of Libyans to foreign ideas and movements, 
but also their ability to share anti-Italian views with the rest of the Muslim world. Although 
few exiles made their way to Saudi Arabia, the titular head of the Senussi order, Ahmad 
al-Sharif, lived in Mecca until his death in 1933. The Italians were concerned that from the 
pilgrimage site, al-Sharif could maintain connections with other prominent exiles and 
spread anti-Italian propaganda during the Hajj. If Ibn Saud was to continue sponsoring 
congresses of pan-Islamic leaders, it could serve as an opportunity for an influential exile 
like al-Sharif. In order to stay informed, the Italian consulate of Jedda made a concerted 
effort to surveille al-Sharif’s every move, employing to this end a substantial annual 
sum.520  
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Furthermore, congresses held in Mecca in 1924 and 1926 had provided a platform 
for pan-Islamists as first Hussein Sharif, and later Ibn Saʿud attempted to bolster their claim 
to oversee the holy cities of the Hejaz.521 When the Italian passenger line company Florio 
asked the Ministry of Colonies for permission to transport Libyan pilgrims, authorities in 
Tripoli expressed their concern at the possibility of contacts between the pilgrims and pan-
Islamists.522 Two years later, the Italian ship carrying Libyan pilgrims included two agents 
tasked with surveilling such interactions.523  
While attempting to subdue ʿUmar al-Mukhtar’s Cyrenaican resistance in 1931, 
Arab criticism of Italy had reached a fever pitch, and the Italians were particularly 
concerned about that year’s Hajj. Afterwards, the Jedda consul reported that  
the Egyptian Legation told me that anti-Italian agitators had tried to start anti-Italian 
demonstrations among the pilgrims, who were then all in Mecca, and that the 
movement’s organization had been directed by Ahmed Sharif Senussi. The news 
that arrived from Mecca was hardly more reassuring: among the pilgrims the 
accusations against Italy became a preferred topic of conversation and commentary 
that was, needless to say, unfavorable to us. In Jedda, my guards surprised groups 
of pilgrims intent on listening in the public streets to the reading of an [anti-Italian] 
libel; some of them cried, while others insulted Italy. With such an atmosphere, it 
was not difficult for those committed to their task to incite restlessness, which, in 
the special circumstances of religious fervor, could have caused a serious incident 
with vast repercussions in other Muslim countries. One could then only wait for the 
unvoiced unrest among the pilgrims to assume larger proportions and for the 
designs of the agitators working in the shadows to have a jumping-off point.524 
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The consul added that he had pleaded with the Saudi Government to crack down on anti-
Italian pamphlets and journals, but suspected the Saudis of attempting to appease both Italy 
and Muslim political activists.525 Such efforts appear to have been fruitful, with the Consul 
noting a few days later that King Ibn Saʿud had been accused by “local nationalists” of 
“sequestering a great quantity of pamphlets published by the ‘Tripoli Committee in Egypt’ 
as well as those newspapers that reproduced their call for aid, wherever they were found”, 
and for having “ordered the Police to surveille the most rowdy nationalists and above all 
those most familiar with Ahmed Sharif”.526 Thanks to Ibn Saʿud’s desire to use Italy as a 
geopolitical counter to Great Britain, the Italians had help in their attempt to stifle anti-
Italian discourses and actions. By July, the consul could say confidently that the anti-Italian 
movement “has failed thanks primarily to the firm demeanor of the Wahhabi sovereign.”527 
Yet the episode highlights the importance of the Hajj as a theatre in which Muslim public 
opinion could potentially turn against Italy. Consequently, at first the Italians treated the 
Hajj to Mecca largely as an event in which spies and agents had to limit any potential 
damage to Italy’s reputation. Yet with a more assertive Italian propaganda policy towards 
Arabs and Muslims, the Hajj became more of an opportunity than a danger. Fascist Italy 
therefore embarked on an effort to try and dictate its own representation in the eyes of 
Muslim pilgrims. 
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Though the Hajj presented a threat to their prestige, the Italians slowly developed 
an apparatus to exploit the pilgrimage for their own benefits. The first steps taken by the 
fascists began in 1927 when the Jedda consul noted the Italian-Muslim Hospice in Mecca 
serviced Italian-Muslim pilgrims more effectively than those from most other countries. 
With a full-time director, he believed the Hospice could further improve the Italian image 
in Mecca, while also providing Italy with an agent who could act as an informant and 
mediator with Meccan authorities for the Jedda consulate. Furthermore, the Foreign 
Ministry suggested that, given “the echo that is produced throughout the Muslim world by 
everything that happens in the Hejaz during the pilgrimage”, Libyan pilgrims be sent to 
Mecca on Italian rather than British ships.528 At this point, the Italians began to take a 
stricter control over the Hajj more seriously, though it was only in the 1930s that their 
efforts became substantial. 
The first attempt to place an agent as Director of the Hospice proved to be a failure. 
From the moment that the Tripolitanian Dr. Edhem Aref was appointed in 1929, the new 
consul in Jedda, Guido Sollazzo, balked at the expenses to be incurred for a position.529 
Shortly after, Sollazzo also suspected that Aref was not only negligent in his duties as an 
informant, but also anti-Italian. Two Italian subjects working for the consulate reported 
that Aref had “attempted to suborn them, calling them to Muslim solidarity and to the racial 
community with the intention of distancing them from the consulate and instilling in their 
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spirit the venom of hatred against Italy.” Furthermore, Sollazzo also believed Aref was on 
good terms with several Senussi exiles. In short, the man sent to facilitate Italian 
propaganda and surveillance was working against their own interests, and was quickly 
recalled.530 Aref’s replacement, Muhammad Ali Dafer, proved to be a trustworthy director, 
and held his post throughout the 1930s. 
In terms of surveilling Libyan pilgrims, Dafer’s job was not too difficult, since the 
number fluctuated between a high of 169 and a low of 66 between 1931 and 1936. And 
Dafer indeed proved more loyal than Aref, informing Sollazzo that three pilgrims had 
frequented Senussi establishments in Mecca in 1931. While Sollazzo then suggested that 
only those who were politically loyal be permitted to embark,531 or that Libyans be simply 
forbidden to go until the end of military operations in Libya, the Minister of Colonies, 
Emilio De Bono, rejected this extreme measure, fearing that such measures would raise 
anti-Italian sentiment abroad and that the limited number of pilgrims posed little risk.532 
Indeed, a careful selection of participants does not appear to have been Italian policy until 
the meticulously planned pilgrimages of 1936-1938. Yet even with the small number of 
pilgrims, each year saw Italy take the Hajj more seriously. In 1933, the Jedda consulate got 
approval for a Bank of Italy representative to aid pilgrims in conversion exchanges to avoid 
exorbitant rates.533 At the same time, the undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Fulvio Suvich, 
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who was a strong advocate for a pro-Islamic/Arab policy, attempted to convince Italian 
shipping companies to make room for Hajj pilgrims. The time was right for a propaganda 
coup, according to Suvich, because “in the Islamic world, France has been accused of 
hampering the pilgrimage of its subjects to Mecca, placing obstacles in the way of their 
departure.” If Italy increased its transportation, it would gain sympathy from Saudi Arabia 
and in “the whole Islamic world”.534 And though the three main shipping companies all 
expressed either the impossibility or difficulty of fulfilling Suvich’s wishes,535 it was clear 
that by the mid-1930s fascist authorities had taken an interest in integrating the Hajj into 
their larger propaganda campaign to appeal to Arab and Muslim sensibilities. 
Indeed, Suvich continued his efforts to politicize the Hajj. In January 1936, in the 
midst of a new wave of anti-Italian sentiment provoked by the invasion of Ethiopia, Suvich 
hoped to utilize the Hajj to assert that Italy, and not Great Britain, would protect Islamic 
traditions and customs. In a note sent to the Minister of Colonies, Alessandro Lessona, 
Suvich claimed that “it is evident that Muslims influenced by Great Britain will seek to 
give the pilgrimage the character of a demonstration against Italian ‘aggression’, and will 
strive to convince Somalis and Arabs to not fight with us”, and that “it is obvious that this 
year’s pilgrimage will be a crucible in which Great Britain will try to observe the various 
reactions of the Muslim world in the face of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, directing them, if 
possible, against our interests”. In response, Suvich advocated bypassing the required 
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deposit of one thousand lire in exchange for a special passport given with an oath of loyalty. 
The pilgrims would then travel in a single steamer, with medical tasks carried out by 
Muslims.536          
Suvich’s plan faced opposition from Balbo, who believed that the number of 
pilgrims was small and loyal enough that exposure to potential anti-Italian propaganda was 
not a serious risk, and that lifting the thousand lire deposit requirement would simply result 
in the Italians having to pay for repatriation expenses.537 Alessandro Lessona informed 
Suvich that “even this year it was not possible to organize a true pilgrimage with the special 
steamer” due to a limited number of requests from Libyans.538 Yet Balbo did attempt to 
assuage Suvich’s concerns by exerting more influence over the 1936 pilgrimage, which 
would be the first of a string of highly controlled and political pilgrimages. According to 
Lessona, the small pilgrimage of sixty-six Libyans, chosen among those of “secure and 
excellent political precedents” would utilize the pilgrims “as a propaganda opportunity for 
our ends to be carried out in the Hejaz among fellow Muslims that will arrive from various 
parts of the Muslim world”.539 
A report from the leader of the Libyan group, Commandant Muhammad Jacoubi, 
gives us a fascinating insight into how Libyans navigated foreign spaces while protecting 
Italy’s image and interests. While travelling from Tripoli and Benghazi to Alexandria, 
Jacoubi gained the trust of the pilgrims to better “guide and control them” by aiding them 
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in currency exchanges and in paperwork preparations. Once in Egypt, Jacoubi ensured that 
the pilgrims stayed together and avoided contact with Libyan exiles whom he suspected 
would attempt to contact the travelers for information and to turn them against Italy. 
Jacoubi also took advantage of his time in Egypt to spy on those same exiles, pointing out 
which ones were in the pay of Great Britain. Finally, he visited the most pro-Italian Libyan 
students of Al-Azhar, who assured him that they did not allow the others to speak ill of 
Italy. 
The next phase of the trip saw the group travel by an Egyptian boat from Suez to 
Jedda. On the way, Jacoubi convinced a provincial Egyptian leader that the Libyan freedom 
to travel to Mecca disproved the rumors circulating about Italian abuses in Libya. The party 
then quickly moved from Jedda to Mecca, where they were lodged in the Italian hospice, 
along with over two hundred Eritreans, Somalis, and Ethiopians, with the presence of the 
latter making “a strong impression on the Libyan pilgrims”. Upon returning from Medina 
to Jedda, the pilgrims told Jacoubi that the Italians should build a Hospice in Medina 
similar to that in Mecca, so they could stay together instead of being mixed in with other 
groups. Finally, on the way back on a French steamer, Jacoubi continued to vouch for Italy. 
As he reported,  
I had a chance to meet many Tunisians and Moroccans from whom I heard many 
not very favorable opinions regarding our Government’s actions in Libya and 
during the occupation of Ethiopia. I sought to change their minds, showing the true 
facts, and I learned that the information they received came from the Arab press 
and communist propaganda. I also had a chance to notice their amazement when 
we entered the port of Tripoli, where they remarked upon its infrastructure, the 
grandiose aspect the city offered, and their verification that Italy had not destroyed 
mosques to build churches as they were told, but had restored them and built new 
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ones. I therefore have the feeling that many of the false ideas put in their heads were 
afterwards changed.540 
The 1936 pilgrimage thus displayed how the Italians could hope to benefit from the 
Hajj through careful control over its participants and the use of political agents to counter 
anti-Italian propaganda. And Balbo promptly forwarded the pilgrim’s request for a hospice 
in Medina to the Colonial Ministry.541 The Jedda chargé d’affaires, Giovanni Persico, 
agreed with the plan, arguing that the added Ethiopian pilgrims would render such a service 
necessary, and that “regardless of the pilgrim’s comfort, the fact that they will be together 
in the same building will facilitate their political and sanitary control by the Legation.”542 
By 1937, the Medina hospice was functioning under the guidance of Ali Dafer’s cousin. 
From 1937 to 1939, the political use of the Hajj by the Italians reached its height, 
thanks to co-operation with their Spanish nationalist allies. Since Franco relied heavily on 
Moroccan troops, the Nationalists sought to follow in Italy’s footsteps by appealing to the 
religious sensibilities of its Muslim subjects. By working together to help their subjects 
perform the Hajj, the Italians and Spanish could assert universal fascism as the only 
ideological platform that respected Islamic traditions. And in practical terms, the Spanish 
would supply a suitable ship for both Moroccan and Libyan pilgrims to avoid resorting to 
French or British transportation, while the Italian network of consulates and hospices could 
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represent the interests of the Nationalist government.543 The Spanish therefore prepared 
the steamer “Domine” to carry Moroccan and Libyan pilgrims to Mecca. The French were 
quick to realize the implications of the pilgrimage, with a message sent to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs warning that the Spanish and Italian efforts would lead to a rise in anti-
French propaganda, partly because the number of pilgrims from French Morocco that year 
would only be slightly higher than those from Spanish Morocco, despite having a 
population ten times greater.544 According to the Italian consul in Tétouan, the presence of 
the Italian destroyer “Scirocco” in Ceuta, sent to protect the steamer, occasioned “frenetic 
applause” by the Moroccans that amassed on the quay. He also reported that the news of 
Italian protection caused the number of pilgrims to jump from 202 to 315, with others being 
rejected for lack of space, while rumors circulated that the Italians would treat the pilgrims 
to a lavish welcome in Tripoli.545 And indeed, the pilgrims were given a tour of Tripoli and 
its principle mosques by Libyan notables.546 In Italian eyes then, the event would serve as 
a chance to display its power and benevolence to Muslims outside of Libya. The political 
nature of the visit to Tripoli also caught the attention of the French consul in Tripoli, who 
reported that “the pilgrims and the crew of the ‘Domine’ welcomed the [Libyan] notables 
with cries of ‘Long live Mussolini, Franco and Hitler’.” Furthermore, the interior of the 
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ship focused on the fascist patronage of Islam, with a “central hall, arranged as a prayer 
room, decked out with the colors of the Spanish rebels, as well as those of Italy, Germany, 
and Portugal.” The large number of Moroccan soldiers partaking in the Hajj then spread 
throughout Tripoli, “giving the fascist salute and everywhere arousing the curiosity of the 
local indigènes.” The consul had no doubt that the pilgrims were handpicked, and admitted 
that members of his consulate who talked with them “attested to their remarkable culture 
and their profound knowledge of European governments.”547 Yet despite the pilgrims’ 
apparent dedication to their fascist sponsors, when the Tétouan consul suggested that the 
Moroccans stop again in Tripoli to salute Mussolini during his trip to Libya,548 Balbo 
disagreed, stating that they “represented an element capable of dangerous infiltrations.”549 
On the whole, however, the Italians and Spanish were pleased enough with the 
cooperative effort to repeat it in 1938. This time, Italy chose not to send a warship to Ceuta 
as an escort, since the Spanish had already assigned their own cruisers for the task.550 Yet 
the decision seemed to have hurt Italian prestige with local Moroccans, who crowded the 
Italian consulate’s office demanding to know if Mussolini would protect the pilgrimage or 
not. The consul also pointed to the possibility that the lack of an enthusiastic celebration 
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along the pier may have been caused by the lack of an Italian presence.551 Despite this 
beginning, the 1938 pilgrimage again seems to have gone well for the Italians. Tunisians 
travelling to Mecca via the newly opened Litoranea coastal highway in Libya expressed 
their admiration for Italian rule to border authorities. While in Mecca, some Libyans 
reported that their attempts to publicly stump for Mussolini in Mecca had incited arguments 
with Egyptians.552 Though this may have been a means of gaining Italian trust, since the 
consul in Jedda had not heard of such incidents from his informants, several participating 
Libyan notables assured that Mussolini had been included in private prayers.553 
In 1939, the Libyans and Moroccans took separate ships, but Ali Dafer continued 
to oversee their stay in Mecca. A French report explained how the 1,100 Moroccan and 
772 Libyan pilgrims continued to speak in the name of the fascist powers, stating that “The 
majority of these pilgrims seemed to us to be propagandists sent by their respective 
Governments, charged particularly with critiquing Anglo-French colonization in overseas 
colonies populated by Muslims.” They not only critiqued, but praised their governments 
and forecast their success in future conflicts: 
On the subject of international tensions, the Moroccans hoped that one day Italy 
would declare war on France, thus allowing them to take hold of French Morocco. 
They have at their disposition, they say, enough weapons, munitions, and German-
Italian war materials to throw themselves at the French zone and liberate their 
brothers. They continued, as in the past, to praise Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler. 
They say that these men are the benefactors of humanity, the future liberators of the 
Muslim world placed momentarily under Anglo-French protection. France for these 
men is an exhausted nation, ruined by politic and Jewish international finance; that 
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in the case of war, it would not last more than two months, thanks to a lack of gold 
in its treasury to make purchases abroad. They think no less of Great Britain and 
believe that the Jewish hold over this nation will wind up losing it. As for the 
Libyans backing the Italian cause, who were rather numerous, they continue to 
praise the “Duce” whose voyage to Libya in March 1937 has utterly transformed 
the social situation of Muslims. And they add: Marshal Balbo has become the father 
of Libyan Arabs by installing equality of rights between Italians and Libyans, 
aiding the fellahs, and creating Italian schools with Arabic instruction, for which 
he has appealed to Arabic masters of Egyptian, Syrian, and Tunisian origin. The 
Libyan refugees in Tunisia who were promised impunity have re-integrated into 
their country by receiving their properties that had previously been confiscated. As 
for the installation of the new Italian colonists, they have not hurt a single native. 
Finally, they admire the Head of the Italian government, despise our country, and 
are sure that Tunisia will become in the near future Italian through an accord or 
through conquest. 
The pilgrims were then capable of asserting Italian claims on a multitude of questions, 
while also inserting their own hopes for the “liberation of the Muslim world”. Finally, a 
point often repeated by the Libyans and Moroccans was that their governments had 
organized the trip at prices that halved what the French charged. Though the author of the 
intelligence report was sure of the loyalty of French subjects, he believed that the question 
of costs “was skillfully exploited and we could have avoided several unfortunate incidents 
if precautionary measures had been taken beforehand.”554 
Yet, as Luc Chantre has argued, the Italian efforts at utilizing the Hajj as a 
propaganda tool had begun to backfire by 1939. Co-operation with Spain continued, but 
Italian authorities worried that they were being upstaged by their allies. Meanwhile the 
targeted audience soon tired of Italian proclamations, as the invasion of Muslim-majority 
Albania in April 1939 served as further proof of Italy’s lack of respect for the independence 
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of Muslim nations.555 Perhaps Italian claims around the Mediterranean were also rendered 
hollow thanks to its governing strategies in Libya itself, a topic to which we will now turn. 
THE FAILURE OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION 
The Italian concerns about Libyans abroad, though intensified by the fascist desire 
in the mid to late-1930s to alter the Mediterranean status-quo, was not so different from 
the desire of France and Great Britain to surveille the activities and movements of their 
own colonial subjects. A second tool of controlling Libyans was more clearly fascist in 
content, though it was never fully developed. This was the strategy of placing Libyans, 
particularly those living in the coastal cities, in fascist institutions. While Great Britain and 
France served as the great models of parliamentary and republican governance, they had 
to limit such political institutions in their North African and Middle Eastern colonies and 
Mandates in order to uphold their economic and geopolitical interests. Italy, on the other 
hand, could export its totalitarian institutions to colonial subjects without undermining its 
imperial power. If a significant consequence of the fascist creation of organizations for 
youth, leisure, domestic life, and economic groupings was the de-politicization of mass 
politics through regimented public life, then theoretically such a system would be adaptable 
to Italian colonies.  
Such a response would also seem to mimic fascist “third-way” rhetoric, normally 
meant as an alternative to capitalism and communism/socialism, in the colonial sphere, 
where Western colonial administrators and experts tended to debate the merits and demerits 
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of assimilation and association. Fascist colonial experts, bureaucrats, and journalists were 
very clear in their rejection of “French” assimilation, for a number of reasons. In their eyes, 
assimilation would dilute the unity of the Italian nation by introducing foreign elements 
while also risking the foundations of Italian colonial sovereignty. Furthermore, they 
generally argued, not only in propaganda pieces, but also in internal memos and reports, 
that assimilation would tend to undermine local traditions and ways of life that had to be 
respected if Italy was to hold any authority. The model of association, which saw colonial 
administrations acquiesce to the maintenance of traditional local authorities and the 
forbearance of overly direct Western impositions in exchange for political loyalty, was 
viewed more favorably by fascists. Yet the fascists tended to denigrate the “British” model, 
which they viewed as a form of association that was overpowered by capitalist interests 
that ruthlessly extracted resources from British colonial subjects. The Italian form of 
association, rhetorically, was based on vague promises that colonial subjects would be 
protected and nurtured by the state.556 The fascist distinction between colonial models drew 
clear contrasts that did not exist in reality. The fact that most French colonial administrators 
had largely given up on assimilation by the 1920s and 1930s was largely ignored. Yet if 
the fascists wished to distinguish their colonial model, it would have to be through the 
importing of fascist institutions into the colonies. As we will see, despite some small steps, 
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this was never accomplished in Libya due to constant administrative and legal concerns, as 
well as the strong emphasis placed on Italian racial prestige with the conquest of Ethiopia 
in 1935-1936 and the passing of the Racial Laws targeting Italian Jews in November 1938. 
I. Inquadramento Strategies 
The first group targeted for fascist integration was youth. Though this was a project 
proposed by Governor Balbo in 1935, there had already been precedents for subjecting 
Libyan youth to “fascist discipline”. In Cyrenaica, four schools of orphans, with the support 
of the government and local Italian leaders, trained about two thousand Libyans in 
agricultural practices and small trades. Yet these were not viewed as simple trade-schools, 
as physical education was heavily stressed as a means of creating the “soldiers, workers, 
and farmers” that would constitute “the future citizens of Cyrenaica”. A journalist lauded 
the effort, describing how the students engaged in gymnastic activities “presented perfectly 
organized and disciplined centuries” that “paraded…behind their flags, to the cadenced 
rhythm of drums and trumpets, with a sure step and in perfectly aligned groups, and saluted 
like so many little soldiers and offered a picturesque show in their blue uniforms, with their 
aviator berets and crimson belts, giving one the sense of witnessing the movements of 
instructed and highly disciplined Ascari companies.”557 Despite the professional training 
acquired by the students, it is clear that these schools also served the role of the Italian 
Balilla organization in providing forms of pre-military training. 
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Balbo’s official institutionalization of this practice came in 1935 with the 
establishment of the Gioventù Araba del Littorio (GAL, The Arab Lictor Youth). In his 
proposal to Mussolini, Balbo stressed that the GAL would appeal to the Libyan “masses” 
and make of the “new generations, that interest us the most, disciplined subjects proud to 
belong to the nation.” Despite these grand ambitions, Balbo conceded that the project 
would have a somewhat limited recruitment at first, in order to carefully control the loyalty 
of the first members.558 A few months later, Balbo was bragging to Mussolini about the 
positive reception in Tripoli when the newly founded GAL participated in the ceremonies 
for the thirteenth anniversary of the March on Rome.559 
There is unfortunately not much documentation on the GAL, but we know of its 
organizational structure and early membership numbers. The purpose of the GAL was to 
provide pre-military training to Libyan youth between twelve and eighteen years old. 
Perhaps to stress the military nature of the organization, the administration was carried out 
not by the National Fascist Party (PNF), but by the Black Shirts. The Black Shirts were an 
all-voluntary militia that served as an ideological appendix to the military, since the latter 
had not become a truly fascist institution. Their responsibility over the GAL indicates the 
Italian desire to focus on the military training of its members. GAL members were split 
into two groups: the Aṭfal (Children) between twelve and fifteen and Shubban (Youth) 
between sixteen and eighteen. Those Shubban who were students were separated into a 
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special section and kept apart from the others where possible. This was most likely done 
to keep the sons of Libyan notables from mixing too closely with other Libyan youth. While 
the Aṭfal would train with batons, the Shubban would be given rifles. The periods of 
instruction were somewhat sporadic, held two or three times per month with exceptions for 
religious holidays and agricultural work. Instruction consisted of gymnastics/sports, unit 
training, Italian language and culture, and lessons on hygiene, agriculture, and pastoralism. 
Eighteen months after the founding of the GAL, the total membership had reached 5318 in 
forty-five sections.560 
In May 1936, over one thousand GAL members visited Rome along with a group 
of Libyan notables. The Libyan youth camped on the outskirts of the city and visited the 
Colonial Museum, some of the famous sites of Rome’s past, and the newer fascist zones 
of the University City and the Mussolini Forum for athletics where a cinematographic event 
was held.561 Despite this early exercise in attempting to turn the GAL into a depoliticizing 
tool of mass politics akin to other fascist organizations, it is hard to gauge the extent to 
which the normal activities of the youth group fulfilled this purpose. Information is scarce 
in this regard, although the GAL had their own Balilla-inspired beach camps, and were 
allowed to compete in sports events against Italian squadrons, indicating that the objections 
of some colonial administrators to interracial sports were ignored.562 Youth camps for 
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children under twelve were also established to guide them towards GAL enrollment later; 
they were given basic military and agricultural training.563 At times, GAL members served 
as mediators between Italian authorities and the broader population, as when they 
distributed an illustrated news publication in Arabic.564 And to inculcate young Libyans 
into the fascist “youth spirit”, a revised version of the fascist anthem Giovinezza was edited 
for GAL members to sing.565 Whatever the effects of these attempts to turn the GAL into 
a fascist institution, a proposal during World War II to shift the responsibility for the GAL 
from the Black Shirts to the National Fascist Party indicated a desire to focus more on the 
political nature of the organization while still providing pre-military training.566 It is likely 
that the military priorities of the GAL upset Libyan parents; according to a French report, 
the resistance of Bedouin parents who were held responsible for their children’s presence 
at training camps was “ruthlessly suppressed”.567 
The establishment of agricultural villages served as another field in which Balbo 
sought to apply fascist tools of social and political control to the Libyan population. In 
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1938, Balbo jump-started the failed attempts to colonize Libya with Italian settlers by 
overseeing the transportation and establishment of twenty thousand Italians, mostly from 
the unemployed and struggling families of the Veneto and Emilia regions, into government 
prepared agricultural villages along the Libyan coastline.568 Another ten thousand arrived 
the following year, amid growing fears among Libyans who had already been subject to 
land confiscations and pasturage restrictions. In response, Balbo decided to implement a 
colonization program specifically for Libyans. Since offers of state support for private 
Libyan landowners ran into too many bureaucratic obstacles to have much effect,569 Italian 
economic planners decided that the blueprint for Italian colonization should be repeated 
for Libyans. Families would apply and be settled in state-built farmhouses and model 
villages with mosques, cafés, markets, and schools. By settling traditionally nomadic and 
pastoral Libyans onto sedentary, state-backed farms, the fascists could claim to bring 
Libyans into their “civilization”. It is important to note that this experiment occurred in the 
context of much larger Italian attempts to settle poor Italian families on small farms in 
order to slow down movement into cities. Furthermore, fascist ideology framed the 
agricultural initiatives as a means of creating the ideal fascist soldier-laborer. Placing 
Libyans in such villages then was not just a means of deflecting criticism from Italian 
settler-colonialism, but a positive measure meant to create a class of Libyan farmers more 
dependent on the fascist state and representative of fascist values. As such, Italian 
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authorities immediately spread the news of the initiative through their Middle Eastern and 
North African consulates, while figures like Balbo and the former governor De Bono made 
official visits to highlight to the farmers and to the press the importance of the Italian policy 
shift.570 
However, reality was quite distant from propaganda. Only four villages saw the 
light of day. Two of these, called Zahra and Fajr, were situated along the coast and west of 
Derna. Both struggled to get off the ground, with Balbo hoping Libyan notables could aid 
in recruitment; a third, Jedida, was never populated. Mahamura, located to the southwest 
of Tripoli, appears to have had more success. Other villages were planned, but the war 
obstructed the project before it could develop. Yet it is unlikely that the villages would 
offer Libyans a panacea for the Italian land-grab. Though the Libyan villages followed the 
same practical and ideological contours of those destined for Italian settlers, their scope 
was significantly reduced. The base discrepancies were significant: 131 Libyan families 
with farms up to five hectares in size settled in three villages while Balbo’s colonization 
program placed three thousand Italian families on farms of up to fifty hectares of more 
fertile land. And while Libyans in Tripolitania proved eager to apply for the settlements, 
recruitment in Cyrenaica was much more difficult given the region’s greater emphasis on 
pastoralism and mistrust in the Italians following the brutal measures taken in the early 
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1930s. Overall, the project ended in failure, with the Libyans showing little enthusiasm and 
the Italian agricultural technicians expressing their frustration with the entire experience.571 
That the Italians had failed to provide economic opportunities for the Libyans who 
had been removed from their traditional grazing lands became clear during the first British 
occupation of Cyrenaica (February-March 1941) during World War II. Freed from Italian 
authorities, Libyans demonstrated their resentment at decades of land expropriations and 
harsh treatment by attacking the farms occupied by the new Italian settlers. Violence 
between Libyans and Italians broke out sporadically as well, with between twelve and 
fourteen Italian deaths. Authorities looked to settler letters to gauge the degree of tensions. 
The results belied the supposed collaboration between Italians and Libyans. As one settler 
wrote in a censored letter, “Every time I see an Arab and I’m sure to not be discovered, I 
send him to find his Muhammad”.572 A memorandum for Mussolini warned that the 
violence should not encourage state reprisals, and was simply a manifestation of “war 
psychosis”.573 Fascist authorities may have wished to play down the mutual hatred, but the 
acts of Libyan resistance were clearly a cathartic moment for the dispossessed, a moment 
when, as Federico Cresti has argued, the “blood and hatred” caused by land expropriation 
spilled over.574 
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II. Debates over Libyan Citizenship 
With the failure of the agricultural settlements, and the limited political nature of 
the GAL, the tentative first steps towards inserting Libyans into fascist society proved 
rather ineffective. Only a thorough re-ordering of the colonial hierarchy could provide the 
impetus to a more equitable and serious application of fascist institutions and social 
programs to Libyans. Yet the debate over Libyan citizenship which lasted throughout the 
late 1930s, ended in a resounding failure for those who hoped that substantive reforms 
would offer a more promising future for Libyans. An examination of the internal debate 
will show how concerns about Italian racial prestige, reactions from Arabs and Muslims 
abroad, and French colonial problems played important roles in dampening the few 
attempts to grant Libyans a form of citizenship that would offer guarantees to participate 
equally in Italian fascist society. 
With the unification of the colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1934, Libyans 
gained the legal status of “Libyan Italian citizens”, with the option of gaining full 
“metropolitan” citizenship for those who were monogamous, had reached a certain level 
of education, were innocent of any criminal/anti-Italian political activities, and were 
already either a military veteran, a civil servant, decorated by the state, or a descendent of 
an already naturalized Libyan. As in French North Africa, choosing this form of citizenship 
necessitated the renunciation of adherence to the Islamic “personal status”. In December 
1935, Italo Balbo proposed a Decree Law that would give him the power to facilitate the 
accession of Libyans and foreign nationals to metropolitan citizenship, with certain 
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limitations,575 for a period of two years. Balbo’s motives were clear: he believed he could 
bolster the faith of Libyan elites in Italy with a more liberal awarding of full citizenship. 
Furthermore, by also naturalizing foreigners, the Italians could subtract them from foreign 
sovereignty and ensure fewer occasions for interventions in Libyan affairs. 
Balbo’s proposal would begin a discussion on the legal status of Libyans that would 
last until the outbreak of World War II. During this debate, the Italians discovered the 
difficulties of balancing fascist “prestige” and racial policies with the need to conciliate the 
Libyan elite. Furthermore, the contemporary political crises in French North African 
colonies over similar matters tended to confirm the fascist views that no risks could be 
taken when establishing legal rights and duties for Libyans. An examination of the debate 
will therefore allow us to see how fascist ideals mixed with a fluid international situation 
to shape Italian policies of legal status. 
While Balbo was merely looking to facilitate the application of a possibility already 
afforded by the law in December 1934, the backlash against his liberal interpretation placed 
the whole idea of allowing Libyans to become full Italian citizens into question. The first 
blow to Balbo’s ambitions came when the most respected Italian Orientalist, Carlo Alfonso 
Nallino, weighed in. According to Nallino, any question of citizenship had to take into 
account the inherently political nature of Islam, which ensured the primacy of personal 
status over secular law, and the solidarity of the Muslim world with respect to their 
adversaries. Given these conditions, Nallino declared that “the project of conferring Italian 
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citizenship would be a de facto incitement to apostasy and would unleash a storm of 
recriminations against Italy throughout the Muslim press and in rallies.” Nallino also 
pointed to Tunisia as a failed site of integration, since the few Tunisians who gave up their 
personal status were ostracized by their communities, causing considerable headaches for 
French authorities. Furthermore, the Algerian example showed that a liberal policy could 
lead to the privileging of Libya’s Jews, which would only cause further rancor among 
Muslims. Nallino also pointed out that what Muslims wanted was equality of rights and 
opportunities to rise to any position, such that any half-measure would only do more 
political harm than good.576 
During the winter and early spring of 1936, a slew of opinions from Palazzo Chigi 
and the Ministry of Colonies backed up Nallino’s concerns while adding many others. Most 
reports pointed to the French experience in Tunisia to demonstrate the dangers of any state 
initiative that encouraged Muslims to give up their personal status, and an April 1935 report 
from the Tunis consul Enrico Bombieri describing the political troubles caused by 
naturalizations seemed to prove such assertions.577 Thus, the Italian interpretation of 
France’s tentative half-steps towards assimilation was that only a firm policy of legal 
separation was acceptable in Libya. The opposition to Balbo’s proposal was so unanimous 
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that Mussolini refused to even allow its discussion in the Council of Ministers.578 Yet, there 
were signs that the citizenship question would have to be addressed in fuller terms if Italy 
was to further tighten its imperial legal system. At one point, a Foreign Affairs report even 
admitted that the question of citizenship could not be answered so long as the long-term 
organization of Libya was still undecided, stating that they must examine if “as a general 
directive of our colonial policy in Libya, it suits us to favor offering metropolitan 
citizenship to Muslim Libyans, thereby creating a group of metropolitan citizens of the 
Arab race and ruled by a personal status derived from the Qurʾan, or to continue favoring 
the immigration…of metropolitan citizens with the goal of populating Italy’s fourth shore 
with truly Italian elements.”579 Italian policy in the late 1930s hesitated between these two 
options, though always leaning heavily towards the long-term dominance of an Italian 
settler population. One should be careful to note that while Balbo was perhaps the most 
fervent supporter of a liberal policy towards the Libyans, he also tied his reputation to the 
success of mass-colonization programs. 
Following Mussolini’s visit to Libya in March 1937, the question of Libyan 
citizenship came up again. According to Lessona, the much-heralded event had led to 
“unfounded” rumors that Italy would finally bestow Italian citizenship upon Libyans. Yet 
Lessona deemed that the occasion warranted a closer examination of the possibility of 
conferring a form of Italian citizenship that would maintain the Qurʾanic personal status, 
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so long as polygamy was rejected. This Italian citizenship for Libyan Muslims would not 
be a mere political ploy, but a way of inserting Libyans into the regime: “it cannot be form, 
but content; not just an empty name without substance, but, in its coordination of rights 
and duties, an essential spiritual value; not a cumbersome burden or an unimportant label 
for those who do not desire it or are not worthy of it, but rather the highest honor and 
invaluable benefit.”580 Clearly, what Lessona had in mind was a program that would 
provide much fuller rights for the Libyan elite while maintaining the personal status, a 
reform that could potentially bolster Arab and Muslim support both in Libya and abroad. 
In order to explore the legal ramifications of such a reform, Lessona requested the opinions 
of two legal experts, the President of the Council of State, Santi Romano, and the First 
President of the Appeals Court, Mariano d’Amelio. 
The reply of d’Amelio, who was acquainted with colonial and foreign affairs,581 is 
a fascinating one for the logic of his recommendations, and for its unacceptability in the 
eyes of colonial officials. D’Amelio began by rejecting the French model of assimilation, 
partly because to favor those Libyans who were willing to reject the personal status would 
be counterproductive. In d’Amelio’s words, “the bad Muslim is almost always a bad 
subject, and it would not be politically wise to transform these into citizens of the highest 
status [optimo jure].” At the same time, he believed that the fascist corporative system 
offered a new alternative way forward. If democracies were hesitant to make colonial 
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subjects equal in rights, it was because they feared the power of the right to vote. Yet, 
fascist politics were vigorously controlled through plebiscites, regime approved lists, and 
an upcoming Chamber of Fasci and Corporations. Given such control, Italy could easily 
concede voting rights. “Essentially”, d’Ameglio explained, 
the most socially advanced colonial subjects ask for equal political treatment as 
Italian citizens. If they can convince themselves that such treatment has been 
conceded to them, all their desires will have been satisfied. The union of the races 
will have been cemented. For now, it is a matter of examining if such a result can 
be brought about through corporatism and syndicalism, applied rationally in the 
colonies. 
For d’Amelio, the inclusion of Libyans in the corporatist order in no way required a change 
to Muslim personal status, even when it came to polygamy.582 D’Amelio had pointed to a 
proper fascist policy; the concession of de jure and not de facto political rights would 
square the citizenship circle, especially because any Libyan complaints about meaningless 
elections would be part of an Italian, and not simply colonial political framework. Yet his 
suggestions were largely ignored, and never formed the central basis for further 
discussions, possibly due to the threat to Italian prestige and superiority that other hierarchs 
felt could follow from such a broad extension of political equality. Indeed, the efforts of 
some corporatist theoreticians in 1931 to push for the inclusion of Libyans had already 
failed.583 While minor steps were taken to integrate Libyans into the corporative structure, 
the regime never placed a priority on this possible integration strategy. This failure also 
                                                 
582 ASMAE, MAI, Affari Politici, B. 91, F. Cittadinanza, 1932-1938, D’Amelio to Lessona, 21 
May 1937. 
583 François Dumasy, “Le fascisme est-il un ‘article d’exportation’? Idéologie et enjeux sociaux 
du Parti National Fasciste en Libye pendant la colonisation italienne”, Revue d’histoire moderne 
et contemporaine, 55 (July-September 2008), p. 108. 
 251 
gave the lie to the attempts by colonial experts to claim that Italian colonialism, through its 
generous social programs and state-control, represented a distinct alternative to an 
exploitative capitalist model.584 
Santi Romano’s thoughts, on the other hand, fell more in line with the cautious and 
conservative inclination of Italy’s colonial establishment. Romano believed that any forced 
extension of Italian citizenship upon Libyan Muslims would “disrupt the unity and 
homogeneity of the Italian nation”, while being seen by the Libyans as an “aggression upon 
their civilization and their traditions, and an offense to their religion, for which it is near 
apostasy to take the citizenship of a Christian state.” Such a policy, Romano argued, would 
go even further than the French dared, despite the Italians being publicly critical of French 
assimilation. Not only was this unacceptable to Romano, but he believed that even the 
piecemeal distribution of citizenship according to the 1934 law should be limited. The only 
manner still available to encourage “close collaborative relations” was the admission of 
some Libyans into metropolitan organisms, particularly the parliamentary chambers. Yet 
Romano even had his doubts about this option.585 
Lessona heard other voices of caution while serving as the president of the political 
session of the Third Congress of Colonial Studies held in April 1937 in Florence. Professor 
Renzo Sertori Salis, in particular, theorized the empire as the highest form of the Italian 
nation; colonial subjects were merely living in an organic-structure whose essence was 
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Italian. As such, for non-Italians, taking on political posts was out of the question, as was 
inclusion in corporatist institutions. Treating corporatism as a true expression of the 
interests of producers, Sertori Salis argued that such an eminently national institution could 
not include the colonized without compromising the principles of Italian rule.586 Between 
the more flexible views of d’Amelio and the conservative stances of figures like Romano 
and Sertori Salis, Lessona clearly sided with the latter, and his brief flirtation with a more 
liberal policy quickly halted. And indeed, by October of 1937, with some Libyan veterans 
of the Ethiopian War requesting Italian citizenship from the Libyan Government, the 
Ministry of Italian Africa felt the need to warn Balbo that if too many Libyans became 
citizens, the title would lose its “particular and exceptional benefits”.587 Clearly, Romano’s 
suggestions spoke for the colonial authorities in Rome. 
Yet a year later, Balbo would make another effort to protect the future role of 
Libyans in Italian Libya. The key reform Balbo hoped to implement was the replacement 
of the Libyan Italian citizenship with a new form that would allow for the Libyans to 
maintain their personal status and achieve legal equality with Italians, so long as they 
remained in Libya or in other African colonies. Most importantly, Balbo hoped to provide 
this citizenship to all Libyans living in the coastal provinces.588 In October 1938, at the 
Volta Congress in Rome, Balbo presented his vision of the Libyan colony, in which fascism 
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would create a “Mediterranean” rather than an exclusively Italian civilization. The Libyans 
of the coastal provinces would then be inserted into the social, economic, and political life 
of Italy through fascist institutions. The report met with immediate criticism from 
experienced colonial hands, with one immediate reaction asserting that Balbo’s plan to put 
Libyans on the same footing as Italians would be the equivalent of the Romans destroying 
their civilization through providing citizenship to barbarians.589 Figures in the Ministry of 
Italian Africa with cooler heads also heavily criticized Balbo’s proposals.  
According to the Director General of Political Affairs, orientalist scholar, and 
career colonial bureaucrat, Martino Mario Moreno, the proposed reform would do little to 
change the legal status of Libyans and would only exacerbate frustrated aspirations. On 
one hand, Moreno believed it would be more productive to replace low-level Italians in 
non-political administrative posts with Libyans than to give them promises of false 
equality. On the other, there did exist the possibility of providing a very limited citizenship 
status that would allow Libyans to exercise their personal status in Italy itself, an option to, 
as Moreno saw it, “create something juridically new and original.” Yet, such an experiment 
went in an “absolutely opposite direction” from the racial laws targeting Italy’s Jews, and 
would have to wait until racial legislation was finalized.590 Another official, Tomaso 
Columbano, pointed to the fact that a proposed right for Libyans to join separate syndicates 
and corporations was an empty declaration, as these institutions had no real practical 
existence in Libya. Columbano also feared that Libyans could possibly use their status to 
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take on posts as local officials with power over other Italians, an unacceptable prospect 
given the harsh foundations of Italian rule.591 
It was consequently no surprise that when Balbo presented his reform to the Grand 
Council, it was rejected by fascist ultras like Roberto Farinacci and Achillo Starace. 
According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano, Balbo’s proposal clearly 
contradicted the new set of racial laws. Furthermore, a personal element hindered Balbo’s 
attempt, as Ciano remarked in his diaries how it was “interesting to note how much the 
Grand Council is opposed to Balbo. The mere fact that the provision was related to Balbo 
determined its disapproval by a large grouping.”592 Thanks to this rejection, the new 
citizenship reform would again be limited by legal conservatism and fears of harming 
Italian racial prestige. 
Before the final meeting that would outline the more limited form, Balbo sent a 
message to the Minister of Italian Africa, Attilio Teruzzi, pleading that the “legitimate 
aspirations” of Libyans should not be disappointed. Furthermore, for Balbo, Italy had to 
make a decisive choice with regard to the future of Libyans. Using Mussolini as a cover 
for his own views, Balbo hoped to convince Teruzzi: “I remind you what Il Duce affirmed: 
once Libya is an Italian region, we must either make citizens or slaves of the Arabs. I 
imagine there is no longer anyone who thinks we can make slaves of them; it is necessary 
therefore to make true citizens, that is to say, that citizenship be of such juridical and moral 
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weight to represent for the Libyan people an authentic civil progression, a stage of 
evolution that allows for the insertion of this people into the political, social, and economic 
life of the fourth shore [Libya] with full faith and loyalty.”593  
The Royal Decree of 9 January 1939 formally integrated the coastal provinces of 
Libya into the Italian kingdom while installing a limited form of Balbo’s proposal meant 
to be limited to Libya’s coastal elites. While the new form, called Special Italian 
Citizenship for Muslim Libyans, allowed for the maintenance of the personal status, it 
ensured that no Libyan could hold an administrative or military position with power over 
metropolitan Italians. Furthermore, it was no longer possible to gain Italian citizenship by 
rejecting the “personal status”. All avenues to equality were now cut off. As a result, as the 
Ministry of Italian Africa officials warned, the reform was largely an empty formula. A 
controversial addition added to the proposal by the same Ministry that allowed for the 
participation of these citizens in special Libyan Muslim sections of the Fascist Party was 
removed.594 Though the legal right of Libyans to participate in the corporative system was 
maintained, this would not provide immediate benefits since few corporative structures for 
Libyans existed at that point. As a result, the decree did little to further Balbo’s hopes that 
the Libyans could be integrated into Italian society. And in terms of Italian racial policy, a 
pro-memoria for Mussolini assuaged any fears that there would be confusion over the racial 
hierarchy, arguing that whatever juridical gains could be earned by certain Libyans would 
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not eliminate their status as Arabs, who would “still remain outside the Arian aggregate 
whose prestige we intend to protect.”595 
Though initial reports from Egypt indicated the reform was well-received,596 and 
Balbo assured Mussolini that even the “inveterate diffidence of those accustomed to many 
too-often delusional promises…has been decisively dismantled”,597 the Libyans in reality 
were far from appreciative. From the beginning, there were signs of barely concealed 
protest. According to a French informant, many Libyans saw right through the Italian 
attempt at flattery. During a ceremony in which many distinguished Libyans favored by 
the regime received their certificates of special citizenship, one respected Libyan remarked 
that “They give us citizenship so that we’ll fight our Tunisian brothers”, while a religious 
school teacher asserted that “When the donkey is invited to the banquet, it is so he can 
transport the water destined for the guests, and receive a blow from the stick.”598 
Further confirmation of Libyan disillusionment came in a report from late 1940. 
After the death of Balbo in a plane crash in June 1940, Rodolfo Graziani returned to Libya 
as Governor-General after overseeing the brutal rounding up of Cyrenaican civilians in the 
early 1930s. In August Mussolini asked Graziani to put together a report summarizing the 
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consequences of the new form of citizenship so as to guide future colonial policy. The 
study was to be done in secret, with only Graziani’s most trusted functionaries aware of it, 
in order to avoid raising any hopes for future reforms, or to indicate that the regime was 
unsure of what it had previously promulgated.599 Graziani believed that the abrogation of 
the ability to attain full Italian citizenship through the foreswearing of the personal status 
was seen as an insult by Libyans. As for the reform as a whole, Graziani, unlike Balbo, 
was honest with Mussolini: 
The Muslims, however, who are naturally inclined to consider the practical side of 
everything, had expected tangible benefits from the joining of the Libyan territory 
to that of the Kingdom and from the concession of the special citizenship, and did 
not hide their disappointment for the disillusion they underwent. The more 
cultivated milieus, though being the subjects of the benefits brought by the new 
citizenship, did not fail to express their remorse insofar as it represented a step 
backwards (for example, with respect to the restriction, inexistent beforehand, of 
those taking on the position of Podestà to only those municipalities with an entirely 
Libyan population; the institution of obligatory conscription; the eliminated 
possibility to acquire full metropolitan citizenship, etc.)…The great mass of 
uncivilized Muslims and of those of low social status, given their cultural level and 
their consequently scarce political sensibility, not only were incapable of 
appreciating the true meaning of the provision since they continued to hold that 
they could interact with metropolitan Italians as absolute equals, but also 
formulated rather pessimistic conjectures as to the material consequences, 
particularly with regard to a probable harshening of the fiscal regime and to the 
extension to the mass of Muslims of obligatory military service. Later on, the 
question, having lost its immediacy, no longer held the attention of Libyans, who 
now appear, at the least, indifferent to the issue. 
The first of Graziani’s points accurately diagnosed one of the core problems with the new 
forms of citizenship. From the beginning of the occupation, Italy had relied on the “urban 
notable class” that emerged under the late Ottoman Empire. Some of the figures, like the 
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Qaramanli and Muntasir families, had sided with Italy once they had been shunned by the 
Young Turks; others hoped to protect their land-holdings and local influence.600 For these 
urban notables, the new legislation promised to permanently bar them from rising in the 
administrative ranks. Furthermore, Graziani pointed out that since many rights previously 
enjoyed by all Libyans were now transferred to those few who opted for the special 
citizenship, some Libyans even rejected the new option since they thought Islam did not 
allow for legal variations between Muslims. And as “special citizenship” did not offer any 
new tangible benefits, many qualified Libyans did not take up the Italian offer. If the new 
form of citizenship was meant as a tool to guarantee the loyalty of the urban elites, it had 
clearly failed. However, Graziani did believe that the Libyan youth who had had contact 
with fascist institutions were much more receptive, and would constitute a generation more 
willing to collaborate with Italy. Yet in terms of the new fascist party and corporatist 
organizations that were supposed to insert these younger Libyans into a fascist society, 
Graziani had little to say. The new Muslim Association of the Littorio must have had few 
members, given that its membership was restricted to holders of the special citizenship. 
Finally, with regard to corporatist organs, Graziani admitted that after two years, only three 
corporations for Libyans had been established.601 
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As for recommendations, Graziani suggested that the status-quo be maintained for 
the time being, given Italy’s entry into the war, but that a fruitful reform would be to impose 
the new form of citizenship on the Libyan population as a whole. As it was, only 2500 
certificates of citizenship had been distributed out of a population of 700,000. In short, 
Graziani wanted to eliminate legal distinctions between Libyans that would hinder their 
integration into the fascist state, while still maintaining the absolute supremacy of Italians 
and those judged to be of the Aryan race. At the same time, Graziani admitted that for most 
Libyans, urban modernity would be out of the question, since the Italian expropriation of 
the best lands on the coast had pushed them to the interior where they would be engaged 
in “pastoralism and primitive forms of ambulatory agriculture” for the foreseeable 
future.602 
PROTECTING OR DE-POLITICIZING ISLAM? 
If the Libyans were to have their national identity subsumed by their inclusion as 
restricted citizens in the new Italian imperial state, then the support of Islam would serve 
as a counterbalance; a recognition on the part of the Italians that Libyans would not be 
content to view themselves primarily as members of an Empire. In the eyes of the Italians, 
a pro-Islamic stance would not only serve to lessen the blow of their plans to drastically 
alter the social and economic order of Libya, but would also demonstrate to the world’s 
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Muslims that Italy respected Islam. As the transformation of Libya intensified during the 
governorship of Balbo, so too did the Italian attempt to prove its dedication to the protection 
of Islam. A close look at the Italian measures, however, indicates an attempt to de-politicize 
and control Islam through state support. Furthermore, a reification of Islamic aesthetics 
and traditions served as a tool of commercialism and tourism that authorities hoped would 
bolster the Libyan economy. Meanwhile, the protection of Islam program sparked a 
discussion among Italian Orientalists, journalists, and colonial experts about the historical 
nature of the West’s relationship with Islam, and what lessons were to be drawn from that 
history to ensure the success of Italy’s imperial project. 
I. Legitimizing Italian Rule 
The Italians hoped that their Islamic policy would serve as the primary tool of 
legitimizing colonial rule in the eyes of Libyans as well as Muslims abroad. In the early 
1930s, Italy certainly suffered a lack of legitimacy, as it had used great force to stamp out 
intense resistance in Libya, while many horrified Arabs and Muslims in other countries 
had been fairly unanimous in their condemnation of Italian expansionism. Yet, the appeal 
to Islam and to vague notions of tradition offered a possible means of salvaging Italy’s 
reputation. J.C. Myers’ study of South Africa has revealed how the indirect rule of 
supposedly traditional chiefs constituted a means of legitimizing the Apartheid regime by 
masking the power of a centralized-state with local actors.603 The Italians were too 
suspicious of the Libyans to allow for such forms of indirect rule, but their policy towards 
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Islam performed a similar function of legitimation. By endlessly touting their respect and 
protection of Islam, the Italians hoped to prevent their opponents from criticizing the 
regime on religious grounds. In the longer term, creating a depoliticized Islam reliant on 
the fascist state promised to render the Libyan populace more compliant. These efforts 
culminated in Mussolini’s visit to Libya in March 1937, when he bombastically declared 
himself the “Protector of Islam”, an event that produced much derision on the part of 
politically active Muslims, journalists, and foreign colonial experts, but nevertheless 
indicated the lengths the regime dared to go in pushing this particular strategy of 
legitimation.604 
However, one should not be shocked that an attempt at imposing a party-line of 
respect for Islam would face some resentment and disobedience from certain fascists. Just 
after the march on Rome, fascists in Libya recommended using Islam as a means of tying 
the population to the land; the preference was for a regime of segregation made sounder 
through the use of Islam as a means of preventing assimilation.605 Yet even with a 
conception of Islam driven by Italian national egoism, intransigent Italian nationalism 
combined with the presuppositions of Italian superiority over the “backwards” Libyans 
unsurprisingly served as catalysts for incidents that demonstrated the uphill battle any pro-
Islamic program would encounter. With the arrival of the Black Shirts in Libya in 1923 
came the methods of squadrismo terror, despite the efforts of Italian officials to control and 
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punish the aggressors. In Tripoli, a group of Black Shirts rampaged through the streets 
chasing Libyans who they falsely believed had attempted to steal rifles from their barracks. 
Amid other excesses, some barged into a mosque in pursuit of Libyans seeking refuge, 
causing those in prayer to flee in panic.606 Even worse was an episode in Homs in 
September 1923, in which fifteen Black Shirts broke into a mosque at night, stealing 
whatever they could find and defecating inside as a sign of their contempt.607 In this case, 
the guilty parties were sent back to Italy; hardly a severe punishment given Italy’s claims 
to respect Islam, as Angelo Del Boca has pointed out.608 
Though Italian authorities discouraged such transgressions, little was made of 
Italian official respect for Islam until the governorship of Italo Balbo (1934-1940). 
Whereas Rodolfo Graziani sought to instill fear in Libyans through harsh punitive actions 
and thinly veiled threats, Balbo hoped to play the role of an Italian Lyautey; that of a 
modernizer with great admiration for Islamic traditions and culture. Though Balbo 
encountered resistance to his attempts to grant more meaningful rights for Libyans from 
fellow fascist hierarchs, the policy of supporting Islam had a broad consensus in Italian 
colonial circles. Despite Mussolini’s early reservations about “exaggerating Arabophilism” 
in Italian propaganda,609 a flurry of pamphlets and booklets sent out abroad extolled the 
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virtues of Italy’s benevolent policies, while the pan-Islamist Shakib Arslan (1869-1946), 
working with Italian authorities, compared Italian Libya favorably to French North African 
colonies on account of Italian largess and tolerance with regards to Islam. 
Arslan was a particularly interesting ally of Italy. From Geneva, where he ran a 
pan-Islamic paper, La Nation Arabe, Arslan advocated pan-Islamic solidarity in the anti-
colonial struggle as well as reform of Islam in the tradition of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and 
Muhammad ʿAbduh.610 Arslan’s kind words for Italy and support of their Ethiopian 
campaign has long sparked debate. Did the financially struggling Arslan betray his 
principles for Italian subsidies? Did he see Italy as a useful tool to free North Africa and 
the Levant from British and French control? His biographer sides with the latter 
explanation; subsidies from Italy would go back into his political projects, not personal 
expenses, as Arslan was living in poverty in the mid to late 1930s.611 Yet one can envisage 
the possibility that Arslan saw the values of fascist Italy as akin to his own pan-Islamic 
worldview. In his most popular book, Our Decline and its Causes (1930), Arslan explained 
what Muslims could do to assert themselves again on the world stage. Defining Islam as a 
religion of action, and not of passivity, Arslan argued that the glory of the Islamic world 
would only return through sacrifice, by “expending bodily energy and material wealth”. 
For Arslan, Europe was not powerful because of its science or rationality, but for its strong 
national, religious, and ethnic traditions, which inspired it to tremendous sacrifices, as seen 
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in the Great War. Maintaining the willingness to sacrifice for such values kept a people 
strong, and a lack of belief would lead to “atheism…and a life of licence and unrestrained 
libertinism.”612 In Arslan’s fairly dismal view of history, Muslims could only compete by 
out-sacrificing Europeans.  
Aside from the possibility that Arslan may have admired the fascist focus on 
sacrifice and disdain for atheism, the Italian policy of respect for Islam seems to have 
constituted a basis for his support. Maintaining the Islamic faith and values was Arslan’s 
ultimate objective, as no revival could occur otherwise. Consequently, it was no surprise 
that Arslan became an international champion of Islam when the French unsuccessfully 
attempted to replace shariʿa law with French civil law in Moroccan Berber communities in 
1930. Arslan interpreted the move as a French effort to assimilate the Berbers and convert 
them to Catholicism. Until his pro-Italian turn in 1933-1934, Arslan similarly depicted 
Italian rule as primarily focused on destroying Islam in order to settle Christian colonists. 
But with the end of military operations and the beginning of the Balbo era, Arslan changed 
course. Though Mussolini rejected Arslan’s requests for real Libyan autonomy, it is 
possible that the Italian program of respect for Islam did satisfy Arslan; as long as Italy did 
not assimilate Libyans, the basis for future independence and Islamic revitalization would 
remain untouched.613 
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Though Arslan suffered for his defense of Italy, he was an important catch for the 
Italians, whose propaganda efforts responded to the work of Libyan exiles, who spread 
word of Italian atrocities and disrespect toward Islam. Organizations like the Executive 
Committee of Tripolitanian and Cyrenaican Communities, run by Bashir al-Saʿdawi from 
Damascus, made contacts around the Islamic world to rally opinion against Italy and 
formulate the bases of a Libyan nationalism. Meanwhile the Arab Bond Society in Egypt 
provided a platform for Libyans to state their case to Egyptians and other Arabs.614 If the 
Italians wanted to improve their relations with other Arab nations, they would have to 
respond to as many of the Libyan exiles’ critiques as possible without compromising Italian 
sovereignty. Arslan’s early conversion to a pro-Italian stance may have helped convince 
the Italians that others would follow if they initiated enough reforms, and provided proper 
publicity. 
The bulk of Italian gestures in favor of Islam in Libya occurred between 1935 and 
1936. These included the construction and refurbishing of mosques, the handing over of 
confiscated Waqf properties to Libyans for administration, state support for certain Islamic 
practices, and the establishment of an Islamic College in Tripoli. Though sources for Italian 
administration in Libya are scarce, an examination of these measures will reveal the Italian 
strategy to employ Islam as a tool of political control and as a means of gaining more 
support from Muslims abroad. 
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Though they confiscated land and property from the Senussi order, Italians could 
point to their support of Waqfs with pride. Claudia Gazzini has argued that whereas the 
French demanded written proof of property from Algerians to facilitate their confiscation 
of Waqf lands, the Italians were more generous during the early years of their occupation. 
This was partly because fewer agricultural lands were held by Tripolitanian Waqfs, and 
Italian colonization efforts had yet to start demanding land. But little changed under fascist-
rule. By 1939, the 1917 statutes regarding Waqfs were extended to all the Libyan 
provinces, including Fezzan. Though the Italians did not expropriate Waqf property, they 
did ensure that the Governor would have broad control over the institutions, with 
administration being left to Libyan notables.615 
Restoring and building mosques also served as a particularly useful technique for 
the Italians. At the time of Mussolini’s visit to Libya, Italians could boast that they had 
built twenty-one new mosques in Tripolitania.616 By trumpeting their support for mosques 
through propaganda, Italians hoped to deny charges that they had suppressed freedom of 
religion.617 In addition to foreign propaganda, there were also domestic interests at stake. 
In Cyrenaica, where the Italians had dismantled many Senussi zawiyas (confraternities) 
and confiscated their properties,618 new mosques could serve as sites of religious 
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observation under closer state supervision. Balbo, fearing a possible resurgence of Senussi 
influence, rejected the re-establishment of Libyan zawiyas. Instead, he pointed to the 
construction in Cyrenaica of five new mosques and the restoring of two others at a total 
expense of 290,000 lire as proof that the government was doing enough to support Muslims 
without risking a return of Senussi institutions.619 Several new mosques would replace 
those destroyed or damaged during the war against the Senussi, and in the case of Derna, 
the new mosque was built next to a military barracks.620 Italians either argued that Senussi 
zawiyas were purely political groupings with no religious content, or constituted a 
backwards and corrupted form of Islam that had to be suppressed in favor of the 
modernizing, Orthodox movements.621 
Though the Italians were sure to prevent the Senussi from challenging their 
sovereignty, they took a more practical line when it came to the question of modernization, 
and facilitated the introduction of new norms in the practicing of Islam in Libya. Gazzini 
has reconstructed Italian legal theory in Libya as one that differed from British and French 
practices. Instead of drawing up colonial codes that codified local law, the Italians allowed 
judges to exercise jurisprudence with the help of Muslim and Jewish scholars to formulate 
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new laws that would respect local traditions when not in direct contradiction with Italian 
positive law. Though it began in the liberal period, this flexible system continued under the 
fascists.622 Balbo also oversaw significant reforms to the practice of Islam in Libya. Since 
the remaining documentation on the Italian administration of Libya is unfortunately quite 
scarce, we must piece together what some of these reforms were. In two meetings with 
Libya’s qaḍis, Balbo agreed to several measures that would abolish practices that, as 
L’Azione Coloniale stated, were “absolutely not permitted by the Qurʾan, because they are 
recognized to have pagan origins.” These included a ban on fakirs and the wearing of 
traditional tribal ponytails, as well as increased age requirements for marriage. In the case 
of the religious ban on ponytails, Balbo added hygiene concerns to his consent, declaring 
that such Libyans would not be allowed to enter government offices.623 There were other 
changes; during funeral ceremonies, women were no longer allowed to ululate.624 And 
during Ramaḍan, the government enforced store hours and banned the sale of alcohol to 
Muslims,625 while also punishing those who failed to conform to such norms in order to 
“do away with impiety and bad examples.”626 But unsurprisingly, the Italian “respect” for 
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Ramaḍan served as a cover for propaganda; in 1939, authorities used the occasion to 
celebrate the opening of a Libyan agricultural village, to honor Libyan notables with 
decorations, and to distribute subsidies in events designed to foster loyalty.627 
It is likely that Balbo hoped to placate the reformist ʿUlema of Libya through these 
measures. A fascist expert on Islam and admirer of Balbo, Gino Cerbella explained how 
“the most cultivated and judicious figures in the Muslim world admonish the use of exterior 
forms in certain mystic sects that end up in vulgar spectacle, contrary to all sense of public 
propriety [civismo].” Furthermore, he quoted the Egyptian reformer Muhammad Ferid 
Wajdi at length, explaining how Europeans could hardly be expected to understand true 
Islam so long as they were exposed to its unorthodox historical accretions.628 James 
McDougall has shown how Algerian ʿUlema expressed similar concerns that un-Islamic 
practices would solidify European views of Islam as backward.629 The Italians then hoped 
to get ahead of the issue by supporting, and even taking credit for a modernization of Islam. 
The foundation of an Islamic college in Tripoli promised to further the goals of 
reforming Libyan Islam. Yet the institution was the result of several proposals that were 
primarily concerned with the possibility that such a school could produce potential political 
enemies. A recommendation by the Italian Legate in Egypt for the creation of a Center for 
Islamic Studies in Italy was refused by the Ministry of Colonies on the grounds that 
                                                 
627 ANOM, GGA Algérie, Tripolitania 36MIOM/104, S.E.A. “Note de Renseignements: 
Politique indigène en Libye”, 3 January 1940. 
628 Cerbella, Fascismo e Islamismo (Tripoli, 1938), pp. 31-35. 
629 Jams McDougall, History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 
110-135. 
 270 
colonial subjects studying in Italy were uprooted and consequently “absorbed what is least 
good” from Western civilization.630 Any new school would have to be based in Libya, 
where there was already a need for such an institution. In 1926, the Italians had closed the 
primary Islamic center in Libya, the Senussi controlled Jaghbub school. Despite 
recommendations that Jaghbub could host a new school, this time protected from 
“fanaticism and xenophobia” by trustworthy teachers,631 Balbo and Mussolini had already 
opted for a new location in Tripoli. In early 1935, a former Iranian Prime Minister, 
Zia’eddin Tabatabaee suggested to Mussolini that Italy would increase its reputation in the 
Islamic world if it established a theological school.632 Mussolini passed the idea on to 
Balbo, and by January 1936, the Islamic College of Tripoli had opened. For the Italians, 
the purpose of the school was to educate the Libyan Muslim and administrative elite within 
Libya,633 so as not to run the risks inherent in sending Libyan students to Tunisia and Egypt 
for their schooling. The regime, however, spun the college as a chance for Libyans to attain 
respectable civil posts (which in reality were severely restricted), and to take on positions 
in Shariʿa courts. As a result, the college also served as a resource for children of the urban 
elites that the Italians had been cultivating for decades. Yet the institution struggled to find 
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capable teachers and prepared students. Citing contacts with Orthodox Libyan Muslims, 
the French consul in Tripoli asserted that the poor education standards of Libya ensured 
that little would be achieved through the college, despite having considerable Waqf sums 
to draw upon.634 The French consul believed the real goal of the college was to strengthen 
the state’s patronage of the “three-hundred elite Libyan families” that exercised their power 
as administrators of Islamic property and justice.635 Indeed, the Italian strategy of 
cultivating the Libyan urban elites required tools like the college to ensure that these 
families could provide opportunities for their children given the Italian monopolization of 
administrative positions. To this end, students at the Islamic College were enrolled in the 
GAL to strengthen their loyalty to fascism.636 
While some Italian measures therefore appeared to support the modernizing Islamic 
trends, at other moments colonial authorities displayed a willingness to support rural 
traditions. For instance, when thousands of pilgrims came to the oasis of Taourga for an 
annual pilgrimage to the tomb of a local saint, the local Provincial Commissar took 
advantage of the event to communicate the provisions taken by Italy in favor of Libyans 
and Muslims.637 The Taourga pilgrimage was not an isolated incident of the Italians 
tolerating local Islamic traditions for their own reasons. In Misurata, a zerda, or popular 
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festival, was the occasion to incorporate fascism into traditional Islamic life. In front of a 
collection of civil authorities and Libyan notables, the local Libyan students saluted 
Mussolini, sang, and gave a gymnastics demonstration before the brightest of the indigent 
students received prizes and gifts.638 And while the Italians were hesitant to support the 
Senussi order, they bragged about their efforts to conserve the oasis of Jaghbub, where the 
tomb of the Senussi founder was located. Whereas the Senussi leadership had left the oasis 
in “total abandonment”, the Italians claimed to have returned it to its “former splendor”.639 
Clearly, the state had no issues encouraging pilgrimages and traditional North African 
forms of Islam so long as these contained no political element besides that of extolling the 
regime. 
Yet the basic contradiction between Italian claims to superiority and the respect 
Italians owed to Islamic culture continued to create tensions. In one instance, Balbo 
expelled a military chaplain from Libya for giving a speech to a congregation in which he 
declared that Muhammad’s ideas would one day be revealed to be false. Since the chaplain 
delivered the speech in a public square, Libyans overheard his derogatory comments, 
which, according to Balbo, also upset several Italians.640 Even in 1939, Balbo still had to 
reproach local administrators for allowing construction companies to destroy Muslim 
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cemeteries. Dismayed by the fact that the dug-up bones were “thrown away, or piled up 
and left out in the open, without alerting those who could care for their transferal”, Balbo 
complained that such actions showed a “lack of respect for the moral and religious 
sentiments of Muslims that indicated scarce intelligence and no political understanding.”641 
Given the importance of cemeteries as sites of political contestation in Tunisia in the 1930s, 
the failure of the Italian authorities to protect such sacred spaces indicates the limits of 
Italian respect as practiced on a daily level. 
The behavior of Italians, no doubt exacerbated by the regime’s racial policies, 
continued to bely the official line of respect. According to French reports, Italian 
functionaries and military officers so commonly showed their disdain for Arabic that 
visitors had to gain the trust of Libyans before the latter would speak their own language.642 
Following a 1942 PNF report that even the Libyan elites were subject to frequent 
humiliations, the Minister of Colonies Attilio Teruzzi proposed using the PNF and police 
organs to repress such behavior, even leaving open the possibility of expelling Italians who 
risked public order by criticizing Libyans.643 Consequently, the racism shown towards 
Libyans, which was implicitly encouraged by the constant state reminders of Italian 
superiority, had to be kept within acceptable boundaries through party organizations. 
Italian rule in Libya would end before a new party-based initiative could attempt to instill 
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manners in Italians. Yet these final efforts reveal the impossibility of resolving the tension 
between notions of superiority and “Latin” universalism that plagued Italian imperial 
doctrines. How exactly to treat the Libyan “Other” was therefore a question upon which 
the regime struggled to provide a clear answer. While recent studies on Italian imperialism 
have focused on propaganda directed towards Muslims, it is critical to examine the 
differing ways that Italians represented Libyans, and Islam more broadly, to themselves. 
II. Friend or Enemy? Italian Debates on Arabs and Muslims 
While the Italian state sought to placate Muslims in Libya and abroad, Italian 
academics and journalists debated whether the Mediterranean was a space for collaboration 
or conflict between East and West. Each interpretation suggested different courses for 
Italian policy concerning the treatment of Muslims: either a policy aimed at establishing 
the grounds for cooperation, or a harsher policy based on the assumption that Muslims 
constituted the historical enemy. 
When recounting Libyan history, a common theme stemming from the French-
Italian privileging of Latin influences in North Africa was the denigration of Islamic 
contributions. The contempt that derived from such a position could be quite clear: in an 
article by an influential fascist hierarch in Benghazi reviewing the local ruins of several 
civilizations, that of Muslims was accused of “leaving nothing in Cyrenaica but 
tombs…signs of death among so much pulsating life, the only advance of a civilization 
that deflowered Cyrenaica through destruction, without knowing how to substitute a more 
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creative capacity for that of Greece and Rome”.644 Though oft-repeated, the charges of 
Islamic decadence in Libya were outweighed by those who believed in an eternal struggle 
between East and West. Mario Missiroli, an influential journalist, provided a typical 
reading of this form of Mediterranean history in an article that asserted that the Crusades, 
despite consisting of a series of military disasters, served as a lesson for the modern West 
in how the impulse to expansionism toward the Orient would lead to “the triumph of 
millennial values”.645 In this view, the Mediterranean served as a space for periodic 
Western rejuvenations. And when applied to contemporary affairs, such a perspective 
generally assumed that Islam was an ally of Bolshevism in the struggle against a West 
facing a choice between decadence or regeneration. The left-fascist journalist Ugo 
D’Andrea expressed this view by depicting Bolshevism as representative of a typically 
“Asiatic” opposition to Latin Dionysian and Germanic Faustian civilization. Once again, 
according to D’Andrea, the “East and West are battling like two currents that rise and fall 
along the coasts of the Mediterranean countries.” Rome had struck first by uniting the 
Mediterranean, but beaten back by the “Arab tide”, before the West re-asserted itself in the 
nineteenth century. Now it was the turn of Asia, in the form of an alliance between 
Islamism and Bolshevism.646 
Others questioned the confluence of Bolshevik and Islamist interests. In the most 
influential fascist periodical on colonial affairs, L’Azione Coloniale, Genesio Eugenio Del 
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Monte argued that while some Muslim leaders wanted to use Moscow as a tool, the 
cooperation between Moroccans and Franco proved that Islam was compatible with 
fascism and not communism.647 The young Ruggero Orlando, who later became a socialist 
journalist, argued that the Arab world was not “passive”, but rapidly asserting itself. While 
Italy had to find common ground to introduce this world into the “concert of Europe”, 
Orlando believed that the Arabs’ “traditional sense of justice” would lead them to reject 
the “cynical contempt of certain values…[of] European imperialists and businessmen 
condemned to moral and material decline”, and thereby recognize the importance of 
cooperation with Italy.648 Taking this argument further, V. Branzoli Zappi saw Arab 
Muslims as the foremost allies of Italy in a struggle against a 
Western world deprived of its function, darkened by Jewish-Asiatic communist 
theories, by moral confusion, by neo-paganism, a world in which fascist Italy is 
today the bulwark of Christian and Roman civilization. Now, opposite the frightful 
darkness of the North and the dissolving forces of Bolshevism, the famous ‘infidels’ 
of the time of the Crusades are a still healthy force, capable of resisting the 
threatening disintegration. We are in this sense much closer to the Muslims of the 
Philippines than to the Marxists of Barcelona; in Muslims we recognize the sense 
of hierarchy, of discipline, and social solidarity, the love of a daring spirit, the cult 
of the family and God, in short, the prevalence of spiritual values.649 
 By transposing the quintessential fascist values onto Muslims, such arguments hoped to 
convince Italians that in a global struggle between the forces of “disintegration” and 
“health”, Italy must find new allies. Muslims were then not the only target for propaganda 
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that collapsed the distinctions between fascism and Islam. Italians would have to be 
comfortable with an alliance with Muslims as well. 
A supporter of such an alliance was Gino Cerbella, a fascist who studied Islam and 
contributed articles on North African folklore and culture for reviews. In his 1938 book, 
Fascismo e Islamismo, Cerbella hoped to convince Italians that Mussolini’s pro-Islamic 
policy would be a profound and historical one. To start, Cerbella outlined the similarities 
between fascism and Islam, drawing several parallels between the two; both established 
order out of anarchy, had heroic leaders, sought to unify their communities, and held 
universal aspirations. In his enthusiasm, Cerbella even described the eighth and twentieth 
centuries as “pillars of a bridge of light, leading to the future of humanity”.650 Most 
importantly though, the alliance of fascism and Islam would be built around “a common 
enemy to defeat: bolshevism”; while Italians would fight Bolshevism in Europe, Muslims 
would present “a human wall of 250 million people”. Cerbella argued that the Muslim 
devotion to spirituality over materialism, to tradition over the novel, to a theocracy over a 
secular state, precluded any confluence of interests between Islam and communism. 
Communist attempts to encourage anti-colonial resistance would only lead to nationalist 
movements strongly shaped by Islam. 651 The Italians would not have to fear a pan-Islamic 
or pan-Arab state since the national states created after World War I would not cede their 
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sovereignty.652 The shift towards nationalism in the Islamic world would then redound to 
the benefit of Italians and help secure their alliance against Bolshevism.653 
Given Westerners’ common use of Islam as an epithet for fascism, partly to explain 
away the phenomenon as something separate from the West, as Reinhard Schulze has 
demonstrated, it is interesting that Cerbella did not argue for an equivalence of the two, but 
of a profound similarity.654 Whereas others saw both fascism and Islam as a “political 
religion”,655 Cerbella distinguished between Islam’s “theocratic state” and Mussolini’s 
“theocracy of the state”.656 As such, Islam did not explain fascism, which, from a fascist 
perspective, could hardly be removed from the deep roots of Italian history. Rather, 
constructing an image of Islam that paralleled that of fascism served to place Muslims 
among Italy’s friends. Of course, the fascist view of Islam that privileged whatever 
elements could be compared to fascism was as opportunistic as those of other Europeans, 
but the key goal was to lay the groundwork for geopolitical collaboration. Thus, writers 
like Branzoli-Zappi and Cerbella hoped to employ the friend-enemy distinction to convince 
Italians that an alliance with Muslims was in their best interest. The threat of Bolshevism 
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in particular, which became much more central to fascist propaganda in the wake of the 
Spanish Civil War,657 served as a useful incentive to support a pro-Islamic policy. 
If fascism needed to maintain its historical autonomy from Islam despite the desire 
for an alliance, it was still possible to engage in historical revisionism that questioned the 
inclusion of Arabs and Muslims in an East destined to combat the West. The young colonial 
expert Mario Dorato, who would later become the head of the Istituto Coloniale in post-
fascist Italy,658 argued that the common understanding of Islam as the historic enemy of 
the West was mistaken. Not only did Muslims take on elements of Latin civilization, but 
they developed their own as well: “It was the Arabs from Cordoba, Damascus, Baghdad, 
and Cairo that spread the light of a most elevated literary, scientific, and artistic culture, 
that introduced so many words into our language, that through their activity and 
industriousness created the opulent irrigated gardens of Spain and stupendous architectural 
masterpieces, such as Cordoba’s mosque and Granada’s Alhambra.” Dorato argued that 
the distrust of Islam derived from the Seljuk and Ottoman Turks and Barbary pirates, and 
not Arabic and Islamic civilization. By pinning the blame on Turks and pirates, the latter 
of which was “in no way typically or essentially Muslim”, Dorato could present a history 
with far fewer conflicts. And though Dorato recognized that the Crusades were crucial to 
a romantic self-understanding of Europeans, he also admitted that the episode was “one of 
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the most colossal wastes of human life and wealth in recorded history”, which saw innocent 
Syrian Arabs become “victims of an authentic aggression by the armed forces of feudal 
Europe”. Dorato concluded that Islam and fascism shared a dedication to a “single and 
eternal Law”, and spiritual values of faith and discipline. Once the two forces had rid 
themselves of corrupting foreign ideologies, they would find common ground.659 
In a conference held during the 1937 Colonial Congress, the Orientalist 
Michelangelo Guidi made a similar attack on a historical reading that privileged conflict at 
the expense of collaboration. Guidi hoped that revealing the lesser-known cultural contacts 
through the study of Islam would inform Italy’s political and cultural elites, and thereby 
provide a basis for the resumption of long-lasting historical trends of cooperation. By 
rewriting a history of wars into one of cultural transmissions, and in particular, of the 
Islamic conservation of ancient thought, Guidi hoped to link Orientalism directly to the 
geopolitical interests of fascism, and thereby receive more state support.660 Guidi was not 
alone in his attempt to bring East and West together through a re-examination of the past. 
In the same conference, Cerbella attempted to uncover lost cultural similarities by arguing 
that the games played by Libyan youth in Tripoli’s Qurʾanic schools were similar to those 
played by Italian youth.661 Once the regime began to make preparations to teach Arabic in 
Italian middle-schools, Cerbella pushed for a re-writing of Islamic history in Italian text-
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books. According to Cerbella, such reforms would allow Italians with little knowledge to 
gain the understanding that experts had on Islam.662 Some non-experts, like the decorated 
military doctor Alfredo Bucciante, seemed to get a head-start on fulfilling Cerbella’s wish. 
Bucciante contributed to the push to emphasize the merits of the Islamic world with an 
article in Il Mediterraneo on Arab medicine in which he credited Arabs with conserving 
and developing Greek medicine, as well as establishing the basis for modern, scientific 
pharmacy.663 
Others sought to reconcile Italian Catholic culture and religion with Islam. As early 
as 1932, the Orientalist Giuseppe Macaluso-Aleo sought to refute Dante’s portrayal of 
Muhammad; a notable criticism given the fascist figuring of Dante as father of Italy. 
Macaluso-Aleo argued that Dante’s condemnation of Muhammad as a “sower of discord” 
was a result of medieval ignorance concerning Islam. Given Dante’s placement of Saladin, 
Ibn Rushd, and Ibn Sina in Limbo, Macaluso-Aleo believed that the Florentine poet would 
not be averse to a more respectful treatment of Muhammad if he knew the truth of Islam 
as finally understood by modern Westerners thanks to intellectuals like Thomas Carlyle.664 
The presence of such arguments in fascist publications showed an early willingness of 
regime actors to permit arguments that encouraged a cultural rapprochement and more 
tolerance on the part of Italians. And Orientalists were not alone in these efforts: In a series 
of articles for L’Italia d’Oltremare, the Catholic writer Giulio Castelli emphasized the 
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Islamic respect for Jesus and Mary, as well as the similarities between Allah and the 
Christian God. In an attempt to reverse “the absurd theory of an unbridgeable gap between 
the Muslims and us”, Castelli hoped to convince readers that Italians had an obligation to 
cease giving offense to Muslims and instead encourage them to become even better 
Muslims as a means to more peaceful relations.665 Castelli also pointed out that the Vatican 
was moving towards a policy of understanding Islam rather than proselytization despite 
some residual opposition, through organizations like the Jesuits’ Lega degli Amici 
dell’Oriente Islamico, and argued that the new stance would strengthen the political goals 
of Italian imperialism.666 Finally, Castelli believed that an alliance between Christians and 
Muslims was necessary in the face of the rational and atheistic forces of Western laicism 
and Russian Bolshevism. The conflict-ridden past between the two religions had “vanished, 
blown away by the powerful winds of modern civilization”,667 creating new friend-enemy 
distinctions. Castelli’s desire for religious reconciliation under the aegis of Italian worldly 
power is an instructive example of how even some Catholic intellectuals had 
accommodated their views to fascist expansionist aims. 
Some Catholics also hoped that the spiritualty of Muslims would serve as an 
incentive to Italians to take their religion more seriously. For the former socialist Pio 
Gardenghi, Ramadan in particular brought about “an almost mystical atmosphere” that 
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served to remind both Christians and Muslims of the divine and eternal values of God that 
would outlast all “turbulent ideologies” and “prideful scientific theories”.668 In a more 
direct appeal for Catholics to equal the spiritual dedication of Libyans, Balbo ordered all 
fascist officials to attend official Catholic masses in a 1938 circular. The formerly anti-
clerical governor, who grew to see the value of the Church as a force of order in the late 
1930s,669 argued that “in this land, where the Muslim population places spiritual faith at 
the highest level of human values, we must demonstrate our respect, attachment, and pride 
for the Roman Catholic Church.” Furthermore, since Balbo opposed the Italian turn to 
racial theory, he urged that religious difference constitute the justification for Italian 
superiority in Libya.670 Thus, Balbo hoped that respect for Islam would not only serve 
political goals vis-à-vis the Libyan population, but also as a fillip to greater Catholic 
religiosity. Only by being strong Catholics would Italy maintain its right to rule over a 
similarly spiritual people. 
Others chaffed at the prospect of state policies directed towards reconciliation. In a 
letter sent to Mussolini, the Italian Catholic missionary Roberto Focà, a member of the 
Algerian branch of the White Fathers, warned of the dangers of encouraging Islam. Citing 
the unchanging nature of an Islamic faith that could not support foreign or secular rule and 
forced backwards practices on believers, the missionary believed that Islam was 
incompatible with Italian expansionism. The Italian rhetoric of “respect” for a 
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“modernizing” Islam would play into the hands of anti-Western and eternally backwards 
Muslims. The best path forward was to establish freedom of religion in Italian colonies 
with no direct support for Islam. Given a freedom of choice, Focà predicted that Italian 
Muslims would renounce their religion and adopt Western practices and beliefs.671  
Though authorities turned a blind eye to Focà’s warnings, his argument did share 
an element with those who sought reconciliation: the link between Italian political interests 
and Islam. The common framework for Islamic supporters and critics was that any 
interpretation of the role of Islam would be tied to Italian expansionism. Even if figures 
like Guidi and Castelli had the momentary upper-hand, critics of Islam like Focà, along 
with those convinced that the East-West divide would always breed conflict, had an anti-
Islamist position ready-at-hand for the fascist regime. And those pushing for a truly pro-
Islamic turn often admitted that they were fighting an uphill battle in public opinion thanks 
to a long history of suspicion, hatred, and ignorance towards Islam. As Cerbella put it, “Let 
us say that the Muslims know who we are, whereas we still know little about them”.672 But 
as long as the regime felt that supporting Islam was compatible with its imperial control, 
the official policy of “respect” would be maintained. 
III. Consuming Libyan Traditions 
Italian policy towards Islam coincided with a broader desire to reify the cultural 
and economic life of Libyans. Analyzing this strategy raises questions about the 
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relationship of colonialism, modernity, and tradition. The Italians believed that their brand 
of colonialism would introduce modernity to their subjects while maintaining traditional 
social structures and ways of living. The scholar of Nigerian history, Olúféṃi Táı́wò has 
called such a form of colonialism sociocryonics. In the case of figures like the influential 
British colonial governor Frederick Lugard, promoting indirect rule was not just a cost-
cutting move, but also protected Africans from modernity.673 This view was informed by 
strongly held racist views which even held sway in the League of Nations Permanent 
Mandates Committee of which Lugard was a key member. The application of 
sociocryonics to Mandate colonies was common, despite being in direct conflict with the 
goal of preparing the Mandates for eventual independence.674 For Táı́wò, the use of 
sociocryonics marked a gap between colonialism and modernity, since it prevented 
Africans from enjoying the freedom to choose their own path of development and progress. 
While colonialism could offer signs of modernity such as roads and hospitals, it could not 
truly bring it about unless it allowed the colonized to become free individuals with the same 
guaranteed rights enjoyed by Europeans.675 The harsh Italian treatment of Libyans would 
certainly substantiate the claim that colonialism and modernity were distinct. And a clear 
goal of the Italians alleged protection of Islam was to prevent Libyans from joining the 
urban middle-classes and making political demands. However, by examining the Italian 
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views of why the maintenance of Libya’s traditions was necessary, we can see that even if 
sociocryonics suppressed certain elements of modernity, its imposition was a response to 
explicitly-stated needs of a modern Italy. 
As we have seen, the Italian protection of Libyan traditions included an Islamic 
element which was inspired by the need to impress Muslims around the world and respond 
to criticisms of Italian rule launched by exiled Libyans and pan-Arab and pan-Islamic 
figures. Similarly, the rejection of legal assimilation and the maintenance of traditional 
legal courts and statuses was informed not just by the growing push for racial policies 
within Italy, but also the knowledge that French efforts at assimilation had provoked a 
political backlash from nationalists and Islamic reformers across North Africa. Even 
accounting for these external considerations, the Italians themselves sought to define 
themselves against the Libyan “Other” through the discovery and safe-keeping of what was 
“authentically” Libyan. Many Italians grieved at the potential loss of Libyan traditions at 
the hands of Europe’s “decadent” modern civilization. A member of Balbo’s entourage, 
the writer Nello Quilici, was emblematic of this view, declaring that Europeans were 
condemned to follow a cultural ideal of pursuing “impossible perfection…which only 
increases our insatiability and adds to our torment.” The Orient however, taught that 
happiness could be found in limiting desire through recognition of the vanity of struggle.676 
The “lesson” of the East was incommensurable for Quilici; a mere recognition that an 
alternate way of life existed, out of the reach of Europeans. As long as Libyans were 
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sheltered from those elements of modernity deemed harmful, Italians believed that the 
colony would serve as a safe-haven for spiritual values and authentic customs. 
Though Europeans had long seen the Orient as a site where the “authentic” and 
“sublime” could still be found, the Italian focus on protecting Libyan traditions was shaped 
by the power of the state to intervene. An “authentic” Libya would then require, to borrow 
Hobsbawm’s famous expression, the invention of traditions, or at times, their 
appropriation.677 Such practices would not be exclusive to Libya; Italian folklorists were 
hard at work resurrecting local traditions while cities spruced up their historical buildings 
to better conform to tourist expectations.678 Following Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi’s 
argument, we can see how in Libya, as in Italy, the regime hoped to create forms of cultural 
consumption consistent with fascist goals.679 In Libya, the primary cause of state 
intervention in creating and promoting an “authentic” Libya for purposes of consumption 
was unsurprisingly the development of a Libyan tourism industry. As early as 1932, shortly 
after the cessation of hostilities in Cyrenaica, Fulvio Suvich outlined a strategy to promote 
tourism that would focus on the fact that Libya was the only North African colony that had 
not been “excessively Europeanized”. And to maintain that claim, Suvich argued that all 
the “local color” of urban centers in the province would have to remain intact, even with 
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the addition of sanitation infrastructure. Furthermore, Suvich urged that colonial 
advertisements focus on images of the exotic instead of long-winded written 
descriptions.680 Within months, there were already calls to bring tourists to Muslim 
pilgrimage sites during large festivals.681 And when such festivals did not exist, they were 
invented: when one hundred Italian schoolteachers visited the oasis of Tajura in late 1932, 
a local colonial official organized one thousand Libyans for a night of whirling dervish 
exhibitions, camels, and dance competitions.682 In this case, teachers supposedly sent to 
learn about the realities of colonial life would more likely act as travel agents back home.  
Since the Italian displacement of so many Libyans into the interior had done much 
to shatter traditional ways of life that could appeal to tourists, the easiest way to maintain 
the necessary Oriental aesthetics was through the conservation of Libyan architecture and 
artisan trades. The 1934 plan for Tripoli met Suvich’s demands by forbidding the 
construction of European building in the old city, while calling for its residents to rebuild 
dilapidated structures in a traditional manner.683 When Arab aesthetics were not present in 
sufficient quantities, they were sometimes added by Italian administrators. In Benghazi, 
where there were few Arabic arches, the municipality decided to add them throughout the 
city. As one commentator noted, the danger of turning the arch into a dull leitmotif caused 
the local architect to “vary its characteristics while remaining faithful to the spirit of the 
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Arab style.”684 At the same time, a plethora of buildings meant for Italian-use, like the 
Uaddan Hotel and Casino, borrowed heavily from local Libyan designs.685 Despite such 
efforts at preserving a local feel, by 1937 one commentator noted that Tripoli had become 
too European for those looking for new experiences. Only a development of the nascent 
tourism infrastructure to southern oasis towns like Nalut and Ghadames could offer 
authentic experiences for the “nervous and rushed humanity of the century of machines.”686 
But even in these towns, the “authentic” was maintained through state-actors. In 
Ghadames, those local Libyans who had been granted land-concessions also received 
houses that mimicked the traditional domiciles of the oasis.687 
The other state-supported signifier of the “authentic” was the artisan industry. 
Trade schools in Tripoli and Benghazi ensured that Libyan artisans would continue to 
produce traditional goods, while the establishment of the Fascist Institution for Libyan 
Artisans in 1936 sought to nurture the industry through subsidies and participation of 
artisans in fairs and exhibitions.688 Meanwhile, Balbo oversaw the construction of an 
artisan’s quarter in Tripoli, with schools for gold and silversmiths, as well as potters and 
weavers.689 Colonial publications ran long series of articles in an attempt to delineate the 
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various local Libyan products in order to gain public attention.690 Support for Libyan 
artisans accomplished two goals. Firstly, it would ensure that a portion of urban Libyans 
would have steady work rather than constituting a mobile and potentially dangerous labor 
force. Secondly, the artisan workshops, stores, and products served as a key component to 
the tourism industry. 
The needs of tourism proved a powerful impulse to the attempted reification of 
Libyan traditions. After visiting Tripoli for a month to work on a novel, the writer Mura 
shared her thoughts on the local artisan industry for the Milanese paper, Sera. Mura was 
no fascist shill, as she was placed under surveillance for her stories of interracial love. Yet 
her desire to protect a “traditional” Libya not only corresponded to that of fascist officials, 
but went even further. For Mura, traditional artisanship had to be protected from machines 
and the universalizing effects of “corrupting” mass-market consumer culture. Calling an 
Arab dressed as a European “out of place” [stonatura], but “always an Arab and always 
unique”, Mura believed that the protection of the industry would first and foremost protect 
a way of life. While Italians threatened “authentic” Libya with their modernity, they were 
also uniquely qualified to act as protectors for traditions that “Arab negligence had almost 
allowed to die”. Without the maintenance of such traditions, tourists in search of “folklore” 
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would only find the same mass-produced goods sold as trinkets all over the globe.691 Those 
who held similar views could feel some relief in the knowledge that the fascist regime also 
sought to prevent the industrialization and proletarianization of Libyans. If the state-
sponsored emigration of thirty thousand Italians to Libya in 1938-1939 was meant to keep 
rural Italians out of cities, then it is no surprise that the regime hoped to fix Libyans into 
traditional occupations. 
The Italian attempt to fix Libyans into a traditional and largely rural economy had 
qualifications. Their policy was not to return rural Libyans to a “natural” state, but rather 
to offer a modernized and controlled pastoral economy. Measures to this end can be seen 
in Balbo’s much publicized rescue of large flocks from drought-stricken pastoral areas,692 
the construction of over four hundred traditional tukuls outside of Tajura to settle 
Bedouin,693 and mobile medical units to provide basic health services in the countryside. 
Such state-actions were meant to promote a return to the countryside for those who had left 
for the coast and prevent the creation of an uprooted Libyan proletariat.694 These fears also 
contributed to the measures taken in the late 1930s to facilitate the Libyan acquisition of 
small farms. Arab schools, like that of Misurata, hoped to provide the sons of small 
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landowners with an education that combined modern and traditional methods.695 Despite 
limited resources, the administration was clearly interested in slowing down the creation 
of a mobile labor pool. Yet public works projects and Italian industry required cheap 
manual labor. In an effort to prevent the demand for Libyan labor from encouraging too 
many to leave rural occupations, Balbo established a maximum wage for Libyans and 
offered incentives for Italian business owners to attract Italian workers to Libya.696 Thus 
the state hoped to use modest tools of modernization to balance the displacement of 
Libyans from the most fertile lands with the prevention of internal immigration to coastal 
cities. This mixture of modernity and tradition could be seen in other fields. For instance, 
Radio-Tripoli bragged that its Arab transmissions were popular for playing modern music 
that remained tied to Arab roots, rather than borrowing from the “too-modern” styles that 
mixed in elements of American jazz.697 Similarly, Italians claimed that broadcasting 
prayers over loudspeakers was a means of modernizing Islam.698 For Italian colonial 
authorities and experts, the success of the Italian imperial project in Libya depended on the 
reification of Libyans into protected, but permanently second-class citizens who would 
serve as tourist artifacts as well as allies in future conflicts with the allegedly anti-Islamic 
liberal and communist geo-political spheres. 
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CONCLUSION 
When it came to governing Libya’s Muslims, Italians had to consider domestic and 
foreign factors. Fascists never wavered in their final goal of maintaining Italian supremacy 
in Libya through demographic colonization; aside from an administrative elite loyal to 
Italy, Libyans would largely be relegated to agricultural labor. Yet foreign policy interests 
dictated that Libya appear to be a model of pro-Islamic governance. As such, the Italians 
framed the secondary-status of Libyans as a means of protecting Islam. If Libyans could 
not access upper-administrative and political positions, it was because their elites were 
destined for religious posts. The protection of artisan labor would salvage local culture and 
prevent urban Libyans from forming a proletarian mass. Italians cynically touted second-
class citizenship as a pledge to protect Islamic law and traditions. In order to communicate 
this message to potential Arab allies, Libyans themselves were expected to express their 
appreciation for Italy and fascism whenever abroad. At the same time, the protection of 
Islam and an “authentic” Libya from European modernity was in reality a result of 
European modernity itself, whether it be the reform of Islamic practices according to 
European notions of decency, or the staged recreation of the traditional in the name of a 
tourist industry. Finally, some colonial figures like Balbo were not content with the 
subjugation of Libyans; they would also need to become good fascists. To that end, early 
steps were taken to integrate Libyans into the fascist body-politic, albeit as a separate 
appendage. What is most striking in this regard is that while fascists trusted their 
inquadramento strategies for Italians, they were concerned that affiliating Libyans too 
closely with fascism would risk the loss of Italian racial prestige. As a result, steps that 
would include Libyans in the institutions of the regime were half-hearted or rejected. Taken 
together, these tools of legitimation and governance provide one model for how fascists 
hoped to depoliticize religious and nationalist opposition and inculcate support for, or at 
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the least, inspire obedience to Italian rule. Yet the continued reports of Italian abuses by 
Libyan exiles, the lack of enthusiasm for fascist initiatives within Libya, and the tense 
relations during World War II exposed the numerous failures of fascism to win over its 
Libyan subjects. 
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Chapter Five: Governing Muslims II: The Failure of Reform Projects in 
Vichy-Era French Algeria 
INTRODUCTION 
When France signed an armistice agreement with Germany on 18 June 1940, 
French authority in Algeria rested on shaky ground. Though the heated political culture of 
the 1930s had been temporarily tamped down by the administration’s suppression of the 
nationalist Parti Populaire Algérien (PPA) and the Algerian Communist Party (PCA) in the 
months leading up to the war, there could be no doubt that the political contestations of the 
Popular Front years would return. Vichy administrators therefore faced a difficult task. The 
maintenance of empire was a core component of the Vichy vision for France. Not only 
could the empire serve as a means to recuperate the French loss of influence in Europe, but 
it also offered a field for the application of more authoritarian and conservative values. 
Imperial reforms promised to strengthen both individual colonies and the rightist project 
of national regeneration. Yet the wartime economy greatly restricted the resources 
available for large-scale development plans favored by technocrats. And significant 
political reforms were hard to envision given the French concern for their prestige in the 
wake of defeat and the conservatism of Vichy administrators. Despite these limitations, 
Vichy governors and administrators hoped to employ the new tools of the National 
Revolution to forestall a political crisis in Algeria and offer an alternative to the failed 
program of the Popular Front. 
Despite the short duration of Vichy rule in Algeria, the period is seen as critical to 
the ensuing struggle for independence in Algeria, insofar as the authoritarian and illiberal 
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turn forced Algerian nationalist movements to work underground. And when those 
moderates who had failed to extract meaningful reforms from the Popular Front faced 
similar barriers when dealing with the far-right, there seemed to be no other alternative 
than eventual independence. In narratives that track the development of Algerian 
nationalism leading to the war for independence, such as those of Annie Rey-
Goldzeiguer699 and Mahfoud Kaddache, the racist and repressive policies of Vichy are 
consequently highlighted. In the case of Kaddache, the period is even treated as something 
of a speed-bump, as Algerian nationalists merely had to wait the war out.700 Jacques 
Cantier, on the other hand, provided a thorough examination of the period in L’Algérie 
sous le régime de Vichy, a book that admirably covers the social, political, and economic 
events of Vichy Algeria. With Cantier’s detailed account, we can see the complexity of the 
period, full of contradictory policy ideas, conflicting personalities and social formations, 
and competing interest groups.701 This chapter aims to build on Cantier’s work, by focusing 
solely on Vichy policies towards Algerians, and the experiences and reactions to those 
policies. In particular, it relies on documents not utilized by Cantier; these largely consist 
of Algerian and French Algerian opinions overheard or intercepted by French agents. Since 
French administrators understood that censorship limited the role of public opinion as a 
provider of feedback, it was essential to discreetly figure out what people actually thought 
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of government actions. A careful use of these documents can now provide us with an 
insight into how different actors responded to and interpreted Vichy policies. 
Algeria was only a part of a broader French empire that the Vichy regime sought to 
revitalize. Studies by Ruth Ginio and Eric T. Jennings have explored the Vichy experience 
in French West Africa, Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina. For Ginio, Vichy did not 
so much represent a new form of colonial governance, but rather an intensification and 
unmasking of what had existed before 1940.702 This argument certainly holds weight in the 
Algerian case as well, but can minimize the belief of actors that the moment of authoritarian 
government provided opportunities to carry out policies that previously were either pursued 
with great hesitation, or not at all. Without denying the many continuities with republican 
colonialism, the authoritarian and rightist Vichy administration did bring about new 
discourses, schemes, and expectations. The most compelling argument made by Jennings 
is that the Vichy focus on folklore and traditionalism unwittingly helped shift colonial 
opposition groups from working within the universalist republican ideal to a more 
exclusionary and anti-French nationalism.703 Yet while the regime did speak about 
Algerian traditions, it was always careful to avoid mobilizing the nationalism of religious 
and political groups. Since these movements had already gained traction in the mid-to-late 
1930s, Vichy’s positive role in intensifying Algerian nationalism must be viewed 
skeptically. 
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The central argument in this chapter is that Vichy policies towards Algerians were 
strongly colored by ideological concerns. In the effort to gain the adherence of Algerians 
willing to work with France, rightist authorities had to sell the authoritarian values of the 
National Revolution as a promising alternative to the liberal-socialist values of the Popular 
Front. As a result, similarities arose between Vichy policies and those of the Italians in 
Libya. Islam would allegedly be more compatible with the right than with the universalist 
left. Institutions geared towards youth would provide a public role for ambitious Algerians 
without risking open political opposition. Social policies to protect a traditional and 
agricultural way of life would keep Algerians from entering the sites of dangerous and 
anarchic modernity-the coastal cities. The clearly formulated ideological vision became 
quite complex and messy in reality, as the exact nature of any given reform was open to 
debate. More importantly, the reactions of Algerians with different goals in mind, as well 
as French Algerians hesitant to change the slightest foundation of the status-quo, altered 
the trajectory of reform efforts.  
Vichy policy towards Algerians was most clearly outlined in a long report sent from 
Governor-General Jean-Marie Charles Abrial to Admiral François Darlan, the head of the 
Vichy government, in June 1941. Though the context of the document must be kept in 
mind- Abrial would soon be replaced by General Maxime Weygand and was likely looking 
to highlight his political initiatives- it still reveals the fundamental Vichy strategy towards 
Algerians with clarity. And while the two successive Governor-Generals would alter 
Abrial’s program in small ways, it largely remained intact until the Allied occupation in 
November 1942. 
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For Abrial, the starting point of “Muslim politics” was the impossibility of enacting 
“structural reforms” given the social and economic instability caused by the war. In the 
meantime, the highest priority was to “maintain: maintain the security, trust, and 
confidence of the population groups”, followed by defending against harmful propaganda. 
The primary tool of maintaining order would be the “absorption or neutralization” of any 
social or intellectual movements that threatened to constitute a strong opposition. Abrial 
elaborated upon his techniques to appeal to each Algerian group that could assert its 
interests: moderate reformists, reformist and traditional Muslims, loyal notables, and the 
urban and rural Algerian bourgeoisie. A plethora of tactics followed to back up Abrial’s 
claim that absorption was the best strategy to follow for all these groups, as opposed to the 
neutralization of Communists and Algerian nationalists. 704 
This chapter will explore some of the tactics employed by Abrial and his 
successors, and why most proved to be ineffective. Not only did the policy of 
“maintenance” instead of structural reforms disappoint the many Algerian political figures 
desperate for meaningful change after the struggles of the Popular Front, but appealing to 
so many different groups also proved difficult. The Islamic reformists, the ʿUlema, as well 
as the nationalist Parti Populaire Algérien tended to support policies that preserved a 
cultural divide between the French and Algerian communities, and had little interest in 
working with French authorities. Other Algerian reformers, like the former ʿUlema leader 
Ṭayeb al-ʿUqbi, Muhammad Salah Bendjelloul, and those in the urban middle-classes, led 
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by Ferhat Abbas, hoped that legal equality could be attained through petitions to the new 
Vichy government. As Abrial recognized, the desire for equality was “more than a 
tendency, but a myth in the Sorelian sense of the word”.  The reference to the renegade 
Marxist philosopher Georges Sorel, known for his influence on fascist ideology, was apt. 
Sorel predicted that a mythic image of a general-strike would mobilize working-classes 
and make clear their absolute opposition to employers.705 In the colonial context, Abrial 
feared a similar binary political crisis pitting the French against Algerians rallying around 
different interpretations of “equality”. The Algerian governors had to pursue their 
exclusionary policies while outwardly balancing respect for Algerian difference with the 
desire for equality. 
A FAILED “POLITICS OF RESPECT” 
Maxime Weygand, who had taken on the Vichy-created position of Delegate-
General for North Africa, tasked with coordinating a broad economic and military policy 
for French North Africa,706 gave a speech in late October 1941 reprimanding “certain 
indigènes [who] are no longer faithful to their polite customs which are a tradition among 
Muslims”. According to Weygand, such behavior had political consequences: “The policy 
of understanding, of patience, and of respect [d’égards] that I have encouraged is not 
possible unless it is practiced by all. As a result, I have given orders that this stance be 
respected.” Unsurprisingly, Algerians were displeased at being blamed for poor relations 
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with the French.707 Yet Weygand’s speech is instructive insofar as it reveals the importance 
placed by Vichy figures on the “politics of respect”. 
The idea seems to have derived from an Algerian teacher, French citizen and World 
War I veteran from Kabylie, Rabah Zenati (1877-1952).708 Best known as the director for 
La Voix indigène (1929-1947), a key paper advocating a pro-French position with a print-
run of two thousand copies, Zenati was briefly involved in reformist politics in the mid-
1930s before quickly abandoning any hope of political action without the support of the 
French administration.709 As an Algerian who advocated for reforms without questioning 
French sovereignty, he was a particularly well-suited mediator for Vichy. When speaking 
with a French agent in Constantine, Zenati explained that authoritarian governance 
provided a propitious occasion for reform, though he believed the French would have to 
act quickly, since they would only have so much time before the colons re-asserted their 
authority.710 Since Zenati hoped for the regime’s success, French administrators read his 
articles carefully and hoped to follow his advice when possible. 
Zenati’s rightist leanings must have helped as well, since he often spoke the 
language of Vichy supporters. Though he called for assimilation, Zenati hardly had 
political equality in mind, stating that “We have too often spoken of rights, which has given 
birth to more than dangerous tendencies. Fortunately, we Muslims hold the principle of the 
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absolute necessity of a strong authority that maintains our old traditions through order and 
discipline. Therein lies the secret of the moral success of France.”711 In fact, at other times, 
Zenati fell in with far-right discourse by questioning the purity of a potentially decadent 
France. While musing on the nature of civilization, the Kabyle teacher bemoaned the 
“many Frenchmen…[who] have lost the sense of their own civilization and confuse it with 
vague ideologies collected in the bazaar of a spiritual internationalism. It is evident that 
one cannot apply such confused conceptions to indigènes, that one cannot make them 
benefit from an historical experience whose meaning has been lost and which one can no 
longer interpret.”712  
Starting in the fall of 1940, Zenati’s articles focused almost exclusively on the 
importance of better relations between the French and Algerians. The new Prefect of 
Algiers, Pierre Pagès, an authoritarian and paternalist colonial hand from Indochina, 
commented extensively on these articles as he tracked the lack of desired progress while 
recommending that more be done by the French to moderate their own behavior. At first, 
Zenati proposed the idea as a means of averting a social crisis, arguing that “the smallest 
bit of injustice profoundly affects the indigène…But he is ready to follow into Gehenna 
those who give him the impression of respecting his dignity.”713 But as the months passed, 
the tone became more urgent. In a February 1941 article that was entirely censured, Zenati 
warned that Algerians were “beginning to become disenchanted, claiming that with some 
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lower functionaries, the re-establishment of authority means more strictness, more impolite 
behavior, more harassment, all of which leads to a tightening of the screw of the old 
practices.”714 Two months later, Zenati continued his criticism of the failure of the “politics 
of respect”, fearing that the National Revolution would be wasted by the many French 
Algerians who “continue to display to indigènes that air of haughty superiority and of 
contempt which always arouses troublesome reflections among Muslims.” Pagès agreed 
with the author, and feared that such behavior would spoil the “mystique of the New 
France” among Algerians. For the Prefect, the answer was to be found in the teachings of 
the highly respected colonial figure Hubert Lyautey. Since the Catholic and monarchic 
Lyautey rejected unmediated French modernity in the colonies in favor of a controlled 
modernization that relied heavily on the collaboration of local elites and French respect for 
customs and traditions, he was a perfect example for many like-minded Vichy 
adimintrators. Pagès included several quotes from the former Governor General of 
Morocco in his report as examples of the proper attitude to be carried out by the French 
administration, including an excerpt from Lyautey’s May 1921 speech in Rabat in which 
he explained that “the secret is the outstretched hand, and not the condescending hand; the 
loyal handshake between men that leads to understanding. This race is not inferior, it is 
different. Let us understand their differences as they understand our own. Let us adapt to 
each other”.715 By framing the “politics of respect” as a continuation of Lyautey’s legacy, 
                                                 
714 ANOM, Algérie, 912/135, Préfecture d’Alger, C.I.E., “L’activité indigène dans le départment 
d’Alger”, February 1941. 
715 Ibid., April 1941. 
 304 
which Zenati did as well, Pagès hoped that the idea would no longer be seen by French 
Algerians as mere weakness in front of the Algerians. 
Yet as time went by, Pagès’ reports on the lack of progress in respectful relations 
started to read as anecdotal catalogues of how firmly entrenched the French-Algerian 
contempt for Algerians remained. While the Prefect frowned at the many instances of 
insults and misunderstandings between civilians, the behavior of government functionaries 
was far more disturbing. A long complaint from May 1941 is particularly revealing of how 
difficult it was for Vichy authorities to impose respectful behavior on lower officials 
accustomed to treating Algerians harshly: 
Some low-level authorities are still, here and there, pointed out as engaging in acts 
of brutality against the indigènes. In Algiers, on May 25, a European police agent 
engaged in unjustifiable mistreatment of an ambulant merchant. In Lavigerie, April 
28, during a distribution of grain, a hundred indigènes threw stones at the Wheat 
Office building, with one European being lightly wounded. We must not see here, 
it seems, a demonstration of discontent against the Administration, but a revolt of 
indigènes against a brutal man, for whom the baton was the only argument. The 
rural policeman of Boghni (a naturalized Italian), who, having surprised, on 2 
August 1940, a young indigène bathing in the municipal wash house, brutalized 
him to such a point that he died of a ruptured spleen, was just acquitted by the Oran 
Appeals Court. The affair already had at the time caused a justified reaction in the 
Dra-el-Mizan region. One now fears that the recently rendered verdict may now 
bring up “racial justice” again. The judicial act, through racism or through a lack of 
contact with public authorities, has betrayed the government’s way of thinking.716 
On the eve of the Allied invasion of North Africa, the situation remained the same, with a 
French Municipal Councilor from Maison-Carré defending several legionaries who 
urinated on the interior wall of a Muslim cemetery as a ceremony ended, and another 
functionary reporting that “The Muslims are increasingly distancing themselves from us. 
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To tell the truth, we don’t do enough to approach them. Many colons show little 
understanding. The Municipal Administration, responsible for important contacts, lacks 
tact.”717 Despite the fact that some in the Algerian administration understood that daily 
interactions were poisoning the Vichy discourse of national unity, their efforts yielded 
little.  
The extent of the failure of local authorities to adhere to a “politics of respect” was 
highlighted by the “Zéralda Affair” in August 1942. The mayor of Zéralda, though 
possessing more contacts with republicans than rightists, placed a sign on the town’s beach 
banning Arabs and Jews after French residents complained about local Algerians collecting 
wood in the area. The sign-post, placed next to another sign banning dogs and horses, 
became a symbol of French contempt in the eyes of Algerians. In order to enforce the ban, 
the mayor led a round-up of those who had allegedly frequented the beach. Forty Algerians 
were then placed in a small basement room, where twenty-five died overnight from 
asphyxiation. As protests followed, the Director of Muslim Affairs, Augustin Berque 
feared that the case could turn into a Sorelian myth uniting Algerians against a simplified 
figure of the French colon as an enemy.718 In the end, those administrators who hoped that 
a mere change in attitude would save colonial relations were disillusioned. Yet the failure 
of Vichy to redress the economic, political, religious, and social inequality between French 
and Algerians practically guaranteed that verbal abuses would continue, especially in a 
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war-time situation in which a lack of resources heightened tensions and inspired racial 
solidary among French settlers. 
REACTIONS TO THE STRATEGY OF RESPECT AND CONTACT 
The naïveté of the politics of respect is demonstrated by the reactions of French 
settlers. Many felt that the administration was endangering the colonial status-quo; far from 
treating Algerians as equals, many settlers hoped that French authority could be asserted 
even more forcefully. Some French colons believed that the administration’s efforts to offer 
palliatives and respect to Algerians only discouraged their work ethic. As a result, even the 
hesitant and small-scale efforts made by Vichy authorities raised immediate concerns 
among French Algerians. One visitor to the countryside told a friend in France that it was 
“impossible to force them [the Algerians] to work; they know they are supported. The 
brigadier of the village gendarmerie is even going to be replaced for having lifted his hand 
against one of them.”719 The colon Jean Gandelin complained that Algerians sold their 
rations at high prices on the black market and therefore felt no need to work. Unless the 
administration re-established order, he feared he would not have enough labor for 
harvesting.720 Another could barely contain his anger, exclaiming how “Now, everything 
is for the indigènes, fabric and yarn, all out of fear that they may revolt, which is shameful, 
since the majority of them resell it all on the black market. If the higher-ups knew these 
people, they would not give them so many rights; they would not put them on the level of 
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Europeans…If they lived like us among this race, they would quickly understand that these 
people, at bottom, are still savages.”721 Similarly contemptuous views were presented in a 
speech by the president of Oran’s Chamber of Agriculture, Catroux, during the Interior 
Minister Pierre Pucheu’s visit to Algeria. Catroux reportedly gave “an outrageous 
panegyric of the Algerian colon” before attacking Algerians, “whose laziness and 
indolence he stigmatized in violent terms.” Both the French administration and Pucheu 
were upset at Catroux for alienating Algerians.722 
Indeed, those in the Direction of Muslim Affairs acknowledged the problem of 
labor shortages but tried to find different causes. One report from Algiers noted that in 
some areas of the department, up to half of manual laborers refused to work despite higher 
wages. Even attempts to withdraw ration cards failed. Though no evidence could be found, 
two possible catalysts for the unrest were identified: returning POWs spreading German 
propaganda, and Jews telling Algerians that the French took anti-Semitic measures in order 
to cut off Algerians from local credit.723 Whatever the causes, by October 1942, the DMA 
suggested that “adequate administration measures” would have to be taken to encourage 
Algerians to work.724 
For Algerians, it was not a matter of laziness or foreign influence, but of survival. 
Despite small administrative measures to raise wages, the cost of living greatly exceeded 
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purchasing power.725 A letter from Abdelkader Kroub to a family member in France 
expressed the desperation of the situation: “The workers here get paid 50 francs a day, but 
one doesn’t find many since death has taken so many. When you leave “the land of infidels” 
to come back to “the land of Islam”, you will see for yourself how you have no worries, 
whereas we have hundreds: death, lack of clothes, etc. I am very worried about the family. 
I ask you to come quickly if you don’t want to find the house empty.”726 
Other French Algerians believed that Vichy policies favored Algerians at their 
expense. A common theme was that Algerians used their rations and higher wages to buy 
up supplies. As one frustrated French Algerian remarked during a phone call, “this situation 
will finish badly if the Government continues to concern itself more with them than with 
the French. The Arabs profit too much from it.”727 Other instances raised French Algerian 
resentment at both Algerians and the administration. One mother agreed with her 
imprisoned syndicalist son that he would be freed if he were Algerian, adding that “the 
indigènes are listened to closely now, and you know that they won’t forget to let you know 
that they are more French than the French.”728 A resident of Oran feared that Algerians 
passing Europeans in ration lines indicated that they “want to become the masters again”.729 
Even an Algerian from Kabylie who appreciated the efforts of Governor-General Châtel 
remarked upon French resentment:  
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There are a number of Europeans who are spreading the idea that Algeria has never 
been so poorly governed…The Governor goes everywhere and constantly moves 
to see for himself; that doesn’t stop many French from declaring that they detest 
him, as well as the Prefect and the Mayor. Is it because these leaders are interested 
in our fate and our needs! The simple desire of our leaders to do us well allows 
others to believe that everything is going poorly. Harmony between French and 
Muslims will therefore be impossible.730 
When the administration was not blamed for encouraging Algerians, it was deemed 
negligent. A visitor to Tlemcen found the city “abominable for Europeans” since Algerians 
had allegedly become rich from black markets, and thus freed themselves from French 
control. He then warned that “It is of the highest necessity that they know in Vichy-and 
elsewhere-what danger lies ahead of us if we don’t immediately and vigorously act.”731 
It was even possible for those who questioned the French colonial hierarchy to 
credit Vichy for the alleged newfound assertiveness of Algerians. For a certain Madame 
Bidet, one episode in particular, later related to prefect Pagès, confirmed a change in social 
relations. She recounted how an Algerian who accidently bumped the head of a woman on 
a bus was called a “savage” by a nearby rider before several others defended him and 
“rightly” treated the angered French Algerian as “a Spaniard.” As this man continued to 
insult Algerians during the bus ride, several young boys “heroically defended their race” 
by responding to his charges. Mme. Bidet thought the most forceful of these boys to be “in 
effect the image of the National Revolution; one senses that we are giving a new direction 
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to the young, but it’s a little painful to admit that this was a case of a young indigène giving 
a lesson to forty-year old Europeans.”732 
APPROACHING ISLAM 
Faced with unrest and mounting criticisms of colonial abuses, French authorities 
hoped to employ the values of the National Revolution to their benefit. The favored method 
was to compare the values of the French with those of Islam. Within weeks of the fall of 
the Third Republic, the Prefect of Algiers, Marc Chevalier, already envisioned the core 
elements of such a policy shift. Citing the need to bring together the different population 
groups in Algeria with a shared set of values, the Prefect recommended those of authority, 
responsibility, discipline, and the renouncing of electoral struggles. The potential danger 
of replacing liberal values with authoritarian ones would supposedly be softened by the 
fact that “the religious and moral tendencies of the indigène masses, which subsist 
everywhere despite the corruption of customs, can…provide us with a basis for 
understanding and collaboration.” Such a strategy would entail administrative intervention 
to enforce Islamic practices: “Any measure to reform morals, any strict regulation of 
pleasures condemned by the Qurʾan (brothels, alcohol, kif, cocaine, even light 
entertainment, salacious publications, etc.) will have the greatest effect.”733  
Such a policy would also have a basis in the recent French colonial past, particularly 
in Catholic circles. The influential cardinal and Archbishop of Carthage and Algiers, 
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Charles Lavigerie (1825-1892), though rather contemptuous of Islam, believed that 
Muslims could only be successfully ruled by France if the French were to lead by example 
and demonstrate strong Catholic values.734 Similarly, the missionary Charles de Foucauld 
(1858-1916), beloved by Catholics for his work in the Algerian Sahara and eventual 
martyrdom, hoped that virtuous Catholics could eventually convince Muslims to convert 
and embrace not only a new religion, but a superior French civilization.735 Along with 
Lyautey, whose fascination for Islam was famous, these figures represented a French 
nationalist and Catholic tradition of approaching Islam. Drawing on these figures, Vichy 
Catholics could make a new play to gain Algerian loyalty, this time discarding eventual 
conversion for a broader religious understanding between Catholic French and Muslim 
Algerians. 
Though such a policy was never followed extensively during the Vichy period, 
some small steps were taken. The most successful of these was a ban on the sale of alcohol 
to Muslims promulgated in October 1941. Algerian complaints about French inaction 
regarding the regulation of alcohol, prostitution, and drugs helped inspire the measure. 
Newspaper articles, theatrical performances by scouts, and lobbying Algerians with 
connections to Vichy served as tools by concerned Algerians to pressure French 
authorities.736 The new Prefect of Algiers, Pierre Pagès, was pleased with the results of the 
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measure, exclaiming that it “satisfied the reformists, the marabout circles, mothers, the 
immense majority of those in the countryside, café owners, and even certain drinkers, who 
are happy to now be forbidden to engage in their own weakness.” A flurry of telegrams 
arrived in Vichy, thanking Pétain, and the Algiers ʿUlema leader Ṭayeb al-ʿUqbi stated in 
a meeting of reformist organizations that “the reformist leaders see in this measure the 
tangible mark of the Marshal’s concern for Muslims. The new regime has just created for 
itself an irrevocable right to their recognition”. Others were less enthusiastic. Those who 
prided themselves on their assimilation of French culture were insulted by a law that would 
legally distinguish them from the French.737 Those Algerians living in France were 
particularly upset, with many around Marseille complaining that “we are of course 
Muslims, but we want to progress and live in the twentieth century”, and asking if the 
regime “wanted to make Frenchmen of them, or for them to remain indigènes.”738 
Furthermore, the application of the law ran into difficulties. Algerians who had renounced 
their personal status in favor of French civil law could no longer consume alcohol, and 
petitioned the administration to make an exception. On the other hand, in Kabylie, the law 
was not applied to those who were legally French citizens, but no longer Muslim. In an 
attempt to clear the legal clutter and address a variety of complaints, Pagès suggested that 
naturalized French and those wearing European dress be excepted.739 The prohibition 
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measure thus served as a microcosm for the fundamental problem facing Vichy authorities: 
any favoritism shown towards an Islamic or secular French identity for Algerians would 
raise protests from an important segment of society. 
Other small measures were meant to demonstrate the newfound French respect for 
Islam. Before leaving to run the Seine-et-Oise department in September 1940, Chevalier 
encouraged French civil and military authorities to attend and foster the success of local 
Islamic festivals and pilgrimages so as to impress the rural population and “maybe discover 
some aspects of the indigène soul.”740 While it is unclear if local authorities followed 
through on Chevalier’s suggestions, some efforts were made by the most influential 
figures. In January 1941, the Governor-General Abrial embarked on a week-long tour of 
Southern Algeria to gather information, which the Italian consul Arrivabene suspected was 
a means of engaging in Muslim propaganda, since Abrial visited mosques and even prayed 
at the tomb of a local Muslim saint.741 Abrial’s successor, Yves Châtel, showed similar 
signs of respect. When visiting a madrasa in Constantine, he told its students that “It’s 
wrong to believe that Islam is definitively static. It’s not possible to satisfy oneself with 
contemplating the past. The Prophet never taught that. There are two cultures here that 
unify and complete each other: Arab and French. Be good Arabs in order to be good 
Frenchmen.”742 Afterwards, the residents of Oum El Bouaghi fêted Châtel, as the village 
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was “decked out” with “the lively colors of Islam gleaming aside tricolor flags”. In his 
speech, the Governor-General exhorted both French and Algerians to remain fixed solidly 
to the land, and to celebrate the “patriotism of the bell tower” and the “patriotism of the 
minaret”.743 Even if such efforts provided a certain local effect, they did little to assuage 
the concerns of more politically engaged Algerians that Vichy could not match rhetoric 
with actions. 
Yet Châtel’s speech also revealed another element of the Vichy-era appeal to 
Algerian Muslims. Like Abrial and Weygand before him, Châtel was a fervent Catholic, 
and thus hoped to speak to Muslims not as representatives of a secular state, but as 
believers. Despite admitting his lack of knowledge of Islam, even Pétain sought to present 
himself to Algerians as a Godly man. After meeting Pétain in June 1941, the Algerian 
National Councilor Ibnou Zekri wrote an article describing the head of state’s “infinite 
faith in God” and his desire to learn more about a faith he found similar to Christianity. 
Pétain’s message for Algerians was that “You will not be true Frenchmen unless you are 
true Muslims”.744 In a conference in the same month, Pierre Mesnard, a philosophy 
professor at the University of Algiers, proclaimed his hope that by “showing the true face 
of Christian France”, the two communities could remain distinct while being “conscious 
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of their spiritual parentage.”745 French authorities even felt that it was a good idea to invite 
Muslims to participate in the 11 May 1942 national holiday for Joan of Arc. Though Pagès 
feared that Joan’s sainthood could upset those following “pure Islam”, he also felt that the 
Muslim members on a committee for the erection of a statue to the heroine in Blida was 
“an undeniable sign” of Islam’s ability to evolve.746 As for Christians accepting Islam, the 
Algiers prefect believed that Lyautey had established the doctrine of respect, and 
recognized that the conversion of mosques into churches during the conquest of Algeria 
still alienated Muslims, yet did not offer much in the way of meaningful steps to take to 
redress such grievances.747 
Ramadan also served as an occasion for the administration to show its interest in 
aiding Muslims.  In Algiers in 1941, the French hoped extra rations of sugar, semolina, 
gas, and electricity, as well as bans on gambling, singing, and dancing by women in public 
would cultivate more loyalty among Algerians. Though Pagès hoped that the occasion 
could also be used to pardon political prisoners, no action was authorized, to the 
disappointment of the Algerian population.748 
When engaging Muslim religious figures, the administration had two broad 
choices. The first was to stick to the traditional intermediaries, commonly grouped by the 
French under the term marabouts. In rural areas, the marabouts represented local forms of 
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Islam distinguished by idiosyncratic features according to the region. But by the Vichy 
period, service as mediators for the French had greatly diminished the authority of the 
marabouts in the eyes of many Algerians. In the 1930s, the ʿUlema, a group of reformers 
dedicated to modernizing Islam and purifying it from its local and historical accretions 
began to fill the void left by the marabouts. With the founding of the Association of 
Algerian Muslim ʿUlema in 1931, the reformist movement made steady gains thanks in 
large part to its leader ʿAbd al-Ḥamid Ben Badis, who adroitly combined religious 
reformism with Algerian nationalism. With the death of Ben Badis in 1940, the leadership 
of the Association fell to Bashir al-Ibrahimi, despite his being placed under house arrest by 
the administration in April.749 While Ben Badis and al-Ibrahimi were based in Constantine 
and Oran respectively, another ʿUlema leader held sway in Algiers: Ṭayeb al-ʿUqbi (1890-
1960). Yet unlike the others, al-ʿUqbi was more conciliatory to the French administration, 
generally taking more moderate positions than his companions throughout the 1930s, 
culminating in 1939 with his departure from the Association of ʿUlema he helped found. It 
is possible that after being accused of the murder of the Mufti of Algiers in 1936, a crime 
of which he was found innocent, al-ʿUqbi hoped to distance himself from a movement that 
the French authorities held in suspicion.750 Though his softer approach kept him somewhat 
excluded from the mainstream of the ʿUlema movement, he still exercised a notable 
influence in Algiers, with his own paper, al-Iṣlah, and charity organization, al-Khayria.751 
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During the Vichy years, al-ʿUqbi hoped working with the new, authoritarian regime 
would lead to changes in favor of the reformist program for Algerian Islam. In October 
1940, al-ʿUqbi wrote a heavily censured article calling for greater freedom of preaching 
and teaching for the ʿUlema, since only those authorized by the French could do so.752 In 
December, al-ʿUqbi appealed to the pro-Catholic Vichy measures as a precedent for 
Islamic religious freedom in Algeria, demanding that the granting of “freedom for Catholic 
education” should be extended to the ʿUlema.753 Though he had no success with this 
particular cause, which was dear to the ʿUlema, al-ʿUqbi continued to emphasize the 
religious values of the National Revolution as a means of aligning ʿUlema interests with 
those of the French administration. During a gathering of Algiers ʿUlema supporters in 
November 1941, al-ʿUqbi thanked the regime for banning the sale of alcohol to Algerian 
Muslims, and defended his relationship with the administration by pointing out that his 
organizations were helping indigent Algerians. Furthermore, the ʿUlema leader claimed 
that the New State “constituted the safe-guard of religion and Islamic traditions.”754 
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Not only could such statements put al-ʿUqbi on good terms with French authorities, 
they could also serve as a wedge between the administration and the marabouts. In the 
annual celebration for his al-Khayria organization, and in front of an audience of five 
thousand, al-ʿUqbi continued to highlight the similarities between Islam and the values of 
the National Revolution, while suggesting that Governor Châtel should not only visit 
marabout sites as a testament to his respect for Islam, but al-Khayria as well: 
The words spoken by Governor-General Châtel during his visit to the Zawiya of 
El-Hamel, are in our hearts, and we have a special gratitude for him. “Your 
religion”, he said, “is not at all static, as we sometimes are made to believe. There 
is not a single text in the Qurʾan that condemns evolution. A Muslim can, without 
denying his faith, be as modern as a Catholic. Religion unites, it does not divide…” 
That, in effect, is the precise definition of Islam, as we have said for many years. I 
give grateful homage to the intellectual probity with which the Governor-General 
was able to, with these words, restore the true face of Islam, by removing the veil 
of superstitions, of ignorance, and prejudices with which others strive to mask it. 
Islam is, in effect, as we have always said, a religion of harmony, of progress, of 
civilization. As for us, we no longer want to recognize Orthodox, schismatics, or 
confraternity brothers, but just Muslims. Likewise, in the national framework, we 
only want to see the French all united, all free. Harmony, union, equality, this is 
what we call for and will not cease to call for; and we have faith that our venerable 
leader, Marshal Pétain, will grant us this, since this fraternal union, this equality 
without hesitation, is in his doctrine as it is in ours.755 
By reading Châtel’s description of Islam as an endorsement of the modernizing project of 
the ʿUlema, al-ʿUqbi hoped to push the administration away from the marabouts. Al-ʿUqbi 
also clearly rejected the racial aspects of Vichy policy by asserting his desire for equality 
in Algeria. The attempts to cozy up to the administration, even while maintaining a certain 
independence, were not limited to al-ʿUqbi’s speeches and articles. On 9 October 1942, the 
students of the Belcourt ʿUlema school performed several scenes from Molière’s Les 
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Femmes Savantes in Arabic before an audience of eight hundred, including “high 
authorities”. The evening concluded with the singing of the Vichy song, “Maréchal, nous 
voilà!”.756 
Despite al-ʿUqbi’s willingness to work with the regime, and to publicly endorse its 
authoritarian and conservative values, his support was not uncritical. Not only did he 
unceasingly push for the loosening of the administration’s grip on religious preaching and 
education, but he also refused to back Vichy’s anti-Semitic legislation. For al-ʿUqbi, such 
racial legislation could only serve to strengthen the exclusionary policies and practices 
directed at Algerian Muslims. Though al-ʿUqbi could support certain Vichy values, any 
that threatened the equality of Muslims to the French was inadmissible. Consequently, al-
ʿUqbi’s relationship to the administration should be seen as a careful attempt to balance 
different possibilities of the National Revolution with the needs of his organization and 
followers in a time of extreme scarcity and harsh repression. Indeed, when defending his 
actions at an al-Khayria event, al-ʿUqbi pointed to the administration’s helpful actions (out 
of 70,000 francs raised in a charity drive, Châtel and the Direction of Muslim Affairs had 
provided 15,000), and to his influence on the appreciated alcohol ban.757 
Between Châtel’s speeches and al-ʿUqbi’s rhetoric supporting the values of the 
National Revolution, there seemed to be a possible point of convergence between Vichy 
officials and moderate ʿUlema. However, the lack of any strong action from the French, 
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either in the form of a liberalization of laws geared towards controlling Algerian Islam, or 
in a clear favoring of the modernizing project of the ʿUlema and a rejection of the 
marabouts, meant that little had changed. Though a figure like Pagès recognized that al-
ʿUqbi was critical to the maintenance of order,758 this, and not reform, was the primary 
goal of Vichy administrators. As such, beyond small measures like the ban on alcohol, the 
Catholic authorities who hoped to use religion as a point of contact with Algerians largely 
failed. 
HARDY’S RURAL EDUCATION CENTERS 
The task of educational reform was taken up by the Rector of the Académie 
d’Alger, Georges Hardy. An enthusiastic supporter of the National Revolution,759 Hardy 
had long been a critic of French secular universalism in favor of recognizing local traditions 
and customs. Hardy’s career as an educational director in French West Africa and director 
of Public Instruction in Morocco had given him ample time to formulate his rightist view 
of colonialism. Though Hardy rejected Orientalist views of North Africans, he also 
maintained that their unique culture and ways of life could account for the behavior of all 
North Africans. Furthermore, he asserted that Europeans could only understand the 
colonized through an intuitive understanding; any rational analysis would lead to false 
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analogies with Europe and a faith in possible assimilation.760 For Hardy, non-European 
societies and cultures were completely incommensurable. Education then, would ideally 
conform to local needs. Instead of a universal European education that promised 
assimilation, Hardy advocated schools that focused on practical economic tasks and 
instilling strong moral values based on local traditions and religions.761 With a Vichy 
regime that did not need to pay lip service to republican values of universalism, the Rector 
had a new opportunity to put his faith in educational policies in place. 
Hardy presented his overall plan to address the Algerian education crisis to the 
Association of Muslim Students on 28 June 1941, secure in his knowledge that his program 
had already received the backing of Governor-General Abrial. Hardy faced a tall task as 
few Algerian children received an education; in 1936, only 17.2% of Algerian boys and 
1.3% of girls frequented French schools, which were mostly concentrated in urban areas.762 
Hardy began by addressing several concerns of the Algerian students, arguing that the lack 
of schools was due to budget shortfalls, and not French disinterest in young Algerians. 
Since the current rate of educational expansion would take two centuries to provide all 
Algerians with a standardized education, Hardy suggested an alternative. The first step 
would be to ensure that all urban Algerians would be educated, since this was a site of 
potential social instability. Furthermore, he hoped that Qurʾanic schools would be 
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supported by the administration as long as they added French to their curriculums. The key 
to ensuring urban education was a restriction on migration from the over-populated 
countryside. To that end, Hardy moved to the heart of his proposal: the Rural Education 
Centers (Centres ruraux d’éducation, CRE). 
The primary goal of the CRE was to slow down migration to the cities by improving 
the rural economy. As Hardy put it to his audience, “Undoubtedly it is necessary to teach 
him [the young rural] how to read and write, but it is above all necessary to fix him 
[l’enraciner] to the land that nourishes him.” The danger with a comprehensive education 
was that “after five or six years of schooling, the children burn to use their knowledge. Too 
many of them, between the field and the desk lose the paternal tradition and are lost to 
society. This is not unique to Algeria…” For Hardy, it was imperative to employ a practical 
education to stem the tide surging towards the Algerian coast. Consequently, his plan called 
for the creation of four hundred CRE every year for fifty years, until rural Algeria was 
covered with a dense network that would provide a practical education for all while 
improving the rural economy. Costs would be kept down by eschewing proper school 
buildings and desks in favor of suitable existing buildings and carpets. Furthermore, the 
teachers would come from the cities, thus “reducing the number of unemployed 
intellectuals”. Over time, the CRE would be converted into normal schools like those in 
the cities. Presumably, this process would only begin after fifty years. The emergency 
measure to contain the immediate social crisis would provide plenty of time for France to 
shore up its political strength. As a result, the CRE plan was a grand scheme to fix the 
Algerian social crisis that threatened the entire colonial system. 
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The establishment of a network of CRE schools would fit in nicely to the broader 
Vichy modernization project. Inspired by the need to either prepare France for entry into 
the war on the side of the Allies, or to find a place within a German-dominated Europe, 
Vichy leaders like Weygand and Darlan pushed for a large-scale industrialization of 
Algeria. The purpose, according to Weygand, would largely be political; only large-scale 
economic reforms would raise the living standards of Algerians and restore social stability. 
Industrialization did not mean that the regime hoped to attract Algerians to the cities, since 
one goal was to counter the growing Algerian population by drawing in French industrial 
workers to Algerian coastal cities. In terms of agricultural reform, the project of René 
Martin, a government engineer, proposed the expropriation of 20,000 hectares of land that 
would benefit from improved irrigation. Fifteen hundred Algerian families would then 
move on to 5000 hectares, with the rest reserved for 1000 French families. Yet even this 
small step took time to get off the ground, and was later shelved under the Allied-sponsored 
Governor Giraud, who judged it to be “antirepublican”.763 The CRE program offered an 
alternative approach to rural reform that relied less on direct state intervention, instead 
favoring education as a means of improving Algerian agricultural yields.  
During his speech to Algerian students, Hardy also noted that the general idea of 
the CRE was not new, since an early attempt had occurred between 1908 and 1914, but 
without much support. Hardy himself had hoped to revive the idea in 1936, a “poorly 
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chosen year” given the victory of the Popular Front and the brief hopes for a more 
progressive reform platform. But with Vichy authorities in place, Hardy’s idea was well-
received. The CRE’s goal fit perfectly into the rural side of Vichy discourse, as Hardy 
demonstrated when he concluded by proclaiming that “We must renounce providing the 
habitual encyclopedic and theoretical education. The educational value of manual labor is 
recognized today. This way we will rediscover, as Marshal Pétain said, ‘the solid virtues 
that have given the fatherland its strength and longevity’”.764 The Governor-General 
Abrial, who approved of the program, highlighted its suitability to Vichy goals by 
proclaiming that the two most important aspects of the CRE would be to “touch the masses, 
and not just the elites”, and to “conserve, through improvements, the traditional way of life 
of the young rural.”765 
Experimental CRE got off to a shaky start. In the Mixed-Commune of Marnia, the 
administrator reported that construction of a suitable building was difficult since both labor 
and materials were lacking. Furthermore, the subsidy given by the Governor-General 
arrived late and did not cover the costs.766 Similar problems plagued the Mixed-Commune 
of Nedroma, where the success of a first CRE was difficult to replicate.767 Other practical 
issues arose. In the Commune of Aïn-Kial, the Mayor warned that housing the CRE three 
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kilometers away from the village, presumably to take advantage of the plot of land 
available to the school, would prevent many from attending.768 Governor-General Châtel 
tried to put the lack of resources in perspective, instructing that the facilities should be as 
simple as possible, so as not to tempt students to “leave their village, their family, and the 
agricultural work that must be theirs.”769 And though Châtel instructed mayors and 
administrators to find resources and labor wherever possible, and according to local 
possibilities,770 the establishment of new CRE encountered far more obstacles than Hardy 
predicted. Indeed, while Hardy’s original plan called for the annual creation of four 
hundred CRE, by September 1942, only ninety-three had opened.771 Meanwhile, al-ʿUqbi, 
who had met with Hardy personally in 1941 to discuss educational reforms, and who 
supported the CRE program, wrote in al-Iṣlah that the reform had so far remained just a 
project before exclaiming that “there must finally be actions.”772 The failure of the CRE 
demonstrates the inability of the French administration to carry out a large-scale reform 
that was highly-suited to Vichy principles. But there were still other tools to win over 
Algerian youth, who served as a natural political target for rightist figures who for years 
had taken an interest in the role of youth groups as ideological training grounds. 
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CONTROLLING ALGERIAN NATIONALISM: THE SCOUT MOVEMENT 
French scout groups that emphasized discipline, community, sacrifice, work, and 
patriotism served as useful resources for Vichy. Yet Muslim scout groups constituted a 
critical field of nationalist contestation in Vichy Algeria. The same values in such groups 
could be employed to promote Algerian, not French patriotism. As Kaddache writes, “the 
[scout] movement had a clear political dimension, for scouts implicitly offered the 
observation of Islamic principles and ‘fidelity to country’, in short to nationalism…”773 
And for colonial administrators, the number of those involved was not insignificant: by 
June 1941, the number of Muslim scouts was estimated to fall between 2500 and 3000, 
including around 400 belonging to pro-French groups. For those in the Direction of Muslim 
Affairs, all the other organizations were, “a simple instrument in the hands of political 
parties, keen on using the most modern and proven means of propaganda.” 774 French 
administrators understood they were in a bind: taking direct control of Algerian scout 
groups would alienate most participants, while suppressing them would create new forms 
of an “exacerbated nationalism”.775  
The visiting representative for the Scouts de France, André Noël, offered a proposal 
for integrating Muslim scouts into French organizations through a unified French North 
African scout institution. However, French Algerian officials shot down the plan, fearing 
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that unifying Muslim scout groups across North Africa would lead to greater political 
instability. Even allowing for such a concentration in Algeria was considered dangerous. 
The competing plan argued for local interactions in order to ensure that scout leaders were 
loyal and willing to slowly integrate their groups into larger French organizations. Loyal 
groups would be encouraged not by the administration, but by Algerians as 
intermediaries.776 This second plan, more cautious and flexible, was the favored method 
for dealing with Algerian scout groups for the remainder of the Vichy period. French 
records from the Department of Oran indicate that the application of such a program was 
far from simple for French administrators, with ample opportunities for a variety of 
political actors to make competing claims. 
In the department of Oran, there were two competing Algerian scout organizations. 
The larger of the two, the Scouts Musulmans Algériens (SMA), under the larger Fédération 
des Scouts Musulmans Algériens, caused considerable concern among the French. In May 
1941, the French executed the head of the Federation, Muhammad Bourras, for passing 
sensitive documents on to German officials while on a trip to Vichy to learn about scout 
organizations.777 A new bureau sought to calm French fears by placing the trusted loyalist 
and National Councilor, Abderrahmane Boukerdenna as president, with the respected 
moderate reformer Ferhat Abbas as vice-president. The Algiers prefecture was not so 
confident, calling Boukerdenna a means of “covering” the organization from the 
administration, since the councilor allegedly had “neither the taste, nor the pleasure to 
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occupy himself, even from afar, with the Muslim Scouts”.778 Likewise, the administration 
in Oran was wary of the Federation’s SMA groups in Oran, Tlemcen, Marnia, Nedroma, 
and Mascara, with a total membership of around 260. The competing group, the Eclaireurs 
Musulmans Algériens (EMA) appeared more apolitical to the administration, and met with 
more support, though it only had one group of 80 members in Oran.779 
The SMA and EMA competed in the city of Oran, with French administrators trying 
to figure out if either could be loyal. In May 1941, the EMA accused the SMA of getting 
some of their members drunk so as to steal the keys to their meeting place and telling other 
EMA members that their group has been dissolved. More seriously, the Vice-President of 
the EMA group, Aberrahmane Mehani warned the police that the local SMA leaders were 
PPA activists. Given French fears that even innocuous organizations likely harbored 
nationalist intentions, they sought to be careful in choosing sides. Mehani himself was a 
member of the fascist PPF, though he claimed he was not using the EMA as a vehicle for 
PPF propaganda, but simply to counter the PPA.780 Though the French believed Mehani, 
some Muslims were suspicious of his PPF past. One rejected a recruitment attempt since 
he thought Mehani’s group “must have a political goal” as a result of his PPF 
connections.781 The other Oran EMA leader, Bashir Merad Boudia, was a former PPA 
member. In order to convince authorities of his loyalty, Merad Boudia wrote a letter to 
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Governor-General Abrial in which he confessed his mistakes and recounted his conversion 
to the “National Revolution” since Pétain would help people “without distinctions of race 
and religion”. According to Merad Boudia, his former PPA associates sent him death 
threats thanks to his support of the pro-French EMA.782 Perhaps because of such 
professions of loyalty, coupled with the EMA’s position against the PPA, the French were 
inclined to provide a small and secret gift of 1000 francs. Such support had little effect 
though, as the Oran EMA group was riven by internal squabbles between Mehani and 
Merad Boudia. By the summer of 1942, the French officer responsible for overseeing the 
group decided that support had to be withdrawn until they could be more sure of the EMA’s 
effectiveness and of their loyalty.783 
Even the SMA contested the notion that they served as a training ground for 
nationalists. In a circular in February 1942, the Federation heads defended their group, 
arguing that they had dismissed several controversial members and highlighted some of 
the songs sung by their members, including ones dedicated to service, Muhammad, and to 
Pétain.784 An intercepted letter from an SMA member in Marnia shows that the group wrote 
pro-French campfire scenes to be acted out.785 Such efforts to paint the SMA as a 
manifestation of Pétainist values did not assuage French fears. In Tlemcen, a particularly 
strong SMA group, called “al-Mansourah” (Victorious), inspired an effort by the French 
                                                 
782 ANOM, Départment d’Oran, 5I/91, F. Scouts Musulmans, Bachir Merad Boudia to Abrial, 
15 May 1941. 
783 Ibid., N. 399, C.I.E., “A/S du groupement scout des éclaireurs musulans algériens d’Oran”, 
27 July 1942.  
784 Ibid., F. Scouts-Musulmans, Lettre Circulaire N. 109, 1 February 1942. 
785 Ibid., N. 1900, “Etat d’esprit chez les Scouts Musulmans”, 10 July 1942. 
 330 
Orientalist Philippe Marçais to create an alternative organization that would rest firmly in 
French hands.  The al-Mansourah group even held an event at the municipal stadium with 
French administrators and scouts present in order to build trust. After “patriotic speeches”, 
and songs in Arabic, the troop performed several short scenes, one of which attacked the 
hazards of drinking, a theme that would have pleased Vichy administrators after their ban 
on alcohol for Algerians.786 But the French nevertheless believed the group supported the 
PPA; such suspicions appeared to be confirmed when leaders were told to teach members 
about “the conquest of Algeria by French imperialism”.787 As such, claims to loyalty no 
longer held much weight with the French. In a report on al-Mansourah based on Marçais’ 
analysis, Muslim scouts were said to seemingly form in “the framework of the National 
Revolution which bases its hopes on youth” while appearing “impartial, honest, and 
properly French.” Yet their leaders were the same figures that espoused Algerian 
nationalism in movements that “the New France no longer wants”.788 As a result, more 
direct efforts had to be made to intervene and remove nationalist influences. 
In Tlemcen, Marçais helped create a new loyalist scout group, chosen among local 
students. The most promising went to a leadership camp at al-Riath, so as to serve as pro-
French scout leaders in the future. After a year of competing with al-Mansourah, Marçais 
and others hoped to raise the membership of their group to forty, while starting similar 
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groups in other towns in Oran.789 An attempt by al-Mansourah to create a branch in 
Nedroma largely failed, as the local administration placed several Europeans on the 
committee to watch over their practices. By late 1942, the small group was isolated from 
outside influences and entirely under French control.790 Furthermore, three of its best 
members were to be invited to al-Riath.791 By sending loyal Muslims to al-Riath for 
training, the French hoped to create a new, technically trained scout leadership that would 
replace that of nationalists. When the president of the SMA federation suggested four 
members from Oran to attend, two were rejected for being “politically suspect”.792 French 
administrators hoped then that new leadership, coupled with administrative supervision 
would moderate or eliminate nationalist tendencies. 
This was a difficult strategy to enact. In Lourmel, Algerians lobbying for the 
creation of a scout group ran into the opposition of the mayor. The chief administrator, 
fearing a radicalization of the youth if their demands were rejected, worked with the 
Direction of Muslim Affairs in Oran to assist the budding scouts despite the wishes of the 
mayor. The new group was then strictly controlled by administrators and associated with a 
local Catholic scout group instead of the SMA or EMA federations.793 Yet by January 
1942, the president of the newly constituted group had already resigned, citing “as much 
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discouragement in the results as in Muslim morality”.794 In the case of Lourmel, the 
assistance of the French could not inspire the same lively spirit that animated the more 
nationalist scout groups such as al-Mansourah. 
Vichy attempts to control scout groups therefore proved to be a cat-and-mouse 
game wherein pro-French and pro-Algerian groups attempted to work within their political 
and discursive limitations while positioning their organizations as the most influential. And 
while the French could claim a certain degree of success in forcing the more nationalist 
groups to often outwardly expound upon the virtues of the National Revolution, they were 
largely unable to gain control of such groups. There was, however, one last means of 
forming a substantial group of pro-French, Algerian youth. 
TRAINING YOUTH:  THE CHANTIERS DE JEUNESSE 
The Chantiers de Jeunesse, or Youth Camps, was a prominent Vichy program 
aimed at instilling the values of work, military discipline, camaraderie, and sacrifice into 
French youth. Service was a requirement for French youth, who lived out in the 
countryside, engaging in farming and forestry work for periods of up to eight months. Only 
days after the 18 January 1941 law establishing the Chantiers de Jeunesse in Algeria, the 
question of a possible extension to North African Muslims became an important issue.795 
On 24 March 1941, a commission to study the inclusion of Algerians in the Chantiers met. 
Led by Augustin Berque, one of Vichy’s foremost experts on Muslim policy, the 
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commission sought to establish the foundations for an effective encadrement of young 
Algerians into a prized institution of the National Revolution. Its report highlighted the 
need for caution, since, as the commission reported, “in Muslim countries, every 
innovation must be a success”. In contrast to French youth, Algerians would be asked to 
join voluntarily instead of by compulsion. Those that accepted would then be split up into 
two groups: “evolués” incorporated with the French, and “la masse” of fellahs and artisans. 
Though the former would not come from cities, given the prevalence of anti-French 
sentiment in urban spaces, they would be expected to understand the true meaning of the 
Chantiers as a social institution. For the rural participants, the experience would serve to 
teach more modern economic techniques; “to ameliorate their quality of life without 
uprooting them”. A strict surveillance of the operation would be carried out by French 
administrators and loyal Algerian veterans.796 
Shortly after, the Algerian Governor General Abrial summed up the commission’s 
findings to Admiral Darlan, putting particular emphasis on the fact that the Chantiers “must 
not uproot the indigène and tear him from his previous life. On the contrary, it is through 
the return or retention in their milieu of the youth shaped by our methods that our actions 
will bear fruit”.797 This form of Algerian education would be strictly in line with Vichy 
values. A month later, Weygand stressed the limited and experimental nature of the project 
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to Pétain, hoping the proposed decree could be passed quickly.798 At the same time, the 
Minister of National Education and Youth, Jérôme Carcopino suggested that if successful, 
the program could be extended to 60,000 to 80,000 Algerians, and that a specific school to 
train a small cadre of Algerians to be Chantier leaders should be established.799 
Despite these early conversations, almost a full year passed before a decree finally 
extended the Chantiers to Algerians. With the new Governor General, Yves Châtel, the 
program finally moved towards implementation. A commission led by Châtel and the head 
of the CdJ, General de la Porte du Theil met in May 1942 to establish a schedule and basic 
norms. Starting in July 1942, 55 volunteers would spend three months at the Ecole des 
Chefs in Fort-de-l’Eau in order to take on leadership positions. The members of this camp, 
and other smaller leadership training programs, would largely be chosen among college 
educated Algerians and sons of loyal qaḍis.800 At the same time, another hundred 
volunteers would begin an eight-month stage along with French youth. These in turn would 
be shifted to leadership roles in the Chantier groups for 1400 rural Algerians in October.801 
                                                 
798 Ibid., “Le General Commandant en Chef Weygand à Monsieur le Maréchal de France”, N. 
2.385, 15 May 1941. 
799 Ibid., “Rapport sur la formation des groupements indigènes”, Secrétariat d’Etat à l’éducation 
nationale et à la jeunesse. Carcopino also suggested that if the Germans had any problems with 
the inclusion of Algerians, the expansion could be framed as aiding the Eurafrica project. “Le 
Secretaire d’Etat à l’Education Nationale et à la Jeunesse à Monsieur le Ministre Secrétaire d’Etat 
à l’Interieur” N. 2.274. 
800 ANOM, Préfecture de Constantine B/3/678, F. Chantiers de la Jeunesse Musulmans, “Listes 
d’adresses de jeunes musulmans pouvant être invités à effectuer un stage d’information à l’école 
de Fort-de-l’Eau”, 24 April 1942. 
801 ANOM, 92501, Commune de Marnia //30, “Le Gouverneur General de l’Algerie à Messieurs 
les Préfets”, N. 1395, 5 June 1942. AN, AJ 36/69, “Note concernant l’organisation des chantiers 
musulmans en Algérie”, N. 548 D/1, 20 May 1942. 
 335 
With such a schedule, the program could be initiated in a conservative and tightly 
controlled manner before being expanded to all Algerian youth. Other preparatory notes 
asserted the importance of the Chantiers as a means of indoctrinating young Algerian 
intellectuals and elites into the values of the National Revolution, since they were the most 
likely to initiate and spread anti-French propaganda, as well as the need to avoid charges 
of favoring Algerian Jews over Muslims, since the former already had a special Chantiers 
group in Djidjelli.802 
Though the plan for the Muslim Chantiers was still in its infancy when the Allied 
occupation ended Vichy’s North African influence, the early preparation stages can still 
give us an idea of how Vichy intended to form an Algerian elite while keeping “the masses” 
tied to the land. One of its central challenges was employing Islam as a traditional rather 
than a nationalist force. The careful balance began with the name of the organization: in 
June 1942 the regional CdJ commissar expressed concern to Châtel that “Chantiers 
Indigènes” was too pejorative, while the inclusion of the word “Muslim” would 
“emphasize a religious character that is possibly not in our interest to underline”, while 
excluding those in the group that may not be Muslim. Châtel therefore imposed the 
appellation of “Chantiers de la Jeunesse Francaise, Groupement musulman”.803 While 
planners expected to provide Imams and respect Islamic traditions regarding food, the 
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value system would focus on the standard Vichy concerns: virility, loyalty, patriotism, 
camaraderie, discipline. The distinction between French and Algerian groups had to rest 
on religion, since doing so by race would be politically unsound. At the same time, focusing 
on religion could play into the hands of the feared Pan-Islamic nationalists. As a result, the 
administration had to limit religion to a largely symbolic role in the camps. The decision 
to create a separate camp regimen for Algerians did not sit well with many, including those 
willing to work with the Vichy regime. One Algerian in Oran, after many consultations, 
recommended that urban Algerians be included as equals with the French, while the rural 
camps could be separate since their goal was to create a skilled rural elite while also 
extending a weak educational system.804 Informants reported that while most Algerians 
were indifferent to the news of the Chantiers program, the educated youth were 
disillusioned by yet another sign that the French regime was unwilling to treat them as 
equals.805 
An early experiment in training Algerian elites seems to have gone smoothly 
enough: thirty-five Algerians gathered at El-Riath for two weeks in the summer of 1941 
where they experienced an education focusing on sports and athleticism, agriculture, and 
the values of the “National Revolution”. An intercepted letter by one participant must have 
pleased French police, as the young Algerian spoke enthusiastically of a “spirit of 
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camaraderie pushed to its highest degree as we truly feel ourselves to be a family”.806 The 
more comprehensive leadership camps that began in 1942 dealt more fully with the 
question of how to balance respecting Algerians while placing them firmly under 
nationalistic French influence. A guide to a training period running from November 1942 
to January 1943 provides some clues as to what compromises were made. Over the training 
period, participants would undergo 415 hours of education, of which 64 were dedicated to 
Arabic. The subjects of Muslim sociology, Arab literature, Arab History and Muslim Art, 
and Islam in the World combined for another 46 hours. In order to ensure that such lessons 
did not detract too greatly from French influence, 22 hours were assigned to subjects 
relating to the French Empire and its greatest figures. The assignment of French Algerian 
Orientalists such as Philippe Marçais and Georges-Henri Bousquet to teach several 
conferences demonstrates the perceived importance of the Algerian elite camp.807 Though 
someone like Marçais could have a sincere interest in protecting Islam, it is notable that 
Algerian experts only served as guest speakers, on subjects like the “mission of Muslim 
intellectual elites” by a member of the National Council, Ibnou Zekri, and “France in the 
Hejaz and the Pilgrimage”.808 
Thanks to a collection of intercepted letters from both French and Algerian camp 
participants, it is possible to see how the Chantiers functioned as a tool of social and 
                                                 
806 ANOM, Départment d’Oran 5I/91, F. Ecole des cadres à El Riath, N. 3.464, “Opinion sur 
l’Ecole des Cadres d’El Riath”, 28 July 1941. 
807 A less well-known figure at the time, Louis Joxe, was also scheduled to teach. Later, as a 
Gaullist, he would negotiate with the FLN at the end of the Algerian War. 
808 ANOM, GGA, Algérie, 9H/39, Ecole Regionale de Chefs des Chantiers de la Jeunesse de 
l’Afrique du Nord, Fort-de-L’eau, Stage de Formation Islamique, October 1942. 
 338 
political cohesion under the aegis of the National Revolution. Expectations among the 
French youth were high. One believed that by “suffusing Muslim youth with French 
spirit… it appears we are opening the most important page in the last one hundred years of 
Algerian history.”809 After a few days the responses were more mixed. Emile Riboute 
wrote that “our first contact with the Muslims was quite nice…and we can hope to work 
together well.” Another French participant was less enthusiastic, remarking that “Our 
Muslim comrades are not disagreeable people, but as time passes one tends to find them 
inferior”.810 Although French Algerians were stationed somewhat apart from the Algerians 
and metropolitan French, some were quite opposed to Algerian participation. One was 
concerned that “they always want to steal, and we now have to watch over our things”, 
while another was confident that the “very soft” metropolitans would “soon understand 
their race” once in contact with Algerians.811 
Even among the metropolitan French, many of whom hoped to establish good 
relations with the Algerians, results were mixed. One youth thought the Algerians 
“altogether quite swell comrades. One of them who often receives provisions shares them 
with us”. Another was perplexed at studying “such a bizarre mentality”, while others were 
more forthright in their negative assessments. One determined that “their race has many 
flaws”, while another remarked that they were inveterate liars. More thoughtful evaluations 
came from a certain Charrier, who explained that “with the Muslims all is going well. They 
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are rather withdrawn, but are quite agreeable with us despite everything, since they 
understand that we have something to teach them.” Charrier then expressed a fear that the 
controlled homo-erotic nature of camp culture would be lost on the Algerians, writing that 
“Evidently we cannot treat them with great camaraderie, as they are very sexual types and 
the worst catastrophes would occur.”812 Yet, Charrier was also impressed by the Algerians’ 
religious dedication, calling them “determined believers” whose religion was “not as bad 
as one often says”.813 
One strategy of the French youth was to strongly assert their hierarchical authority. 
Bonelli, a camp leader from Marseille charged with helping to train Algerians, sent a letter 
to his parents summarizing his opinions. Bonelli believed that he had to gain their respect 
through fair treatment and unquestionable moral values, since the “Arab watches, and is 
on the lookout for the smallest gesture…justice is sacred in their eyes…ninety-nine good 
acts are annulled by a bad one, rendering work difficult for us metropolitans.” As a result, 
Bonelli believed that a show of “moral superiority”, as well as “firm discipline” was 
necessary to maintain his authority over the Algerian youth. Yet he also admitted that “the 
Arab called ‘évolué’ remains ‘man’, with all his faculties, his soul, and his heart”, and 
complained that those who lacked respect for Algerians risked viewing the French as 
superior in every area.814 
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Despite figures like Bonelli and Charrier who appear to have desired fair treatment, 
others found that the experience proved the necessity of French domination. One 
metropolitan French participant wrote that “putting Muslims on the same level of equality 
as the metropolitans is an error. Why? Because they are excessively proud, and in a short 
time, will believe themselves superior to us. Fortunately, by our conduct and dynamism, 
we greatly outclass them, but they are too proud to recognize it. I think that it would be to 
our advantage to follow the example of British colonization: that of oppression, since every 
concession will be seen as weakness in their eyes.”815 It was common to question the 
possibility of inculcating French ways of life into the Algerians. One believed that his 
Algerian team members “took what is bad from civilization and left the good”, while 
another complained that the Algerians showed their disrespect by making fun of the French 
in Arabic behind their backs.816 The fact that only educated Algerians, along with sons of 
qaḍis had been chosen could also prove discouraging for the French, as one wondered what 
the rural, uneducated Algerians who would attend future camps would be like given the 
behavior of the “elites”.817 
For all the faults the French youth attributed to the Algerians, they did not accuse 
them of rejecting the values of the National Revolution. Indeed, Pierre Forcy believed that 
they regarded Pétain “as a father and much more so than the French from France.”818 
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Perhaps because the Algerians came from families historically loyal to France, or because 
they understood the possibility of their letters being censored, some wrote about their 
experiences in glowing terms that echoed Vichy propaganda. One participant wrote that 
“Today the Marshal, our great leader turns to us Muslims; he wants us to be at the side of 
the French youth, our comrades, so we can help heal the wounds of our dear France.”819 
Another Algerian wrote to a friend that the experience was “in short, a school of hardiness, 
one that fortifies deficient characters and provides a unifying spirit that awakens feelings 
for the flag and of patriotism that for several years have been done away with by almost all 
the former political movements”.820 Ben Habib appreciated the goals of the camp and 
believed it was working as intended: “When I leave here, I will be a new man, stronger 
than I once was, physically and morally.”821 It is likely that a certain number of Algerians 
bought into the program and sought to make the most out of it. 
The Algerian youth also expressed positive views of the metropolitan French. 
Several wrote that they felt like they had a “second family”, and that the leaders were good 
and fair.822 Said Akli even shared the negative French evaluations by complaining that “all 
the indigènes…are more or less slackers, who will make poor team leaders.”823 Some 
struggled in the camps though. A member of one of the first camps, in Group 103 
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complained about harsh conditions and likened his status to that of a prisoner.824 Mustapha 
Boutaiba wrote to a friend that “You’ve done well not coming to the chantiers with us. It’s 
worse than a penal colony. I regret what I’ve done…We work with shovels and pickaxes 
like convicts.”825 Belkacem Bahloul wrote that “I am almost always sad…I’m always 
thinking about home.”826 Another with clear symptoms of depression was pushed to the 
edge by the experience: “Everyone, all the youth are happy. I alone am sad…I’m alone and 
am going to kill myself. Alas! You will never see me again!”827 
While the participants’ letters from Duperre indicated that the experience was 
mostly a success, other camps for Muslims were less successful. A report on Group 107 
written in January 1943, a few months after the end of Vichy Algeria, judged the overall 
project a failure. While the Duperre camp ran with few problems, the absorption of rural 
Algerians into a camp at Rouina encountered difficulties. The French team leaders 
struggled with Algerians who knew little French, and not enough Algerians had been 
promoted to solve the language problem. Those Algerians who had attended sessions at 
Fort-de-l’Eau were upset that they were so often passed over for leadership positions.828 
                                                 
824 ANOM, Départment d’Oran, 5I/91, F. Chantiers de Jeunesse, N. 3.254, “Camps de Jeunesse-
Opinion sur les chantiers de jeuness”, 10 July 1941. 
825 ANOM, GGA, Algérie, 9H/39, F. Chantiers de jeunesse 1941-1942., “Chantiers de Jeunesse 
107-Défavorable aux Chantiers”, 7 September 1942. 
826 Ibid., N. 7363, “Chantier de Jeunesse N. 107”, 10 September 1942. 
827 Ibid., N. 7990, “Dépression morale chez jeune indigène parlant de suicide”, 2 October 1942. 
828 Ibid., F. Chantiers de jeunesse (musulmans) 1941-1943, “Rapport sur les chantiers 
musulmans algériens de la Jeunesse en Afrique du Nord”, 26 January 1943. 
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CONCLUSION 
The attempt by the French Algerian colonial government to instill the values of the 
National Revolution was largely a failure. Settlers who were glad to see the enemies of the 
Popular Front come to power were nevertheless disappointed that harsher measures were 
not employed against Algerians. Any attempt to alter the status-quo in favor of Algerians 
therefore would still run into massive settler opposition, even if the administrative higher-
ups were long-time rightists. And even when the administration had a free-hand to engage 
in its vision for reform, as with Hardy’s educational plan, a lack of resources and a plethora 
of local obstructions prevented significant progress. 
On the other hand, the regime did find a surprising number of potential Algerian 
mediators among both the traditionally conservative pro-French and reformers. Yet even 
when the latter were willing to walk a certain distance along the path of the National 
Revolution, their pre-war claims for political, social, and religious equality never 
disappeared. As a result, even Algerian discourse favorable to certain Vichy values still 
challenged the racial and exclusionary nature of the French authoritarian turn. Even a 
valued mediator like al-ʿUqbi could not countenance the anti-Semitic policies implemented 
during the Vichy years and made his dissatisfaction known. 
Finally, the attempt to mollify all the Algerian social forces deemed to be moderate 
led Vichy officials to waver between calling for a special regime for Algerian Muslims or 
for establishing greater equality. The ensuing tensions were visible in the regime’s 
treatment of traditional and reformist Muslims, and in its attempt to create new ideological 
organizations that would simultaneously politicize and de-politicize Algerian youth. 
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Regime officials failed to square the circle of elevating Algerians to the level of Europeans 
while leaving them to a special legal and civil status that excluded them from fully equal 
membership in a renovated French Empire. The sporadic and half-hearted efforts to do so 
eventually convinced almost all the regime’s interlocutors that the far-right’s program of 
authoritarian reform was an even bigger failure than that of the Popular Front. While the 
radical fascist Parti Populaire Français had failed to convince Algerians that a complete 
rejection of assimilation was in the best interest of both French and Algerians, the rightists 
of Vichy could not sell their confused vision which ultimately boiled down to a set of 
values, such as religion, order, discipline, and sacrifice, that could easily be appropriated 
by others for different purposes. 
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Conclusion 
Fascist imperialism, true to Carl Schmitt’s belief, was intensly interested in 
particular spaces, spaces laden with races, ethnicities, histories, cultures, and religious 
beliefs. Whereas the Nazis applied a strategy of brute-force in the construction of their 
Eastern Empire, French and Italian fascists sought to manipulate the histories, the 
traditions, and the peoples of the Mediterranean so as to justify the expansion or 
maintenance of their imperial states. Given the internally fractious character of fascism and 
affiliated right-wing movements, the means by which this would be achieved was a 
constant point of contention. The multiplicity of rightist conceptions of the Mediterranean 
ensured that clear friend-enemy distinctions would be difficult to establish outside national 
borders. French and Italian rightists ditched Latin unity for their own national empires, 
European chauvinists clashed with Muslim symphasizers, and metropolitan fascists 
struggled with settler conservatism and racism towards North Africans. Though Schmitt 
believed great political spaces could be unified through a shared culture, the fascists 
encountered tremendous difficulties in enacting such a geopolitical order.  
Yet some strategies of Italian and French fascist imperialism were clear: Muslims 
would supposedly ally with similarly spiritual fascists and authoritarian Catholics against 
capitalist plutocracy and Judeo-Bolshevism. In order to appeal to Islam, fascists were ready 
to support both reformist and traditional Islamic groups so long as neither questioned 
European sovereignty, which would re-assert itself through a new vision of the “civilizing 
mission”; this time stripped of the possibility of assimilation, and intensified by greater 
economic intervention from an authoritarian/totalitarian state. While most Muslims would 
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remain in a modernized countryside, the remaining elites would go through fascist-type 
schooling and integration. The basis for such a view came from the belief that the rebirth 
of Islam was more important to Arabs and Muslims than national sovereignty. Encouraged 
by Orientalists, and inspired by the failure of the French Popular Front to proceed with an 
“assimilationist” policy, fascists chose to downplay Arab nationalism in North Africa (with 
the exception of Egypt) at their peril. 
But as Ernst Jünger predicted, the colonized, far from welcoming a program that 
professed to respect Islam while refusing North African national identities, preferred to 
demand liberal rights and national self-determination. The fascists also had few resources 
to carry out their projects, which greatly limited their promise to bring vast economic and 
social improvements in lieu of political rights. Furthermore, in the case of Italy, the late 
1930s racial policies prevented projects of fascist integration from functioning as they 
adequately did in Italy. As a result, North Africans had few reasons to acquiesce to the 
fascist project, which rested on a fundamental basis of violence, whether real or threatened. 
Algerians rejected the Parti Populaire Français’ platform, just as Tunisians dismissed 
Italian claims to rule their country. Many of those North Africans who embraced or 
sympathized with fascism often did so for their own reasons, and not to participate in the 
fascist imperial structures as second-class citizens. Even a truly fascist North African, the 
Algerian Mohamed el-Maadi, envisioned a larger role for Algerians in the fascist 
geopolitical New Order than any European would likely allow. 
Both the French and Italian visions of a fascist empire crumbled with Axis military 
defeats in World War II. The short-lived experiments had proven to be a failure, but 
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demonstrated the complex ways in which fascists could negotiate transnational and 
imperial spaces in the attempt to build geopolitical “great spaces”. While the grandiose 
ambitions and lackluster results give these efforts an air of absurdity in retrospect, it is 
important to take into account how seriously the project was taken by fascists, and how 
many lives were lost or irreparably damaged, particularly in the Italian case, to forge a 
fascist empire. The experience should also remind us that right-wing movements can 
quickly spill over the borders they are so eager to protect. Once beyond their national 
frontiers in search of new friends and enemies, new futures and pasts, new hierarchies and 
victims, the far-right may yet surprise us again. 
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